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Resumo 
Os mercados de carbono existem para promover a redução de emissões de gases com efeito de 
estufa onde esta é mais custo-eficiente. O preço do bem transaccionável, o carbono (CO2equi-
valente), é, por isso, uma variável chave nas decisões de gestão da produção e do risco nos mer-
cados associados a actividades ligadas à queima de combustíveis fósseis, como a produção de 
electricidade. 
Este trabalho pretende melhorar a análise da dinâmica dos preços de carbono, considerando a 
possibilidade de existência de efeitos multidireccionais entre preços de carbono, da energia (fi-
nal e primária), de licenças de offsets, e a performance da economia, em várias frequências. As 
duas principais perguntas de investigação são: (i) o que orienta os preços de carbono? (ii) em 
que preços as variações são consequência dos preços de carbono? Utilizaram-se duas metodo-
logias complementares: (a) um modelo vector auto-regressivo (de uso comum na macroecono-
mia e mercados financeiros, mas pouco aplicado à relação energia-carbono) que permite a aná-
lise de causalidade e de impulso-resposta de preços diários; e (b) uma inovadora análise multi-
variada de wavelets, que permite perceber a relação e causalidade existente entre as variáveis 
nas dimensões tempo e frequência, nomeadamente em ciclos mais longos (4~8 e 8~20 meses), 
não captada em nenhuma análise prévia. Consideram-se como casos de estudo os mercados de 
carbono Europeu (EU ETS) e da Califórnia (AB32), sendo este o primeiro trabalho de investigação 
a apresentar a análise do mercado americano. A análise abrange o período de 2008 a 2013, e 
excluiu a fase I do EU ETS, para maior consistência da amostra. 
Os resultados obtidos permitem sugerir que a economia e os preços da electricidade orientam 
o preço de carbono Europeu, enquanto na Califórnia o gás e o petróleo têm um papel mais re-
levante, havendo, portanto maior influência dos preços de energia final no mercado mais ma-
duro. Também observamos que o preço das CERs não influencia o preço de carbono Europeu. 
Inversamente, este estudo apresenta pela primeira vez evidências de que os preços do carbono 
têm impactos no preço da electricidade em ciclos mais longos (8~20 meses) e no carvão em 
ciclos curtos, e com duração limitada aos primeiros dias. Sugere, portanto, que o mercado de 
emissões surte efeitos mais significativos em ciclos mais longos. Por fim, o preço de carbono 
Europeu também mostra influências nos preços das CERs. Os resultados obtidos são estatistica-
mente significativos e relevantes, e irão melhorar a qualidade na tomada de decisão das partes 
envolvidas nos mercados de energia e de carbono, poluidores e reguladores. 
 
Palavras-chave: Preços de CO2, modelo VAR, análise multivariada de Wavelets, EU ETS, AB32.   
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Abstract 
Carbon markets’ goal is to promote the reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases where it is 
most cost-efficient. This makes the price of the tradable good – carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) 
- a key variable in management and risk decisions, in markets related to activities connected 
with the burning of fossil fuels, such as power generation. 
This work aims to improve the analysis of carbon prices’ dynamics, considering the possibility of 
multidirectional effects between prices of CO2e, energy (primary and final), offsets licenses and 
the economy performance, in various frequencies. The two main research questions are: (i) what 
drives carbon price variations? (ii) what variations do carbon prices drive? We used two comple-
mentary methodologies: (a) a vector autoregression model (of common use in macroeconomics 
and financial markets but not in carbon-energy relations), which allows the analysis of causality 
and of impulse-response functions of daily prices; and (b) an innovative multivariate wavelet 
analysis, which allows us to understand the relationship and causal link between the variables 
in the time and frequency dimensions, particularly in longer cycles (4~8 and 8~20 months), not 
perceived in previous studies. As case studies we considered the European (EU ETS) and Califor-
nia (AB32) carbon markets. This is the first research to present the analysis of the referred US 
market. The analysis covers the 2008-2013 period, intentionally excluding the EU ETS phase I, 
for greater consistency of results. 
Results suggest that the economy and electricity drive the price of European carbon, while gas 
and oil have a greater role in California. So, there is a greater influence of final energy prices in 
the most mature market. We also observe that the price of CERs does not affect the European 
carbon price. On the other hand, this study shows for the first time that carbon prices have 
impacts on electricity prices over longer cycles (8~20 months) and in coal over short cycles (lim-
ited to the first days). It is suggested that the carbon market has more significant effects in longer 
cycles. The price of European carbon also has impact in CERs prices. The results are statistically 
significant and relevant, and will improve the quality of decision making of all parties involved 
in the energy and carbon markets - polluters and regulators included. 
 
Keywords: Carbon Prices, VAR model, Multivariate wavelet analysis, EU ETS, AB32   
x 
  
xi 
CONTENTS 
Index of Figures ................................................................................................................ xiii 
Index of Tables .................................................................................................................. xv 
Abbreviations .................................................................................................................. xvii 
Variables .......................................................................................................................... xix 
Units ................................................................................................................................ xix 
 
1 Introduction ................................................................................................................. 1 
2 Methodology ............................................................................................................. 13 
2.1 The Vector Autoregression Model (VAR) .............................................................. 13 
2.1.1 Background on VAR models ................................................................................ 13 
2.1.2 Theory of a VAR model ........................................................................................ 15 
2.2 Multivariate Wavelets Analysis ........................................................................... 23 
2.2.1 Background on wavelet analysis ......................................................................... 23 
2.2.2 Theory of multivariate wavelets ......................................................................... 27 
3 Dynamics of Carbon Prices.......................................................................................... 39 
3.1 Introduction ....................................................................................................... 39 
3.2 Part I – Europe: EU ETS ........................................................................................ 47 
3.2.1 EU ETS main features .......................................................................................... 47 
3.2.2 Selected data ....................................................................................................... 49 
3.2.3 VAR analysis ........................................................................................................ 54 
3.2.4 Wavelets analysis ................................................................................................ 64 
3.2.5 EU ETS synthesis of results .................................................................................. 70 
3.3 Part II – California: AB32 ..................................................................................... 73 
3.3.1 AB32 main features ............................................................................................. 73 
3.3.2 Selected data ....................................................................................................... 79 
3.3.3 VAR analysis ........................................................................................................ 83 
3.3.4 Wavelets analysis ................................................................................................ 92 
3.3.5 AB32 synthesis of results..................................................................................... 96 
4 Discussion .................................................................................................................. 99 
5 Final remarks and directions for further research ...................................................... 111 
Bibliography .................................................................................................................... 117 
xii 
Appendix - data output and econometric tests ................................................................. 129 
A European data ...................................................................................................... 129 
A.1 Econometric data tests.......................................................................................... 129 
A.2 VAR Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests ........................................... 130 
A.3 Variance decomposition ........................................................................................ 131 
A.4 VAR output ............................................................................................................ 133 
B California data ...................................................................................................... 140 
B.1 Econometric data tests.......................................................................................... 140 
B.2 VAR Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests ........................................... 141 
B.3 Variance decomposition ........................................................................................ 142 
B.4 VAR output ............................................................................................................ 144 
 
  
xiii 
INDEX OF FIGURES 
Figure 1 : Emission trading schemes around the World ............................................................... 5 
Figure 2 : Sea surface temperatures averaged over the NINO3 area in the eastern Pacific. ..... 23 
Figure 3 : The Fourier transform of a time series ....................................................................... 24 
Figure 4 : Wavelet power spectrum of sea surface temperatures in the eastern Pacific ........... 26 
Figure 5 : The real part of a Morlet wavelet ............................................................................... 31 
Figure 6 : Phase relations between time series x and y .............................................................. 35 
Figure 7 : EU carbon prices, 2008/2013. ..................................................................................... 50 
Figure 8 : EU selected energy prices, 2008/2013. ....................................................................... 52 
Figure 9 : EU prices - Granger causality tests .............................................................................. 55 
Figure 10 : Variance decomposition of carbon and electricity prices - EU ................................. 57 
Figure 11 : CO2 price returns accumulated responses to impulses in other variables - EU ....... 58 
Figure 12 : Impulses in CO2 prices and accumulated responses of selected EU prices .............. 60 
Figure 13 : Other accumulated impulse-response functions of energy prices - EU .................... 62 
Figure 14 : Causality cycles between electricity and gas prices - EU .......................................... 63 
Figure 15 : Other causality cycles: the role of coal – EU ............................................................. 63 
Figure 16 : Other causality cycles: the role of gas - EU ............................................................... 64 
Figure 17 : EU prices - time-series plot and time-series wavelet power spectrum .................... 65 
Figure 18 : EU prices - wavelet coherence and phase-differences ............................................. 67 
Figure 19 : EU prices - partial wavelet coherence and partial phase-differences ...................... 69 
Figure 20: California carbon prices, 2011/2013 .......................................................................... 80 
Figure 21 : California selected energy prices, 2011/2013 ........................................................... 82 
Figure 22 : California prices - Granger causality tests ................................................................. 84 
Figure 23 : Variance decomposition of carbon and electricity prices - CA ................................. 86 
Figure 24 : CO2 price returns accumulated responses to impulses in other variables - CA ....... 87 
Figure 25 : Impulses in CO2 prices and accumulated responses of CA prices. ........................... 90 
Figure 26 : Other accumulated impulse-response functions of energy prices - CA .................... 91 
Figure 27 : Other causality relations of CO2 - CA ......................................................................... 91 
Figure 28 : CA prices - time-series plot and time-series wavelet power spectrum .................... 93 
Figure 29 : CA prices - wavelet coherence and phase-differences ............................................. 94 
Figure 30 : CA prices - partial wavelet coherence and partial phase-differences....................... 96 
 
  
xiv 
  
xv 
INDEX OF TABLES  
Table 1 : Power generation in California, per source and geographic origin .............................. 76 
Table 2 : Outline of obtained significant results of variables relationships with carbon price . 101 
 
 
  
xvi 
  
xvii 
ABBREVIATIONS 
AAU assigned amount unit 
AB32 assembly bill 32 
ACV auto covariance 
AR auto regression 
AR5 assessment report 5 
BBL barrel 
BTU British thermal unit 
CARB California air resources board 
CCA California carbon allowance 
CDM clean development  
mechanism 
CDS clean dark spread 
CER certified emission reduction 
CIF Cost, insurance, freight 
CO2 carbon dioxide 
CO2e CO2 equivalent 
COI cone of influence 
CSS clean spark spread 
CWT continuous wavelet  
transform 
EC European Commission 
EEX European energy exchange 
EF emission factor 
EIA energy information  
administration 
ENSO El Niño southern oscillation 
EPA US environmental protection  
agency 
EU ETS European Union emissions  
trading scheme 
EUA European Union allowance 
GARCH generalized autoregressive 
conditional heteroskedasti-
city 
GDP gross domestic product  
GHG greenhouse gas 
ICE (The) intercontinental exchange 
IPCC intergovernmental panel on  
climate change 
IRF impulse response function 
JI joint implementation 
LR likelihood ratio 
MMBTU million BTU 
MWA multivariate wavelet analysis 
NA2050 North America 2050 
NAS national academies of sciences 
NOX mono-nitrogen oxides 
OLS ordinary least squares 
RAWS remote automated weather 
stations 
RGGI regional greenhouse gas  
initiative 
SO2 sulfur dioxide 
STFT short time Fourier transform 
SVAR structured VAR 
tCO2 tonne of CO2 
UNFCCC united nations framework  
convention on climate change 
VAR vector autoregression 
VMA vector moving average 
WCI western climate initiative 
Wh Watt hour 
Whe Watt hour equivalent 
 
  
xviii 
  
xix 
VARIABLES 
EU ETS (prices) 
  
CO2 1 EUA 
CER 1 CER 
ELE_b baseload electricity price 
1 MWh 
ELE_p peak electricity price 
1 MWh 
Coal 1 tonne coal 
Gas 1 MMBTU 
Econ 
or FTSE 
economy performance index 
1 unit 
AB32 (prices) 
  
CO2 1 CCA 
ELE electricity price 
1 MWh 
Gasoline 1 gallon 
Coal 1 tonne coal 
Gas 1 MMBTU 
Oil 1 USbbl 
Econ economy performance index 
1 unit 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
UNITS 
Symbol Factor 
G Giga  = 109 
M Mega  = 106 
k Kilo  = 103 
  
MM Million = 106 
-- Trillion = 1012 (short scale) 
  
t Tonne = 103 kg  
 = 106 g 
g gram 
  
USbbl US barrel  = 159 litres 
gal 1 gallon  = 3.78541 litres 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
-1- 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Global warming is a circumstance of our time coupled to activity of Humankind. Since the Indus-
trial Revolution, the burning of fossil fuels has escalated, increasing the concentration of green-
house gases (GHG) in the planet’s atmosphere (IPCC 2007). The accumulation of those gases 
creates a greenhouse effect that keeps our planet temperature in an equilibrium. However, 
when GHG concentration is above ideal levels, global temperatures rise, causing changes in the 
Earth’s climate.  
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, UNFCCC (1992), in its article 1, 
n.2, p.3, defines anthropogenic climate change as “a change of climate which is attributed di-
rectly or indirectly to human activity that alters the composition of the global atmosphere and 
which is, in addition to natural climate variability, observed over comparable time periods”. An-
thropogenic climate change has also become known as global warming. To support this defini-
tion, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the scientific body for the UNFCCC, 
gathered research supporting an increase in the average temperature of Earth’s surface by 0.74C 
since the 19th century. If no action is taken, the IPCC forecasts a rise up to 1.4°C to 5.8°C above 
1990 levels, by 2100 (Meehl and al 2007). This unfortunate prediction is recognised by major 
National Science Academies (NAS 2005, AAAS 2009, AGU 2013). 
In its most recent report (Assessment Report 5 – AR5), the IPCC identifies a GHG emissions 
budget1 of 840Gt. This carbon budget would allow the world to have a 50% chance of staying 
below 2ºC of warming by 2100, above 1861-1880 levels (IPCC 2013). Current emission rates are 
at 10GtC per year and about 531GtC has already been used (IPCC 2013). So, without additional 
action, in 30 years the budget will have been used. With this knowledge, effects of global warm-
ing, such as melting glaciers and more frequent extreme weather events, that can already be 
felt in some parts of the globe, are estimated to worsen in the coming decades (EC 2013a). As 
an example, under a high emissions scenario, by 2050 the Arctic Ocean is expected to have no 
ice during the summer (IPCC 2013). In fact, the IPCC states that about 20-30% of plant and animal 
species is likely at higher risk of extinction if the global average temperature goes up by more 
than 1.5 to 2.5°C (IPCC 2007). In short, the IPCC points out consequences such as «agricultural 
yields expected to drop […]; diseases […] could spread to new areas in the world; millions of 
                                                          
 
 
1 Carbon budget: cumulative greenhouse gas emissions over time. 
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people expected to be exposed to increase water stress; more intense weather-related disas-
ters; and extinctions» UNFCCC (2007), p.1. Sectors such as agriculture, energy and tourism, very 
dependent on the level of temperature, precipitation and sea level, will, thus, be particularly 
affected by global warming (EC 2013a).  
It is reasonable to say that climate change will globally have harmful effects on societies and the 
economic and natural systems in which they live. 
In this context, the UNFCCC, created in 1992, has the goal of achieving the «stabilization of 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous an-
thropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-
frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food 
production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable 
manner» (UNFCCC 1992), article 2, p.4.  195 countries ratified this overall global objective, prom-
ising to engage in mitigation actions, that is, actions that reduce net carbon emissions and limit 
long-term climate change (IPCC 2007). An important concept in climate change and carbon eco-
nomics is “mitigation”, the act of decreasing future global warming. 
With the mitigation purpose in mind, Governments have a very important role of engaging pol-
luting companies and the society in reducing their emissions. There are essentially two policy 
instruments that help attain the desired goal: either command-and-control imposed regulations, 
or economic incentive instruments. 
The first option, to enforce emission limits, is rather inflexible and does not provide an incentive 
for emitters to engage in further reductions beyond the imposed limit. Also, imposed regulations 
are known to be less efficient and less cost-effective than other options, for they rely on a pre-
cise definition of the conditions and quantities of emissions, which are uncertain to a certain 
point (Tietenberg and Lewis 2009).  
Alternatively, as economic incentive instruments to control emissions we find taxes and cap-
and-trade, although cap-and-trade includes a command and control feature regarding the pol-
lution limit that must be defined. Both trading and taxes recognize a market failure stemming 
from a negative externality. Atmospheric pollution constitutes a negative externality because 
polluters do not compensate society for the damage they cause. “Climate change is the greatest 
market failure the world has ever seen” (Stern 2006). To address these climate externality costs, 
cap-and-trade bounds a “set amount” of emissions, while taxes work indirectly.  
Emission taxes are defined in the form of a Pigouvian tax where the negative externality is inter-
nalized through a tax equal to the marginal social cost of pollution (Pigou 1924). Under typical 
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theoretical economic system conditions, such as perfect information, rational agents and no 
transaction costs, both tools, taxes and cap-and-trade, should reach a set amount of emission. 
They both put a price on carbon, thus consequently correcting the market failure. However, 
while cap-and-trade provide certainty on emission quantities, taxes, on the other hand, are only 
‘cost’ certain (Helm 2005).  
The idea of a cap-and-trade, or an emission market mechanism, was initially born in a study by 
Coase (1960) regarding property rights. Under certain conditions, by clearly defining property 
rights, and making them exchangeable, the market would give a value to those rights and allo-
cate them to “their best use”, as Tietenberg (2010) poses. After Coase, Crocker (1966) applies 
the concept to air pollution and Dales (1968) to water. Baumol and Oates (1971), p.42, corrob-
orate the idea stating that “for any given vector of final outputs such prices can achieve a spec-
ified reduction in pollution levels at minimum cost to the economy”. Greenhouse gases pollution 
are an example of Baumol and Oates idea, which only applies when all emissions have the same 
impact on the environment. In this case, GHGs have the same impact regardless of the location 
from where they are emitted. 
In emission control policy, preference has been shown for emissions trading over the imposition 
of taxes. The main reason for market-preference is the acknowledgment that generated reve-
nues are automatically distributed to companies in the market, rather than collected by the 
Government (Metz and al 2001), although it should depend on the final use of tax revenues, and 
markets transaction costs. In addition, the argument that the knowledge of abatement costs is 
not complete reinforces the uncertainty in the amounts of emissions reductions that the tax will 
achieve (Smith 2008), referred above as the “quantity certainty” of results.  
On operational issues, emissions trading requires, in the first place, the definition of an overall 
limit on emissions, and the issuance of the equivalent number of permits. Market participants 
will need to hold the number of permits that correspond to their actual emissions. The trading 
of permits is allowed, thus allocating reductions to actions with lower marginal costs, regardless 
of the initial allocation. In this sense, by achieving optimal abatement level at a minimum cost, 
the cost-effectiveness of the system is ensured (Tietenberg 2003).  
First microeconomic computer simulations of a cap-and-trade system for cities emissions were 
designed by Burton and Sanjour, between 1967 and 1970 (Burton and Sanjour 1970, Burton et 
al. 1973), for the National Air Pollution Control Administration (now called the US Environmental 
Protection Agency's Office of Air and Radiation - EPA). The simulation produced several insights 
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on emission markets operation (Burton and Sanjour 1970, Burton et al. 1973). In 1985 Tieten-
berg published a review of an emissions exchange system between plants in a same company, 
which EPA allowed. He shows that the system provided the right incentives for innovation and 
investment in emission control, presenting proof of principle that previously simulated emis-
sions trading is a new policy instrument (Tietenberg 1985). At that time countries were having a 
large problem with “acid rain”, mainly caused by sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides, from fossil 
fuel-burning power plants, especially coal power plants. To deal with this issue, the first “cap-
and-trade” system was conceived by C. Boyden Gray, under the Clean Air Act, as part of the US 
Acid Rain Program (Voß 2007, Calel 2011). Trading of permits between power plants started in 
1995. Assessment studies show that the original limit or ‘cap’ goal was reached in 2007, way 
before the 2010 deadline, and with only one fourth of the initially expected costs (EPA 2007, 
Napolitano et al. 2007). 
Other emissions cap-and-trade examples existed, although small when comparing to the Acid 
Rain Program in terms of participants involved and emissions’ reductions (Ellerman and Harrison 
Jr 2003): the “RECLAIM” program, capping NOX (mono-nitrogen oxides) and SO2 (sulfur dioxide) 
stationary emissions in the Los Angeles Basin, since 1994, and the “Northeast NOX Budget Trad-
ing”, trading NOX, in the Northeastern US since 1999. 
On GHG, the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) was the first market to be im-
plemented, in 2005. It is still by far the largest (EC 2013b), including most energy intensive sec-
tors of the economy, currently with obligations up to 2020. In the USA, the Regional Greenhouse 
Gas Initiative (RGGI) started in 2009, and is a trading system for power generators. Also in the 
USA, the state of California has a cap-and-trade program for GHG emissions that started opera-
tions in early 2012, with mandatory compliance since January 1, 2013. Far from there, in China, 
four towns and a province are under regional emission markets covering power generators. 
Guangdong, the province, is expected to have the second-largest carbon market in the world, 
after the EU ETS, pairwise to the California program. Other markets for GHG exist, in Australia, 
New Zealand, the City of Tokyo, Kazakhstan, Switzerland, and Quebec. Most of these markets 
started in 2012-2013. Another three emission trading schemes are scheduled for launching, and 
15 are considered for implementation, as we may see in Figure 1.  
In summary, in the last 20 years we find good results from the initial studies and simulations, we 
have an “Acid Rain” emissions market that rendered high positive outcomes, and international 
policy preference for cap-and-trade rather than direct regulation or taxes. Also, the EU ETS is in 
its third phase, and other 12 markets are in place. We may say, against this background, that 
carbon markets have become officially implemented in international context. All these markets 
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must be liquid, transparent and efficient, to assure their primary goal of capping GHG emissions 
at the least cost for society. 
 
Figure 1 : Emission trading schemes around the World 
(data source: icapcarbonaction.com) 
 
Under a cap-and-trade system, emission prices are of the utmost importance. They reflect the 
‘price of pollution’, or the marginal cost of abatement, providing actors with ongoing incentives 
for technological changes that reduces emissions. Carbon prices present the equilibrium be-
tween demand and supply of emission permits, and consequently are the mirror of abatement 
decisions. Tietenberg (2010), p.3, recalls that in this scheme, prices are instantly determined, 
avoiding a “long iterative procedure […] through trial and error […] found in tax and standards 
system”. The carbon price also conveys useful information to climate policy, which can thus con-
sciously decide on the overall emissions goal (Aatola et al. 2013b). So, expectedly, a large part 
of studies on carbon markets look at price variations, determinations and effects, as will be re-
ferred in the following chapters. 
Looking in particular to the EU ETS, the reference carbon market because of its age and size, one 
can observe a very evident price decline since the beginning of its operations, in 2005. Since 
2008, prices dropped from a maximum of € 28.73 to 2.7€ /tCO2e, averaging 4.4€/tCO2e in 2013 
(Bluenext and SendeCO2 data). Also, studies have demonstrated the existence of arbitrage op-
portunities between spot and futures contracts (Charles et al. 2013). In fact, Tindale (2013) notes 
 
-6- 
that the exchange of allowances at less than 8 € / tonne is too low to encourage investment in 
energy efficiency or 'low carbon' energy, adding that the system has to be improved to raise 
prices and achieve increased stability. Finally, Löfgren et al. (2013) and Lundgren et al. (2013) 
show the lack of a significant effect on companies decisions to invest in the development of 
mitigation technologies based on low EU ETS carbon prices.  
Nevertheless, the EU ETS continues to be the European Union primary climate change policy 
tool, presenting small, but real net emissions reductions additional to other EU sustainability 
measures (Branger et al. 2013). And so, regardless of price forecasts and criticisms, it is expected 
that the review of the European carbon market, which began in 2013, will establish stronger 
links between commitments to reduce emissions of individual European countries (Egenhofer 
and Alessi 2013), and will achieve some control over the price of carbon (Branger et al. 2013).  
More recently, the European Commission presented the “2030 climate and energy goals for a 
competitive, secure and low-carbon EU economy” (EC 2014) 2. The EC proposal has six key en-
ergy-climate elements, including the reduction in GHG emissions by 40% below the 1990 level 
and the reform of the EU ETS. Regarding changes in the EU ETS, the EC (2014), p.1 “proposes to 
establish a market stability reserve […] that would both address the surplus of emission allow-
ances that has built up in recent years and improve the system's resilience to major shocks by 
automatically adjusting the supply of allowances to be auctioned”. Also, estimates by the leading 
source of information on carbon trading indicate prices between 21€/tCO2e and €96/tCO2e for 
2030 depending on the rate of economic growth (Schjølset, PointCarbon), which translates the 
high uncertainty about the dynamics of the carbon price and its feedback effects on other energy 
variables. In view of the importance that energy prices have on energy and climate issues, and, 
in consequence, on the EU ETS, the EC attaches to the 2014 proposal a “Report on energy prices 
and cost”. 
Of course, GHG emissions and energy use are tangibly related, so, this relation should reveal 
itself in the corresponding exchange markets. Emission market fundamentals previously pre-
sented tell us that the carbon price should reflect the negative pollution externality. Thus, en-
ergy markets should act accordingly in the presence of a pollution production cost, penalizing 
the use of more emitting fuels. Also, changes in more more or less polluting energy prices should 
also be reflected in the carbon price. Many authors have discussed causality between carbon 
and electricity, natural gas and coal prices, and, longer term effects of institutional and policy 
                                                          
 
 
2 Presented to the European Parliament on 22/01/2014. 
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decisions (Asafu-Adjaye 2000, Springer and Varilek 2004, Mansanet-Bataller et al. 2007, 
Milunovich 2007, Alberola et al. 2008, Benz and Truck 2009, Fezzi and Bunn 2009, Mansanet-
Bataller and Soriano 2009, Hintermann 2010, Keppler and Mansanet-Bataller 2010, Chevallier 
2011d, Feng et al. 2011, Conrad et al. 2012, Gorenflo 2012, Sijm et al. 2012, Aatola et al. 2013a, 
b, Byun and Cho 2013, García-Martos et al. 2013, Kopp and Mignone 2013, Liu and Chen 2013, 
Lutz et al. 2013). 
The studies on relations between energy and carbon prices, as typical finance markets research, 
follow econometric methodologies. These approaches allow to quantify relations and, more 
than that, test hypotheses with scientific rigor3. Within the vast econometrics models that exist, 
Granger causality tests (Granger 1969) have been used for interconnection analysis between 
CO2 prices and other variables (Keppler and Mansanet-Bataller 2010, Creti et al. 2012). Although 
it can be repeated on both ways, Granger tests only consider a one-way influence of variables 
in CO2 at each moment, while everything else remains constant. In short, the Granger causality 
test studies the hypothesis of one time series being statistically significant in predicting another. 
We may say that the series ‘A’ Granger-causes ‘B’. However, this approach has limitations mostly 
because the test is designed to handle pairs of variables, problems arising when there is a pos-
sibility of the existence of a ‘C’ series that can move both A and B. And, in fact, the reality in 
carbon-energy analysis is that a feedback effect of price variations is expected (Keppler and 
Mansanet-Bataller 2010).  
The mathematical solution to overcome the pairwise endogeneity issue is to use a vector of 
several endogenous variables as dependent and their lagged values as independent variables. 
In econometrics this is called a vector autoregression model (VAR) which is usually applied to 
analyse and display interdependencies between different interrelated time series. The main fea-
ture of this model is to allow the study of impulse-response functions (IRF) that consider the 
influence of all time series at the same time. In this function, an impulse, or innovation, is given 
to one variable, and responses are analysed in other variables.  
There are recent studies related to carbon markets that use VAR models, but they apply this 
methodology to stock prices of clean energy firms, oil and carbon markets (Kumar et al. 2012), 
                                                          
 
 
3 “Reasoning on economic facts means, and always meant, within a very important sector, quantitative 
reasoning. And there is no logical breach between quantitative reasoning of an elementary character, and 
quantitative reasoning of the kind involving the use of ‘higher mathematics’.” Schumpeter, J. (1933). The 
Common Sense of Econometrics. Econometrica 1(1): 5-12., p.1.  
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to the role of macroeconomic indicators (Chevallier 2011c, Chevallier 2011d) or look at the im-
pacts of changes in electricity prices (Aatola et al. 2013b). However, these studies are not di-
rectly related to carbon versus energy prices. There is also a study by Fezzi and Bunn (2009) that 
studies impulse-responses although exclusively between gas, carbon and electricity, in the UK 
for the first phase of the EU ETS. Finally, Gorenflo (2012) also relies on a VAR model to study the 
lead–lag relationship between spot and futures prices of CO2 emission allowances. Other au-
thors look into volatility issues, mostly through GARCH models (Benz and Truck 2009, Chevallier 
2011b, Arouri et al. 2012, Conrad et al. 2012, Rittler 2012, Byun and Cho 2013, Liu and Chen 
2013, Koch 2014, Reboredo 2014). A more detailed literature analysis on carbon prices is pre-
sented in the introduction of the analysis chapter, section 3.1. 
 
In this study, we propose to go deeply on the analysis of carbon price dynamics. Looking at re-
cent data from two large carbon trading schemes, we aim to analyse the interrelationship of CO2 
prices with the most relevant energy, economy and substitute goods influencing those markets.  
 
 
Scientific contributions, research questions and proposed hypotheses 
 
Therefore, as the first scientific contribution of this work, we specify a dynamic vector auto-
regression (VAR) model to estimate response functions of CO2 prices to impulses in other var-
iables, and vice versa. These impulse-response functions (IRF) allow us to observe the impact of 
CO2 in other variables, in terms of duration, direction and magnitude. 
In complement to the previous model from which we obtain short-term responses, we also 
study longer cycles through wavelet analysis. This is the second scientific contribution of this 
work. This analysis is done simultaneously in the time and frequency domains, in complement 
to the time-domain method that is a VAR. This allow us to see how carbon and energy prices 
behave at different frequencies and how this behaviour changes over time. Since wavelet anal-
ysis provides convenient tools to distinguish relations at particular frequencies and particular 
time horizons, our empirical approach has the potential to identify relations getting stronger 
and then disappearing over specific time intervals and frequencies. With this method, we will 
be able to examine the coherence of carbon and energy price variations, and lead-lag causality 
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relations, at different frequencies for the time period in focus. This is useful longer term infor-
mation that the VAR impulse-response function does not provide. To our knowledge we are the 
first to apply multivariate wavelet analysis, proposed by Aguiar-Conraria and Soares (2014). 
We propose to develop such a study on two carbon markets: the largest and oldest carbon mar-
ket – the European, and the newest and promising Californian carbon market.  
These two approaches will increase the evidence on this subject by providing us with suggestions 
on how much cost variation from emissions should be expected and for how long. It will deliver 
a causality analysis of endogenous variables expected to influence and to be influenced by the 
carbon price, and impact duration and direction of changes in those variables.  
 
Our two main research questions include the identification of carbon price drivers, and effects: 
 
What drives carbon price variations? What variations do carbon prices drive? 
 
Following referred previous studies and carbon market fundamentals we hypothesize a possible 
influence of the economy, of both final and primary energies, and of carbon permits substitutes 
(offset credits) in the carbon price. In the reverse view, we consider that carbon prices mainly 
influence final energy prices, although not discarding the possibility of also influencing gas or 
coal prices. We propose that the influence of energy prices in CO2 prices happens in the very 
short-term. We also propose that the potential impact of carbon prices in final energy prices 
occurs in a one year cycle, or more, if considering primary energies prices. Our methods do not 
impose theoretical assumptions4.  
If we look at different variables, and consider the sectors included in the emission markets, the 
above presented hypotheses can be divided into several research sub-questions. 
 
  
                                                          
 
 
4 With the exception, as we will see, of the Choleski decomposition (section 2.1.2.2).  
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On carbon price drivers: 
 
1. Do final energy prices impact carbon price? 
We hypothesize positive immediate reactions from impacts of electricity and gasoline.  
 
2. Do primary energy prices impact carbon price? 
We expect so, in a very immediate term, and expect a positive relation originating from 
gas prices, and negative from oil and coal. Regarding the existence of substitutes for 
carbon licences, we do not expect a significant effect on the carbon price.  
 
3. Finally, on the macroeconomic perspective, does the level of economic activity trans-
lates into the carbon market?  
Yes, we hypothesize a positive, fast, reaction. 
 
On carbon price effects: 
 
1. Does carbon price influences final energy prices, including electricity and gasoline?  
We hypothesize a positive relation.  
 
2. Does carbon prices influence primary energy prices, including natural gas, coal and oil? 
We hypothesize a negative relation towards coal prices and positive relation regarding 
gas and oil.  
 
3. Does the permit price impact the offset price (CER) in the EU ETS? 
In the EU ETS, CERs, or credits from emission reduction projects (offsets) may be used 
in a limited way as alternative compliance tool to the European Union allowance. We 
expect so and with immediate response.  
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In the context of the economic crisis affecting Europe since 2007, and for the proper start-up of 
the Californian market, it is particularly important to respond to the previous questions, identi-
fying what drives carbon prices and how they do reflect market fundamentals. A detailed study 
of this matter carries valuable results to policy and production decisions. Only with a more com-
prehensive knowledge on carbon price origins and effects, a proper evaluation of the market 
policy effectiveness will be possible and market actors will be able to implement necessary 
measures to obtain the desired outcomes of reducing emissions, moving towards efficiency. 
 
This document follows a very simple structure: in chapter two we describe the econometric the-
ory used in the VAR models and Wavelet analysis. The wavelet section has more detail because 
we use instruments not yet used (e.g. multivariate wavelet analysis). Chapter three character-
izes the European and the Californian markets, data, and results. In chapter four we discuss the 
methodology and comment on policy implications from both models and markets, and finally 
chapter five concludes and proposes directions for further research. 
 
.   
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2 METHODOLOGY 
In this chapter we present the methodological and theoretical framework, essentially from a 
mathematical standpoint.  
First we present the construction of the vector auto-regressive model and finally the deduction 
of the partial multivariate analysis tools is outlined. 
The application of this method to our analysis is justified in the introduction to Chapter 3. At 
that point, after this theoretical background, the interest of this innovative approach to the anal-
ysis of carbon prices will become clear. 
The data and MatLab scripts necessary to replicate all our wavelet analysis results are available 
for download at http://sites.google.com/site/aguiarconraria/joanasoares-wavelets. In the same 
website, the reader can find and freely download a wavelet MatLab toolbox, The ASToolbox, 
written by Maria Joana Soares and Luís Aguiar-Conraria. Regarding the VAR analysis, the Eviews 
data files necessary to replicate all our results are available for download at http://www.rita-
sousa.com. 
 
 
2.1 The Vector Autoregression Model (VAR) 
2.1.1 Background on VAR models 
In time series, a vector autoregression (VAR) model is a natural expansion of the one-variable 
autoregression model (AR). In an AR model the variable depends on its past values, whereas a 
VAR model allows for a vector of several evolving variables. VAR models became famous in Chris-
topher A. Sims’ paper “Macroeconomics and Reality” (Sims 1980).They are linear models with n 
variables, thus n equations, where each variable is explained by its own lagged values and pre-
sent and past values of all other variables. In this section we contextualize the use of VAR models 
and in the next present the VAR theory.  
There is a substantial number of relevant references on VAR time series models (Tiao and Tsay 
1989, Amisano and Giannini 1997, Stock and Watson 2001, Enders 2008, Tsay 2010, Peña et al. 
2011).The following demonstrations are necessarily brief, because the methodology is of stand-
ardized use. 
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The VAR framework delivers an efficient and flexible way to observe the dynamics in multiple 
time series. As Stock and Watson (2001) p.1 pose, the VAR work by Sims, “held out the promise 
of providing a coherent and credible approach to data description, forecasting, structural infer-
ence, and policy analysis”. It has been widely used to analyse economic and financial time series 
and for forecasting. However, the problem of defining causality with several variables is still 
challenging, and institutional knowledge and economic theory must always be considered in the 
analysis of the model results. This is especially important in structural inference and policy anal-
ysis, because it is necessary to impose assumptions regarding the causal structure.  
A central outcome of VAR models is that it allows to estimate the dynamic response of a variable 
to innovations in other variables through a set of impulse-response functions (IRF), after appro-
priate restrictions identification.  
Causality issues are usually analysed following a Granger-causality test (Granger 1969). A varia-
ble x is said to Granger-cause a variable y if, given the past values of y, past values of x are useful 
in forecasting y. VAR models can also be used for testing Granger-causality. Granger causality 
relies on correlation between the current value of one variable and the past values of other, so, 
if we test for joint the significance of the lagged independent variables, we are testing for 
Granger causality. However, it is possible that we find Granger causality in both directions, al-
loying for feedback mechanisms. It is also possible that both variables are driven by a third var-
iable. In this situation it would not be advisable to use a Granger test, because it is designed to 
analyse relation between two variables. It may produce distorted results when considering three 
or more variables (Stern 2011). In alternative, the Wald test, or block exogeneity test, checks for 
variables exogeneity, considering more than two variables, thus, may be applied to VAR models 
with n variables. The null hypothesis in the Wald test is that a set of parameters coefficients is 
equal to a specific value, in our case, zero. If we do not reject H0, then it suggests that the vari-
ables are possibly exogenous.  
In short, the Wald test checks for Granger causality in a VAR model: for each equation and each 
endogenous variable that is not the dependent variable in that equation, we compute Wald tests 
that the coefficients on all the lags of an endogenous variable are jointly zero, and, that each of 
the other endogenous variables does not Granger-cause the dependent variable in that equa-
tion. 
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Specification issues: variables and lags 
To correctly specify a VAR model we need not only to decide on which variables to include, but 
also on the on the number of lags. On this regard, it is possible to rely on information criteria, or 
formal testing. The Akaike (AIC) and Schwarz-Bayesian (SIC) information criteria are the most 
common methods used. However, information criteria are not tests, so they mainly indicate the 
goodness of fit of alternative lag number. The alternative is to use formal testing with the Like-
lihood Ratio (LR)5, which we used in the models presented in sections 3.2.3 and 3.3.3 (VAR anal-
ysis of EU and CA, respectively). 
In what follows we present two VARs representations, which will be one of the workhorses of 
our empirical analyses: the structural (SVAR) and the reduced form (VAR). In the SVAR we follow 
econometric theory by Sims (1980) to define the causality relation between variables in the con-
temporaneous period. The main feature is that Sims uses the Cholesky decomposition of the 
VAR variance-covariance error matrix. Others decomposition methods exist, such as Blanchard 
and Quah (1989), this one more adequate to long-run restrictions. The reduced form VAR, de-
duced from the SVAR, considers a serially uncorrelated error term, where each equation is esti-
mated by ordinary least squares, and allows the estimation of the impulse-response functions.  
 
2.1.2 Theory of a VAR model  
2.1.2.1 VAR Analysis 
As previously introduced, a vector auto-regressive model presents the simultaneous evolution 
of a set of variables. These variables are endogenous, which is saying that they evolve as a func-
tion of all their previous values. They may be represented in a vector 𝑌𝑡, where t is the period 
observed in each of the n variables: 
 
 𝑌𝑡 = [𝑦1𝑡 𝑦2𝑡 … 𝑦𝑛𝑡]
𝑇 (1) 
                                                          
 
 
5 The LR test statistic is: 𝐿𝑅 = (𝑇 − 𝑚)(ln|Σ𝑟| − ln|Σ𝑢|)  ~  𝜒
2(𝑞) with T = number of observations (after 
lags); m = number of estimated parameters in equations of the unrestricted system; |Σ𝑟/𝑢| = determinant 
of the covariance matrix of residuals of the restricted (r) and unrestricted (u) system; q = total number of 
restrictions = number of lags × number of variables2. 
 
-16- 
In this work our time series will include carbon prices, electricity prices, and natural gas prices, 
among others, as presented next in section 2.2.1. 
For simplicity purposes, following Enders (2008), we first show the determination of a two vari-
ables and one lag, or, VAR(1) model. Then, we generalize to a VAR(p) of n variables. 
 
Consider the following model with two variables that depend simultaneously on each other and 
also on their lagged value: 
 
𝑦1𝑡 = 𝑐10 − 𝑏12. 𝑦2𝑡 + 𝑐11. 𝑦1,𝑡−1 + 𝑐12. 𝑦2,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑦1𝑡 
𝑦2𝑡 = 𝑐20 − 𝑏21. 𝑦2𝑡 + 𝑐21. 𝑦1,𝑡−1 + 𝑐22. 𝑦2,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑦2𝑡 
 
Where 𝜀𝑦𝑖𝑡 is an i.i.d. error term with mean zero, with 𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝜀𝑦1 , 𝜀𝑦2) = 0. In matrix form: 
 
[
1 𝑏12
𝑏21 1
] [
𝑦1𝑡
𝑦2𝑡
] = [
𝑐10
𝑐20
] + [
𝑐11 𝑐12
𝑐21 𝑐22
] [
𝑦1,𝑡−1
𝑦2,𝑡−1
] + [
𝜀𝑦1𝑡
𝜀𝑦2𝑡
] 
 
Which can be written more compactly written as: 
 
 𝐵𝑌𝑡 = Γ0 + Γ1𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 (2) 
 
Equation (2) is called the structural VAR (SVAR). 
 
Matrix 𝐵 reports the contemporaneous relations between variables, or, in other words, the ef-
fect that a variable in one moment has in the other in that same moment. So the model allows 
for feedback effect because variables at time ‘t’ may affect each other.  
Unfortunately, equation (2) cannot be estimated directly by ordinary least squares (OLS), as they 
would render inconsistent estimates. 
To avoid this problem, one can pre-multiply all equation by 𝐵−1: 
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𝐵−1𝐵𝑌𝑡 = 𝐵
−1Γ0 + 𝐵
−1Γ1𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝐵
−1𝜀𝑡 
 
Which may be simplified to an unstructured VAR usually called VAR, in standard form: 
 
 𝑌𝑡 = A0 + A1𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑡 (3) 
 
The new error terms 𝑒𝑡 are composites of the 𝜀𝑡 errors, or innovations, from the SVAR.  
Equation (3) delivers the VAR in its reduced form and can be estimated by OLS. Note that the 𝑒𝑡’s 
have zero mean and constant in time independent variances, but their covariances are not zero, 
meaning that although they are serially uncorrelated, they are correlated across equations. I.e., 
the shocks in the model are correlated.  
For clarity, we may represent the result of the 2 variables VAR(1) in the matrix form: 
 
 [
𝑦1𝑡
𝑦2𝑡
] = [
𝑎10
𝑎20
] + [
𝑎11 𝑎12
𝑎21 𝑎22
] [
𝑦1,𝑡−1
𝑦2,𝑡−1
] + [
𝑒1𝑡
𝑒2𝑡
] (4) 
 
Generalizing the model to n variables and p lags, a vector auto-regressive model explains the 
value of all variables included in vector 𝑌𝑡 in current period t with their own values in previous 
periods. It is an auto-regression of the vector of variables in previously determined p lags, also 
called a pth-order VAR. Following equation (2), the SVAR(p) may be written as:  
 
 𝐵𝑌𝑡 = Γ0 + Γ1𝑌𝑡−1 + Γ2𝑌𝑡−2 +⋯+ Γ𝑝𝑌𝑡−𝑝 + 𝜀𝑡       , ∀(𝑡, 𝑝) ∈ ℕ (5) 
 
And then, again, pre-multiplying by 𝐵−1, we obtain the VAR model: 
 
 𝑌𝑡 = A0 + 𝐴1𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝐴2𝑌𝑡−2 +⋯+ 𝐴𝑝𝑌𝑡−𝑝 + 𝑒𝑡         , ∀(𝑡, 𝑝) ∈ ℕ (6) 
 
In equation (6), 𝐴1…𝐴𝑝 represent the matrices of the variables values in each lag.  
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Next, we represent the model in lag polynomials to make it more practical6. We may then rep-
resent equation (5), the SVAR(p), as: 
 
 𝐵𝑌𝑡 = Γ0 + Γ1(𝐿)𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡  (7) 
 
And finally obtain the VAR(p): 
 
 𝑌𝑡 = A0 + A1(𝐿)𝑌𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑡 (8) 
 
Again, equation (8) delivers the VAR in its reduced form and can be estimated by OLS. Once 
more, as in equation (3),  𝑒𝑡’s have zero mean and constant time independent variances, but 
their covariances are not zero, meaning that although they are serially uncorrelated, they are 
correlated across equations. I.e., the shocks in the model are correlated.  
This can easily be illustrated in a VAR(1), 2 variables, example. Recalling the matrix B as repre-
sentative of the contemporaneous effects, and from equation (3) that: 
 
 𝑒𝑡 = 𝐵
−1𝜀𝑡 (9) 
 
From linear algebra analytical inverse matrix determination, we have:  
 
𝐵−1 =
1
|𝐵|
(𝐵∗)𝑇 =
1
1 − 𝑏21𝑏12
[
1 −𝑏12
−𝑏21 1
] 
 
With the adjugate matrix = (𝐵∗)𝑇, or, the transposed cofactor matrix. 
 
Rewriting (9) in matrices: 
                                                          
 
 
6  Lag operator, or backshift operator L: 𝐿𝑌𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡−1  or 𝐿𝑌𝑡+1 = 𝑌𝑡 , then 𝐿
−1𝐿𝑌𝑡 = 𝐿
−1𝑌𝑡−1 ⟺ 𝑌𝑡 =
𝐿−1𝑌𝑡−1, which can be generalized to 𝑌𝑡 = 𝐿
−𝑘𝑌𝑡−𝑘. 
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[
𝑒2𝑡
𝑒1𝑡
] =
1
1 − 𝑏21𝑏12
[
1 −𝑏12
−𝑏21 1
] [
𝜀𝑦1𝑡
𝜀𝑦2𝑡
] 
 
With the solutions: 
 
𝑒1𝑡 =
𝜀𝑦1𝑡 − 𝑏12𝜀𝑦2𝑡
1 − 𝑏21𝑏12
      𝑎𝑛𝑑     𝑒2𝑡 =
𝜀𝑦2𝑡 − 𝑏21𝜀𝑦1𝑡
1 − 𝑏21𝑏12
 
 
Because 𝜀𝑦1𝑡 and 𝜀𝑦2𝑡 are white noise, a stationary time series or a stationary random process 
with zero autocorrelation, then 𝑒1𝑡 and 𝑒2𝑡 have the following moments: 
 
𝐸(𝑒𝑖𝑡) = 0 
 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑒1𝑡) = 𝐸(𝑒𝑖𝑡
2) =
𝐸(𝜀𝑦1𝑡
2 + 𝑏12
2 𝜀𝑦2𝑡
2 )
(1 − 𝑏21𝑏12)
2
=
𝜎𝑦1
2 + 𝑏12
2 𝜎𝑦2
2
(1 − 𝑏21𝑏12)
2
 (10) 
 
We obtain similar results to equation (10) for 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑒2𝑡). 
 
On covariance: 
 
 
𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑒1𝑡, 𝑒2𝑡) = 𝐸(𝑒1𝑡 . 𝑒2𝑡) = 
 
=
𝐸[(𝜀𝑦1𝑡 − 𝑏12𝜀𝑦2𝑡)(𝜀𝑦2𝑡 − 𝑏21𝜀𝑦1𝑡)]
(1 − 𝑏21𝑏12)
2
=
−𝑏21𝜎𝑦1
2 − 𝑏12𝜎𝑦2
2
(1 − 𝑏21𝑏12)
2
≠ 0 
(11) 
 
 
So, the shocks in the SVAR are correlated. The contemporaneous effects reflected in matrix B by 
𝑏12 and 𝑏21 would have to be zero in order to obtain a 0 covariance. 
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2.1.2.2 Cholesky decomposition 
Given the contemporaneous effects presented in B, it is not possible to use OLS to estimate the 
SVAR. To overcome this issue, one has to estimate the VAR in the reduced form. Unfortunately, 
from that estimation it is not possible to recover the structural parameters of interest. To do so, 
one needs to add extra restrictions. 
We follow the methodology proposed by Sims (1980) and rely on the Cholesky decomposition 
to impose short run identification restrictions. The idea is to impose restrictions in the error 
covariance matrix of equation (8) in order to recover matrix 𝐵 of equation (7). These restrictions 
impose contemporaneous effects of zero in a predetermined direction. By a convenient ordering 
the variables, we basically impose that the covariance matrix is lower triangular where the first 
equation does not consider any other innovation rather than its own, the second equation con-
siders the second and the first coming from the addition of the first equation and so on, until 
the last equation that considers them all. In the VAR(1) example, with a Cholesky decomposi-
tion7, B matrix becomes: 
 
𝐵 = [
1 0
𝑏21 1
]    𝑡ℎ𝑢𝑠   𝐵−1 = [
1 0
−𝑏21 1
] 
 
hence VAR(1): 
 
 
[
𝑦1𝑡
𝑦2𝑡
] = 
= [
𝑐10
𝑐20 − 𝑏21𝑐10
] + [
𝑐11 𝑐12
𝑐21 − 𝑏21𝑐11 𝑐22 − 𝑏21𝑐12
] [
𝑦1,𝑡−1
𝑦2,𝑡−1
] + [
𝜀𝑦1𝑡
𝜀𝑦2𝑡 − 𝑏12𝜀𝑦1𝑡
] 
(12) 
 
Comparing equations (4) and (12) we obtain the coefficients of the VAR: 
 
                                                          
 
 
7 Considering a symmetric positive-definite matrix A, a Cholesky decomposition factorizes A into the prod-
uct of a lower matrix (L) times its conjugate transpose (L*):  A=LL*. All symmetric positive-definite matrices 
have a single Cholesky decomposition. 
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𝑎10 = 𝑐10, 𝑎11 = 𝑐11, 𝑎12 = 𝑐12, 𝑒1𝑡 = 𝜀𝑦1𝑡
𝑎20 = 𝑐20 − 𝑏21𝑐10, 𝑎21 = 𝑐21 − 𝑏21𝑐11, 𝑎22 = 𝑐22 − 𝑏21𝑐12, 𝑒2𝑡 = 𝜀𝑦2𝑡 − 𝑏12𝜀𝑦1𝑡
 
It is visible in the previous deduction that results will depend on the chosen variable order of 
impact in the contemporaneous period. In the example, if instead we had considered b21=0, the 
results would have been different. Changing the order does not render significative changes in 
the results when the correlation between errors is small (Enders 2008).  
 
2.1.2.3 Impact multipliers and Impulse Response Functions (IRF) 
An impulse, or an impelling force or motion, is what is assumed to trigger the dynamic response 
of the model. The goal is the analysis of the response, the propagation mechanism, of the vari-
ables in the following time periods. The IRF shows the effect of a particular innovation to variable 
𝑖 (𝜀𝑖,𝑡) on the contemporaneous and future values of all variables. 
The process to define these functions starts with the estimated ‘composite’ 𝑒𝑡 residuals (linear 
combinations of uncorrelated innovations) and from them rebuilds the original innovations 𝜀𝑡. 
The process involves representing the VAR model as a Vector Moving Average (VMA) where 
endogenous variables are defined by 𝑒𝑡 shocks (Sims 1980). The VMA allows tracking the shocks 
effects. To see this, note that equation (8) may be rewritten as:  
 
 𝐴(𝐿)𝑌𝑡 = 𝑒𝑡 (13) 
 
Where, for simplicity, we dropped the constants and 𝐴(𝐿) = (𝐼 − 𝐴1(𝐿)).  
Then, considering the VAR model is invertible, it is possible to write equation (13) as a Vector 
Moving Average of infinite order 𝑉𝑀𝐴(∞): 
 
 𝑌𝑡 = 𝐴
−1(𝐿)𝑒𝑡 = 𝐴
−1(𝐿)𝐵−1𝜀𝑡 = Φ(L)𝜀𝑡 (14) 
 
It should be clear from equation (14), that with a VMA representation, and keeping in mind that 
𝑒𝑡 = 𝐵
−1𝜀𝑡, it is possible to estimate the impulse response function. Given a unit change in in-
novation ‘j’, or impulse, the system reaction to a shock is given by individual reactions of varia-
bles ‘i’, which may be called impact multipliers:  
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𝜕𝑦𝑖,𝑡+𝑠
𝜕𝜀𝑗,𝑡
= Φ𝑖,𝑗(𝑠) (15) 
 
Equation (15) shows the impact effect of a one unit change in 𝜀𝑗, a structural innovation, on 𝑦𝑖, 
in s lags. Impulse response functions (IRF) are the representation of the effects of structural 
innovations on current and future values of considered variables Φ𝑖,𝑗(0),Φ𝑖,𝑗(1), Φ𝑖,𝑗(2), … 
They are the time path of dependent variables. For each n variables model we have n2 IRFs.  
When the system of equations is stationary, the impact also becomes stable after some periods. 
However, if it is not, we may see an explosive time path in the IRF. 
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2.2 Multivariate Wavelets Analysis 
2.2.1 Background on wavelet analysis 
In the previous section, we considered the simultaneous analysis of multiple variables dynami-
cally explained by all of them in past periods. This is a very useful approach if we consider a fixed 
frequency of data, in this case, daily prices. However, in a time series there may exist periodic 
signals which vary in amplitude and frequency over time, and therefore provide additional in-
formation beyond that observed at a fixed frequency. This additional information may or may 
not be captured depending on the methodology used, but one cannot deny the possibility of 
existence of different cycles in the same time series. 
Torrence and Compo (1998) present a very evident example of overlapping temporal infor-
mation at different frequencies: the analysis of sea surface temperature in the equatorial Pacific 
Ocean. The most visible temperature variability, originating from the "El Niño - Southern Oscil-
lation" (ENSO), has irregular cycles of 2 to 7 years. But this variation overlaps other longer fluc-
tuations of decades, which modulate the amplitude and occurrence of the phenomena of El 
Niño, as shown in Figure 2: 
 
Figure 2 : Sea surface temperatures averaged over the NINO3 area in the eastern Pacific. 
Data source: (Torrence and Compo 1998). Black represents the averaged sea surface temperatures of the area 5°S-
5°N, 90°W-150°W. Red shows the running 15-year variance, plotted at mid-point, and mirrored to show "envelope" of 
variance.  
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As the authors show, the simplest method of analysing a non-stationary time series would be to 
analyse differences in statistics such as mean and variance in different periods of time. Accord-
ingly, in Figure 2 the authors also present the evolution of a 15 years variance (red line). One can 
see that ENSO had more variation during 1880-1920 and since 1950, also with a relatively quiet 
period during 1920-1950. For analysis of different effects, it would be convenient to separate 
fluctuations over short vs longer periods.  
However, this approach has two problems. Firstly the choice of the time length for the variance 
calculation sets a priori the shape of the red curve, which is a localization problem in time. The 
longer the time interval considered for variance calculation, the smoother the curve would be. 
In other words, the lower the frequencies, the smoother is the curve, and periodic signals are 
lost. While the reverse, high frequencies, present too many oscillations, and the temporal infor-
mation is lost. Secondly, the successively calculated variance does not hold information about 
the frequency (Torrence and Compo 1998). 
To solve these issues, first it would be necessary to consider a adjustable time-length for calcu-
lating the variance, to solve the problem of localization in time. For the question of the localiza-
tion in frequency, one could use the Fourier transform of time in frequency, sliding it over time, 
and calculating it on each cycle. 
Fourier analysis supports the issue of localization in frequency. Born in the early nineteenth cen-
tury, it is the study of how functions can be approximated by sums of simpler trigonometric 
functions. The Fourier transform is, thus, a mathematical transformation that converts signals 
between the time domain and the frequency domain (Figure 3). The amplitudes of the signals 
originate a frequency spectrum of the original function in the temporal domain. 
 
 
Figure 3 : The Fourier transform of a time series 
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The red curve is a periodical function which can be approximated by a sum of simple sine functions. At the right we 
have the Fourier transform of the original function8. 
 
The main problem with the Fourier transform is that when analysing the information in the fre-
quency domain one loses the temporal information (Bloomfield 2004).  
 
This approach allows to obtain information known as the “power spectrum” of a time series. It 
is also called spectral analysis. It describes how the variance of the data is distributed over the 
frequencies at which the time series can be decomposed. That is, the variance distribution as a 
function of the frequency range. The power spectrum is related to the auto-covariance (ACV), a 
concept more easily recognized to social scientists9. In fact, the power spectrum contains the 
information displayed in the ACV, but in a complementary perspective because the ACV is a 
function of time while the power spectrum is a function of frequency. The power spectrum may 
present new information because data variability may be frequency dependent. 
Spectral analysis has also been used in economics research, such as the study of business cycles, 
of relations between different economic variables, military spending, the governments popular-
ity, among others (Granger 1966, Richards 1992, Gerace 2002, Wen 2005). Yet, despite its use-
fulness, it has the problem of the analysis of temporal information. Moreover, the Fourier power 
spectrum analysis is only useful on stationary time series, not recommended for situations 
where cycles do not have fixed periodicity (Goldstein 1988).  
 
Wavelet analysis attempts to solve the problem of simultaneous localization in time and fre-
quency. It gives information on the amplitude of the cyclic signals, and how this amplitude varies 
with time. It is a useful tool for analysing changes in the variability of data in a time series. It 
                                                          
 
 
8  
(Source: Wikimedia commons – Fourier Transform) The red curve is a periodical function which can be 
approximated by a sum of simple sine functions, plotted in blue in the graphs at the centre. The right-
most curve is the Fourier transform of the original function. 
9 The auto-covariance of 𝑥𝑡 is the covariance of x over a time-shifted value. Considering 𝐸[𝑥𝑡] = 𝜇𝑡, then 
the auto-covariance is 𝐴𝐶𝑉𝑥𝑥(𝑡, 𝑠) = 𝐸[(𝑥𝑡 − 𝜇𝑡)(𝑥𝑠 − 𝜇𝑠)]. 
 
-26- 
allows to decompose a time series in the time-frequency space and makes it possible to analyse 
what are the main existing cycles and how these cycles are modified over time. 
The theory of wavelets was developed in the 1980s and since then it has been used in various 
fields, including physics, geophysics, oceanography, signal processing, harmonic analysis, and 
scientific computation. Studies include the study of tropical convection, the El Niño - Southern 
Oscillation, atmospheric cold fronts, the dispersion of ocean waves, wave growth and breaking 
and coherent structures in turbulent flows (Torrence and Compo 1998), among many others. 
Following the previous example of Figure 2, of sea surface temperatures, below in Figure 4, we 
present the respective wavelet power spectrum. In following pages, we will show how wavelet 
transforms are obtained and how their tools, such as the power spectrum, are applied. 
 
 
Figure 4 : Wavelet power spectrum of sea surface temperatures in the eastern Pacific 
Data source: (Torrence and Compo 1998). Wavelet power spectrum of Figure 2. Black contours represent 10% signifi-
cance regions. Red areas indicate high El Niño activity. 
 
Specifically in economics, Crowley (2007) develops a guide for wavelet use and others apply 
these tools to various issues, including the decomposition of economic relationships of expendi-
ture and income (Ramsey and Lampart 1998a, b), to exchange rates (Gençay et al. 2001a, Wong 
et al. 2003), monetary policy (Aguiar-Conraria et al. 2008, Rua 2012), Phillips curve (Gallegati et 
al. 2011), business cycles (Baubeau and Cazelles 2009, Aguiar-Conraria and Soares 2011a, 
Caraiani 2012), stock markets (Gençay et al. 2001b, Fernandez 2005, Gençay et al. 2005, 
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Gallegati 2008, Rua and Nunes 2009, Alvarez-Ramirez et al. 2012, Fernández-Macho 2012), and 
also commodities prices (Connor and Rossiter 2005) and energy commodities and oil prices 
(Aguiar-Conraria and Soares 2011b, Jammazi 2012, Vacha and Barunik 2012, Reboredo and 
Rivera-Castro 2014). 
However, all these approaches consider one, or two at most, dependent variables. Therefore, 
they exclude the possibility of examining other effects that may be included in the study, via 
third variables. With the development of multivariate analysis by Aguiar-Conraria and Soares 
(2014) it is now possible to analyse the relationship of one time series with many others, con-
trolling for the effects of each of them, and then getting information on the interdependence 
between variables. 
To our knowledge, this is the firstly known application of multivariate analysis. We consider it to 
be most valuable to our study because of the existence of inter-relationships and known feed-
back effects between energy and carbon prices. 
In the following sections, we provide the theoretical framework of the wavelet multivariate anal-
ysis tools. 
 
2.2.2 Theory of multivariate wavelets 
In this section we start by reviewing the Fourier and the Gabor transforms. After, we define the 
continuous wavelet transform and present the three wavelet tools used: 
 The wavelet power spectrum, which describes the evolution of the variance of a time-
series at the different frequencies, with periods of large variance associated with peri-
ods of large power at the different scales,  
 The cross-wavelet power of two time-series, which describes the local covariance be-
tween the time-series, and the wavelet coherence, which can be interpreted as a local-
ized correlation coefficient in the time frequency space, and  
 The phase, which can be viewed as the position in the cycle of the time-series as a func-
tion of frequency, and the phase-difference, which gives us information on the delay, or 
synchronization, between oscillations of the two time-series.  
The previous tools are standard but important for the introduction of the concepts of partial and 
multiple wavelet analysis, given later in this section. 
 
 
-28- 
2.2.2.1 The Fourier and the Gabor transforms 
As mentioned, Fourier analysis gives us the possibility to represent any function as an approxi-
mation of sums of sines and cosines. The Fourier transform (indicated by ^) of the time series 
𝑥(𝑡) is a function of the angular frequency 𝜔, given by the following equation: 
 
 𝑥(𝜔) = ∫𝑥(𝑡) (cos(𝜔𝑡) − 𝑖 sin(𝜔𝑡) ) 𝑑𝑡 (16) 
 
Note: for simplicity reasons we consider all integrals in MWA sections to be ∫ .
+∞
−∞
 
 
The angular frequency 𝜔 is related to the 'ordinary' or temporal frequency 𝑓 by the relationship 
𝑓 =
𝜔
2𝜋
. This frequency corresponds to the number of repeated occurrences of an event per unit 
of time. The period corresponds to the duration of this event. 
 
As equation 16 above shows, in the Fourier transform, the information on time (t) is lost. An 
approach that initially aims to overcome this problem, and include t, is known as the Short Time 
Fourier Transform (STFT). This selects a 'window-function' 𝑔, defined in time , which allows to 
locate, in t, the Fourier transform. A window is a function well localized in time, i.e. a function 
with very fast decay in time, taking negligible or zero values outside a given range. Accordingly, 
when multiplying any function by a window, the product value will also be almost zero outside 
this window. The function to be transformed is thus multiplied by this 'window', only becoming 
visible in the part where the functions overlap. 
Gabor (1946), in his transform, used a Gaussian10 as a window function, so this particular case 
becomes known as the Gabor transform. Gabor considers the Gaussian function as one that 
offers the best trade-off between resolution in time and frequency.  
As this Gaussian window is shifted, their Fourier transforms are then computed. Thus, the Gabor 
transform 𝐺 is a function of two parameters: the frequency 𝜔, and the time shift (or translation) 
                                                          
 
 
10 A Gaussian function is of the form 𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑎𝑒
(−
(𝑥−𝑏)2
2𝑐2
)
+ 𝑑, {𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑐, 𝑑} ∈ ℝ. 
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parameter 𝜏. 𝐺(𝜏, 𝜔), is defined in equation 17, as a Fourier transform of 𝑥(𝑡)𝑔(𝑡 − 𝜏), a func-
tion representing the magnitude and phase of the signal in time and frequency. 
 𝐺(𝜏, 𝜔) = ∫𝑥(𝑡)𝑔(𝑡 − 𝜏) (cos(𝜔𝑡) − 𝑖 sin(𝜔𝑡) ) 𝑑𝑡 (17) 
 
A representation of the function x(t) in time and frequency is thus obtained. 
 
However, the immediate problem that arises with the Gabor transform is that it provides a fixed 
time-frequency resolution, since 𝑔 is a fixed window with a fixed size. Morlet, along with Goupil-
laud and Grossmann, developed the work of Gabor, modifying it to what came to be the first 
formalization of the continuous wavelet transform (Goupillaud et al. 1984). 
 
2.2.2.2 The continuous wavelet transform 
In this transform, wavelets are used as window functions. For a function 𝜓(𝑡) to qualify for being 
a ‘mother wavelet’ the minimum requirements are that 𝜓 is a square integrable function11 and 
fulfils an admissibility condition. The admissibility condition is a technical condition which justi-
fies the ‘wavelet’ name because it makes 𝜓 an oscillatory function (Farge 1992).  
Considering ?̂?(𝜔) the Fourier transform of 𝜓(t), the admissibility condition requires that: 
 
 ∫
|?̂?(𝜔)|
2
|𝜔|
𝑑𝜔 < +∞ (18) 
 
Equation 18 implies that the Fourier transform of the wavelet vanishes at the zero frequency. It 
is possible to show that a zero value of the Fourier transform at zero frequency also means that 
the wavelet’s expected value in the time-domain is zero: ∫𝜓(𝑡)𝑑𝑡 = 0 . This makes it an oscil-
latory function, behaving like a wave. 
The 'mother wavelet' 𝜓(𝑡), oscillatory, represents all possible dilations by a scaling/compressing 
𝑠 factor and translations in time by a 𝜏 factor.  
                                                          
 
 
11  A function for which the integral of the square of the absolute value is finite, thus satisfying 
∫ |𝜓(t) |2𝑑𝑡
∞
−∞
< ∞. This integral is known as the energy of 𝜓, and equal to its square norm = ‖𝜓(t) ‖2.  
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The 'child wavelets' 𝜓𝜏,𝑠(𝑡) are, thus, obtained by scaling and translating 𝜓(𝑡), which makes 
them functions of time and frequency localizations given by the following equation 1912: 
 
 𝜓𝜏,𝑠(𝑡) =
1
√|𝑠|
𝜓 (
𝑡 − 𝜏
𝑠
) ,       𝑠, 𝜏 ∈ ℝ, 𝑠 ≠ 0 (19) 
 
 
So, 𝑠 controls the width of the wavelet, and 𝜏 controls the localization (in time) of the wavelet. 
Scaling a wavelet simply means stretching it, if |s|>1, or compressing it, if |s|<1, while translat-
ing it simply means shifting its place in time. 
 
The analysis of the wavelet transform we use is known as the continuous wavelet transform 
(CWT). Given a time-series 𝑥(𝑡), its CWT with respect to the wavelet 𝜓𝑠,𝜏(𝑡) is a function of two 
variables 𝑊𝑥(𝜏, 𝑠): 
 
 𝑊𝑥(𝜏, 𝑠) =  ∫ 𝑥(𝑡)𝜓𝑠,𝜏
∗ (𝑡) 𝑑𝑡 (20) 
 
* means complex conjugation. 
Equation 20 shows how the time series 𝑥(𝑡) is decomposed into a set of functions 𝜓𝑠,𝜏(𝑡), the 
wavelets. 
The square integrable requirement mentioned previously as a property of 𝜓(𝑡), exists to guar-
antee that the integral on equation 20 converges, i.e., so that the scalar product of the wavelet 
function with the time series exists. Also, the admissibility condition is imposed to guarantee 
that the original function can be reconstructed from its CWT. 
In summary, the continuous wavelet transform is used to separate a time-varying function in 
wavelets. Note that the wavelet function itself is not yet defined. Under wavelet properties, 
there are many types of wavelet functions, adaptable to different interests. Further bellow in 
section 2.2.2.3 we will focus on a particular one, the Morlet wavelet, useful to our work. 
                                                          
 
 
12  
1
√|𝑠|
 is the energy normalization factor, introduced to guarantee preservation of the unit energy, 
‖𝜓𝜏,𝑠‖ = 1. 
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2.2.2.3 The Morlet wavelet: optimal joint time-frequency concentration 
There are different types of wavelets that can be used depending on the research goals. Wavelet 
functions are subdivided into discrete and continuous, and the latter may be real or complex 
functions. Examples of discrete wavelets include the Daubechies, Haar, ..., and continuous wave-
lets are, for example, the Mexican hat (real) or the Morlet (complex) amongst many others. 
In our study, we use the Morlet wavelet function, consisting of a modulated Gaussian, or in other 
words, a complex exponential function multiplied by a Gaussian window. It was first introduced 
in Goupillaud et al. (1984). The Morlet 'mother wavelet' is defined by equation 21: 
 
 𝜓𝜔0  (𝑡) = 𝜋
−(
1
4
)
𝑒𝑖𝜔0𝑡𝑒
−(
𝑡2
2
)
 (21) 
 
We illustrate the real part of a Morlet wavelet in the following Figure 5, given by the product of 
a cosine function by a Gaussian. 
 
 
Figure 5 : The real part of a Morlet wavelet 
The function on the right represents the real part of a Morlet wavelet, and results from the product of a cosine function 
(function on the left) by a Gaussian (function in the middle). 
 
Strictly speaking, the Morlet wavelet is not a true wavelet because it does not fulfil the admissi-
bility condition. However, for a large enough 𝜔0 (>5.5), the Morlet wavelet may be interpreted 
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as such, for the errors due to non-zero mean are smaller than the typical computer round-off 
errors (Farge 1992)13. 
For our applications, it is essential to choose a complex wavelet, as it yields a complex transform, 
with information on both the amplitude and phase, crucial to study the cycles synchronism be-
tween different time-series. With real functions, there is no access to the phase information, 
available in the imaginary component. 
 
It is also important to note an inverse relationship between 𝑓 (which is a unit easier to visualize) 
and 𝜔 , i.e when it a function is expanded in the time domain it is also contracting in the fre-
quencies space. This relationship is general and comes from the transform properties.  
For the particular choice 𝜔0 = 6 we have 𝑓 =
𝜔0
2𝜋𝑠
=
6
2𝜋𝑠
≈
1
𝑠
. With this 𝜔0, there is a very simple 
one-to-one relation between scale and frequency and we can use both terms interchangeably. 
This makes the interpretation of results more perceptible, especially in social sciences where it 
is more common to think of frequencies rather than on scales. 
 
The Morlet wavelet has an important property: it has optimal joint time-frequency concentra-
tion. The Heisenberg principle says that one cannot be simultaneously precise in the time and 
the frequency domain. Theoretically, the time-frequency resolution of the continuous wavelet 
transform is bounded by the so called Heisenberg box. A "Heisenberg box" is located in the time-
frequency plane: a rectangle with a time width and a frequency height. It represents a time-
frequency localization. The area of the Heisenberg box describes the trade-off relationship be-
tween time and frequency and is minimized with the choice of the Morlet wavelet, since it is, in 
its essence, a Gaussian. 
 
                                                          
 
 
13 The scale refers to the width of the wavelet, so as it increases, the wavelet extends including more time 
information, rather than greater detail. So, a low scale wavelet is a compressed wavelet, showing rapidly 
changing details, and thus corresponds to a high frequency ω. Inversely, a high scale wavelet is stretched 
and is associated with a low frequency ω. In the Morlet wavelet the scale is the distance between the 
oscillations. The period, or inverse frequency, is the approximate to the Fourier period, which corresponds 
to oscillations within the wavelets. 
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2.2.2.4 Wavelet power spectrum and phase 
As already mentioned, the power spectrum of a time series describes how the variance of the 
data is distributed over the frequencies at which the time series can be decomposed. It is the 
power distribution, obtained by the wavelet coefficients 𝜏, 𝑠, and is defined in equation 22 as 
the square of absolute-value of the wavelet coefficients, or the squared amplitude: 
 
 (𝑊𝑃𝑆)𝑥(𝜏, 𝑠) = |𝑊𝑥(𝜏, 𝑠)|
2  (22) 
 
This gives us a measure of the variance distribution of the time-series in the time-scale (or fre-
quency) plane. This is usually represented in three axis: time (x), frequency (y) the frequency 
and amplitude over time (z). Typically, the charts show this third dimension through warm vs 
cold colours (red: high power, thus high volatility; and blue: low power, thus low volatility). 
 
Wavelet phase 
A complex wavelet function provides information about both the amplitude and the phase, 
which makes it more suitable to capture oscillatory behaviour. The Morlet wavelet considered 
is complex and therefore its CWT is also complex-valued. So, 𝑊𝑥(𝜏, 𝑠) can be separated into its 
real part, ℜ(𝑊𝑥), and imaginary part, ℑ(𝑊𝑥), or in its amplitude, |𝑊𝑥(𝜏, 𝑠)|, and phase angle 
𝜙𝑥(𝜏, 𝑠). The phase angle is given by equation 23: 
 
 𝜙𝑥(𝜏, 𝑠) = arctan(
ℑ(𝑊𝑥(𝜏, 𝑠))
ℜ(𝑊𝑥(𝜏, 𝑠))
) (23) 
 
With arctan denoting the extension of the usual principal component of the arctan function to four quadrants. 
 
For real-valued wavelet functions, the imaginary part is zero and the phase is undefined 
(Torrence and Compo 1998). Therefore, to separate the phase and amplitude information of a 
time-series, it is necessary to use complex wavelets. The information on phase will be useful for 
the bivariate and multivariate analysis, when comparing two or more time series, thus allowing 
to observe if the series are in phase or out-of-phase. 
 
 
-34- 
2.2.2.5 Bivariate analysis with wavelets 
In our study and many other applications, we are interested in detecting and quantifying rela-
tionships between two and more non-stationary time series. 
The Fourier analysis also provides a useful analysis of relations in frequencies between time se-
ries. However, once again the independence of the temporal dimension in Fourier analysis does 
not allow a fruitful application of ‘cross spectrum’ concept to nonstationary series considered in 
this and other studies. CWT allows for an adaptation of concepts through the cross-wavelet 
power, cross-wavelet coherence and the wavelet phase-difference which enable us to deal with 
the time-frequency dependencies between two time-series. 
 
Cross-wavelet transform and power 
The cross-wavelet transform of time-series 𝑥(𝑡) and 𝑦(𝑡),  𝑊𝑥𝑦(𝜏, 𝑠), is given by: 
 
 𝑊𝑥𝑦(𝜏, 𝑠) = 𝑊𝑥(𝜏, 𝑠)𝑊𝑦
∗(𝜏, 𝑠) (24) 
 
The cross-wavelet power is simply given by |𝑊𝑥𝑦(𝜏, 𝑠)|, showing the resemblance between each 
series power spectrum. 
 
Phase-difference and wavelet coherence between series 
For the analysis of the phase difference between different series, it is necessary to acknowledge 
the concept of wavelet coherence, in line with a similar concept used in Fourier analysis. Con-
sidering time series 𝑥(𝑡) and 𝑦(𝑡) it is possible to define their complex wavelet coherence, 𝜚𝑥𝑦: 
 
 𝜚𝑥𝑦(𝜏, 𝑠) =
𝑆 (𝑊𝑥𝑦(𝜏, 𝑠))
√𝑆(|𝑊𝑥𝑥(𝜏, 𝑠)|)𝑆(|𝑊𝑦𝑦(𝜏, 𝑠)|)
 (25) 
 
𝑆 is a smoothing operator in both time and scale. As in the Fourier case, smoothing is necessary, 
for otherwise the modulus of the coherence would be identically one.  
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The wavelet coherence, denoted by 𝑅𝑥𝑦,  is the absolute value of the complex wavelet coher-
ence 𝜚𝑥𝑦(𝜏, 𝑠), presented in equation (26). 
 
 
𝑅𝑥𝑦(𝜏, 𝑠) =
𝑆(|𝑊𝑥𝑦(𝜏, 𝑠)|)
√𝑆(|𝑊𝑥𝑥(𝜏, 𝑠)|)𝑆(|𝑊𝑦𝑦(𝜏, 𝑠)|)
 
(26) 
 
The graphical representation of the wavelet coherence, 𝑅𝑥𝑦(𝜏, 𝑠), at three dimensions, in line 
with the wavelet power spectrum, offers us a similar concept to the correlation between time 
series, but now also in the frequency domain. 
 
The delays of the oscillations of the two series as a function of time and scale (frequency) may 
be obtained by the phase difference, 𝜙𝑥,𝑦(𝜏, 𝑠), which is the angle of the complex wavelet co-
herence, 𝜚𝑥𝑦, defined in equation (27). 
 
 𝜙𝑥,𝑦(𝜏, 𝑠) = arctan(
ℑ(𝑊𝑥𝑦(𝜏, 𝑠))
ℜ (𝑊𝑥𝑦(𝜏, 𝑠))
) (27) 
 
 
Since 𝜚𝑥𝑦 is a smoothed version of 𝑊𝑥𝑦 = 𝑊𝑥𝑊𝑦
∗, 𝜙𝑥,𝑦 is very similar to 𝜙𝑥 − 𝜙𝑦. 
 
 
Figure 6 : Phase relations between time series x and y 
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(Grey quadrants: out-of-phase relation, white quadrants: in-phase relation; dotted quadrants: CO2 leading, clear 
quadrants: CO2 following.) 
 
A phase-difference of zero indicates that the time series move in-phase at the specified fre-
quency. On the contrary, anti-phase, at 𝜋 (or −𝜋) means that the move in opposite directions. 
The time-series x is leading y when 𝜙𝑥𝑦 ∈ (0,
𝜋
2
) and 𝜙𝑥𝑦 ∈ (−𝜋, −
𝜋
2
), while y is leading x for 
𝜙𝑥𝑦 ∈ (
𝜋
2
, 𝜋) and 𝜙𝑥𝑦 ∈ (−
𝜋
2
, 0). 
 
2.2.2.6 Multivariate analysis with wavelets 
In the study of time series, including carbon and energy prices on which we focus in this work, 
it is necessary to consider the influence of one series in others. When working with more than 
two series, it makes sense to consider multiple and partial wavelet coherences. In this sense, it 
is possible to mirror the multivariate linear regression analysis to the multivariate study of the 
frequency spectrum (Priestley 1982). The concept of partial coherence exists when analysing the 
coherence between two variables, controlling for other variables. If this coherence decreases 
when controlling for other variables, then it can be considered that the coherence was due to 
the role of excluded variables. 
The concepts of multiple and partial coherence developed by Aguiar-Conraria and Soares (2014) 
are generalizations for time-frequency of the corresponding concepts of multiple and partial 
correlation, in 'time', and the Fourier coherences, in 'frequency’. 
 
Suppose we have three series x, y, z, we consider 𝜚𝑥𝑦.𝑧(𝜏, 𝑠) the complex partial wavelet coher-
ence of x and y, after controlling for z. We have: 
 
 𝜚𝑥𝑦.𝑧(𝜏, 𝑠) =
(
 
𝜚𝑥𝑦 − 𝜚𝑥𝑧𝜚𝑦𝑧
∗
√(1 − 𝑅𝑥𝑧
2 )(1 − 𝑅𝑦𝑧
2 )
)
  (28) 
 
 
The partial wavelet coherence 𝑟𝑥𝑦.𝑧(𝜏, 𝑠) is the absolute value of 𝜚𝑥𝑦.𝑧(𝜏, 𝑠): 
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 𝑟𝑥𝑦.𝑧(𝜏, 𝑠) = |𝜚𝑥𝑦.𝑧(𝜏, 𝑠)| (29) 
 
Having defined the complex partial wavelet coherence 𝜚𝑥𝑦.𝑧 between the series x and the series 
y, after removing the influence of z, the partial phase-difference of x over y, given z, is the angle 
of 𝜚𝑥𝑦.𝑧. We denote this phase-difference by 𝜙𝑥𝑦.𝑧 and define it in equation (30). 
 
 𝜙𝑥𝑦.𝑧(𝜏, 𝑠) = arctan(
ℑ(𝜚𝑥𝑦.𝑧(𝜏, 𝑠))
ℜ(𝜚𝑥𝑦.𝑧(𝜏, 𝑠))
) (30) 
 
2.2.2.7 Cone of influence and statistical significance 
The Fourier transform assumes that the data is cyclic. In this sense, when analysing finite time 
series inevitable errors appear at the beginning and end of the wavelet power spectrum, called 
edge effects. A solution is to fill in the time series with zeroes before the transform and then 
remove them, as proposed by Torrence and Compo (1998). Additionally, larger scale represents 
a wavelet of greater length and therefore requires more zeroes to be added, which results in 
higher edge-effects. The cone-of-influence (COI) is, therefore, the region of the wavelet spec-
trum in which those effects exist, requiring a more careful interpretation. 
For significance tests of the CWT, and considering that there are no duration issues for calculat-
ing, we fit an ARMA model to the series and construct new samples by drawing errors from a 
Gaussian distribution with a variance equal to that of the estimated error terms. For each time-
series, or set, we perform the exercise 2000 times and extract critical values at 5% and 10% 
significance. However, following Ge (2008) we do not use significance testing for the phase dif-
ference. Alternatively, we only consider the phase information of the corresponding significant 
areas in the coherence analysis. 
There are some theoretical distributions that could, alternatively, be used for significance testing 
for the wavelet power spectrum --- e.g. see Torrence and Compo (1998) concluded that the 
wavelet power spectrum of an AR(0) or AR(1) process is reasonably well approximated by a chi-
squared distribution. Ge (2008), Cohen and Walden (2010) and Sheppard et al. (2012) have some 
important theoretical results on significance testing for the wavelet coherence. To our 
knowledge, no work has been done on significance testing for the partial coherence. However, 
the method of Sheppard et al. (2012) may probably be extended for this case. 
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3 DYNAMICS OF CARBON PRICES 
3.1 Introduction 
In an emissions cap-and-trade system, prices are the signal that guide the polluting companies’ 
investments towards the use of cleaner fuels and energy efficiency. 
Since the moment there is an obligation to comply with an emissions’ limit, and trading is al-
lowed, polluters need to have fast information of GHG pollution costs. Carbon prices are, thus, 
of major relevance to them. Besides, they are also required data for regulators to study and 
analyse the emissions market efficiency. This is visible in the theoretical analyses about the mar-
ket’s effectiveness and operational aspects that emerged even before the start of the European 
carbon market - EU ETS, (Hauch 2003, Huntington and Weyant 2004, Christiansen et al. 2005, 
Linares et al. 2006, Sijm et al. 2006, Smale et al. 2006). After, Zhang and Wei (2010) formalize 
the need for empirical studies of the EU ETS, regarding its operating mechanisms and economic 
effects. On mechanisms, price formation takes special concern, and the authors note it as nec-
essary to the dynamic analysis of energy and carbon markets. Chevallier (2011a) complemented 
this work by reviewing the existing literature so far. 
With the implementation of carbon markets, industries covered by the GHG market, such as 
electricity production, petroleum refining, glass, ceramics, and other energy intensive industries 
are the ones that need to understand carbon price variations, on a daily basis. For them, the 
carbon price is now necessary information to manage their portfolio optimization, production 
costs, and risk management in investment decisions (Roques et al. 2008, Fuss and Szolgayová 
2010, Tolis and Rentizelas 2011). With the development of the market and higher liquidity levels, 
the consideration of the carbon price on those polluters’ production decisions should increas-
ingly be transmitted to their product prices. The importance of the information flow between 
energy markets and carbon markets is present in the research questions initially presented in 
this study. There, we state the expected influence of carbon prices in the prices of final and 
primary energies, and vice versa. 
Under emissions limits, the power sector is the one that allows a more complete and meaningful 
analysis of the causes and effects of cap-and-trade. So, we now provide a brief description of 
this sector’s features, relevant to our study. 
In Europe, the power market is responsible for about one-third of GHG emissions from the com-
bustion of fossil fuels, and so its facilities are naturally included in the carbon market. In this 
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context, the more mature and liquid the carbon market is, the more the price of electricity 
should consider the price of emission allowances. The same is expected to happen in the near 
future with the recent California market, where electricity production is responsible for 19% of 
emissions, including electricity imports, by energy source. In this sense, cost pass-through anal-
yses have been made by Sijm et al. (2006), Zachmann and von Hirschhausen (2008), Sijm et al. 
(2012) and Jouvet and Solier (2013), concluding that there is information passing from carbon 
to electricity prices. 
Another important feature is that the electric power supply is characterized by having to re-
spond to different amounts of demand depending on the time of day, and by the impossibility 
of storage. This situation requires a decision on the use of producing plants known as the 'dis-
patch order', which corresponds to the decision about which plants to put in operation and 
when. The dispatch order varies for baseload generation, and peak-load generation. The base-
load is the power demand quantity that has to be constantly provided. The peak corresponds to 
the hours of the day that need a greater generation effort (usually during the afternoon and 
early evening). Baseload powerplants are those that produce energy at a constant rate because 
they are not flexible to adapt output quantities, or, have higher shutdown and start-up costs. 
Usually they include nuclear and coal, which require hours, or days in the case of nuclear, to 
adjust the quantities produced. There are some renewables that can also support baseload sup-
ply, such as biomass, geothermal, or a small amount of hydropower. Power plants that quickly 
start operating are allocated to peak production such as gas or hydro power plants.  
However, the management of gas and coal use is carefully attended by electrical producers, 
because of the difference in plants operation costs, in fuel prices, and now also because of car-
bon prices. In response to electrical producers need for indicators, the 'clean' spreads appear 
associated with indicators for coal or gas use in electricity generation: the Clean Spark Spread 
(CSS) and the Clean Dark Spread (CDS). The spreads refer to electricity sales margins over pri-
mary energy and correspondent allowances costs14. Through the CDS and the CSS it is easy to 
establish a switching carbon price, which indicates when switching between electricity genera-
tion from coal (cheaper, but more polluting) to gas (more expensive but less polluting) becomes 
advantageous. It is the carbon price that equals the CSS to the CDS, considering everything else 
                                                          
 
 
14 In electricity generation, coal is in proportion more polluting than natural gas (400 gCO2/kWh with coal 
vs 780 gCO2/kWh with gas) (IEA 2012).The CSS is the margin that a producer gets from the sale of elec-
tricity, having bought their needed units of gas and carbon allowances. The CDS is a similar measure, but 
for the production of electricity with coal. 
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constant (rate of efficiency of plants, prices of electricity and primary energy, etc)15. As an ex-
ample, Abadie and Chamorro (2008) analyse the risk profile associated with the use of coal 
power plants, directly via CDS. Based on sectoral studies, Deng (2005), Näsäkkälä and Fleten 
(2005) and Laurikka and Koljonen (2006) conclude that in a market with emission limits, coal-
fired power plants are facing financial risks originating on their profit margins, which in turn 
reduce their CDS, despite its cheaper fuel. 
In short, energy prices and carbon related indicators, like the carbon switching price, represent 
how we measure the charge on polluters for their use of fossil fuels, via carbon markets. So, the 
investment and use of renewable sources may be called positive secondary effects in the current 
carbon markets goals. They are properly considered in complementary economy and policy 
measures, explicitly to promote these energy types. This argument is supported by Kumar et al. 
(2012) that does not find a significant relationship between carbon prices and the stock prices 
of clean energy firms. In Europe, the goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 40% until 
2030, is complemented with a parallel objective of increasing the proportion of energy con-
sumed to 27% from renewable sources by 2030, “necessary to drive continued investment in 
the sector” EC (2014), p.1. In California the targets are similar, though not as ambitious: to the 
agreed limit to reduce emissions by 2020 to 1990 levels (about 15% reduction compared to the 
BAU scenario), various measures for energy efficiency and renewable generation are added, 
namely 33% renewable energy target by 2020.  
The carbon market currently exists to control the use of fossil fuels, within the principles of di-
versity and security of supply in energy generation for the next 50 years.  
 
Now, looking at carbon markets, as is being referred throughout this study, the European EU 
ETS and Californian AB32 carbon markets were selected for this research. The European market 
is the first major example of a GHG market. It is the largest, covering 45 % of emissions, more 
than 11,000 heavy energy-using installations in power generation and manufacturing industry, 
and oldest (since 2005). The EU ETS provides access to large amounts of data that reflect a de-
veloped emissions market. Such as in Europe, emission’s trading in California is a key element in 
fighting climate change. It now covers 35% of emissions from 600 facilities, and will reach 85% 
after 2015, which corresponds to 23% of the estimated reductions target. The California market 
                                                          
 
 
15 𝑆𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 =  
𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝑔𝑎𝑠)/𝑀𝑊ℎ−𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙)/𝑀𝑊ℎ 
𝑡𝐶𝑂2(𝑐𝑜𝑎𝑙)/𝑀𝑊ℎ−𝑡𝐶𝑂2(𝑔𝑎𝑠)/𝑀𝑊ℎ
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(AB32), existing since 2012, will most probably be one of the largest in the world in terms of 
participants’ number, and associated emissions quantities. Also, this market is in many features 
related to the EU ETS. For these reasons and data availability, we included it in our study. 
Research published at the time of the EU ETS inception, after 2005, is essentially focussed on 
the origins of variations in carbon prices and the explanation of the market operations. It is an 
understandable evidence, given the first system’s youth. This research comprises aspects re-
lated mainly to price drivers and price formation (Mansanet-Bataller et al. 2007, Alberola et al. 
2008, Seifert et al. 2008, Alberola et al. 2009b, Benz and Truck 2009, Blyth et al. 2009, Carmona 
et al. 2009, Daskalakis et al. 2009, Hintermann 2010, Chevallier 2011c, Creti et al. 2012, Gorenflo 
2012, Aatola et al. 2013b, Lutz et al. 2013).  
Studies multiply from 2007-2009 using data from the EU ETS first phase (2005-2007), i.e., the 
pre-Kyoto period, where Europe had yet to meet a UNFCCC threshold. Considerable efforts have 
been made since then to model the dynamics of the European carbon markets. The research 
diverged to several directions, including the study of the relation between carbon prices and 
features of market design (Alberola and Chevallier 2009, Alberola et al. 2009a), the relation with 
economic activity, the economic crisis and recovery (Christiansen et al. 2005, Bredin and 
Muckley 2011, Chevallier 2011c, Chevallier 2011d, Declercq et al. 2011, Durand-Lasserve et al. 
2011, Creti et al. 2012), the connections to industrial activity (Reinaud 2007, Demailly and 
Quirion 2008, Alberola et al. 2009b, Hocaoglu and Karanfil 2011), the relation with prices of 
carbon offsets (Mansanet-Bataller et al. 2011, Nazifi 2013), and with levelling prices and clusters 
(Lanzi et al. 2012, Palao and Pardo 2012). Carbon prices volatility, risk-premia and forecasting 
have lately been the focus of attention, using mostly GARCH models, and relating several carbon 
financial assets (Benz and Truck 2009, Chevallier 2010, Chevallier and Sévi 2010, Chevallier 
2011b, Feng et al. 2011, García-Martos et al. 2011, Arouri et al. 2012, Conrad et al. 2012, Feng 
et al. 2012, Rittler 2012, Aatola et al. 2013b, Byun and Cho 2013, Chevallier 2013, García-Martos 
et al. 2013, Liu and Chen 2013, Lutz et al. 2013, Zhu and Wei 2013, Koch 2014, Medina et al. 
2014). Volatility spillovers are also analysed by Liu and Chen (2013) that uses a GARCH to anal-
yses the impact of extreme weather in carbon and energy, and by Reboredo (2014) that looks 
to the relation between oil and the EU ETS using a multivariate range autoregressive model. On 
different methodologies, a copula approach has also been used to analyse value-at-risk of car-
bon prices (Gronwald et al. 2011, Li et al. 2013), the relation between carbon spot and futures 
(Zhuang 2013), and the relation to crude oil markets. Finally, Zhu et al. (2014) also investigate 
carbon futures variations using a Zipfian distribution. 
All these studies, together, note the increasing maturity of the market.  
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Regarding the analysis of carbon price effects in other markets, particularly in the power market, 
studies are fewer in number (Reinaud 2007, Gullì 2008, Zachmann and von Hirschhausen 2008, 
Denny and O’Malley 2009, Oberndorfer 2009, Widerberg and Wråke 2009, Chen and Bunn 2010, 
Keppler and Cruciani 2010, Kim et al. 2010, Kury and Harrington 2010, Aatola et al. 2013a). Other 
studies by Hauch (2003), Kara et al. (2008), Fell (2010), Pinho and Madaleno (2011), Kirat and 
Ahamada (2011), Bonenti et al. (2013) and Thurber and Wolak (2013) are country-specific.  
On the methodology, referred studies essentially explain the price or volatility of one variable in 
terms of others. This exogeneity assumption is very controversial in energy markets, so, to over-
come this issue, we consider an approach that finds effects in both directions, between varia-
bles, regarding energy prices and carbon prices: a vector auto regressive (VAR) model, and tools 
of multivariate wavelet analysis (MWA). 
Fezzi and Bunn (2009), Pinho and Madaleno (2011), Chevallier (2011d) and García-Martos et al. 
(2013) use VAR. Keppler and Mansanet-Bataller (2010) also consider multiple influence between 
variables, but through repeated standard unidirectional Granger causality tests. They consider 
daily data from 2005 to 2008, coal and gas prices, clean dark and spark spread and electricity 
prices. They also include temperatures as exogenous variables. Fezzi and Bunn (2009) build a 
vector error correction model (VECM) that analyses mutual relationships between electricity, 
gas and carbon prices in the daily spot markets in the United Kingdom, also regarding phase I of 
EU ETS. Chevallier (2011d) uses monthly data from 2005 to 2010 VAR Markov-Switching model, 
finding a connection between macroeconomics and carbon prices. Pinho and Madaleno (2011) 
examine interactions between carbon, electricity and fossil fuel returns on a country level en-
ergy-mix, as previously referred, through a VECM, using monthly data (2005/2009) in Europe. 
Finally, García-Martos et al. (2013) use daily data from 2009-2011, regarding fossil fuel prices, 
carbon, electricity prices, and offset prices, to build a conditionally heteroscedastic dynamic fac-
tor model. They compare prediction accuracy between a multivariate and univariate model, sug-
gesting that the multivariate model improves the forecasting quality. Finally, previously referred 
Kumar et al. (2012) use a VAR to analyse stock prices of clean energy prices and carbon markets, 
and Chevallier (2011c) a factor augmented VAR to analyse shocks on carbon prices. 
The use of vector auto regression models for time series analysis is customary in macroeconom-
ics or finance research (Silvestrini and Veredas 2008), but not for the analysis of energy and 
carbon markets relation (García-Martos et al. 2013). Relevant references regarding vector auto 
regression time series modelling include Tiao and Tsay (1989), Enders (2008), Tsay (2010) and 
Peña et al. (2011), whose applications exist in large numbers, including to commodity markets 
(Geman 2009). 
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Regarding wavelet studies, they are indicative of existent relationships in other, longer, cycles 
than daily. Naturally, other authors, before us, have relied on wavelets to analyse the energy 
markets or the relation between energy prices and other financial or macroeconomic variables. 
Actually, one can argue that wavelet analysis is particularly well-suited for this purpose. Energy 
price dynamics are nonstationary and so it is important to use methods that do not require sta-
tionarity. Moreover, there is evidence showing that several energy markets display consistent 
nonlinear dependencies (Kyrtsou et al. 2009). Based on their analysis, the authors call for non-
linear methods to analyse the impact of oil shocks. Wavelet analysis is one such method. Aguiar-
Conraria and Soares (2011b), Naccache (2011), Jammazi (2012) and Tiwari et al. (2013) have 
already relied on wavelets to study the evolution of oil prices, Aloui and Hkiri (2014) used the 
same tools to study the Gulf Corporation Council stock markets, and Reboredo and Rivera-Castro 
(2014) examine the relationship between oil and stock markets using wavelet analysis. Interest-
ingly, Vacha and Barunik (2012) look to other energy commodities and find interesting dynamics 
of correlations between crude and heating oil, gasoline and natural gas. Vacha et al. (2013) rely 
on the wavelet coherence methodology to relate biofuels to several commodities (such as gas-
oline, diesel, corn, rapeseed oil, etc). To the best of our knowledge, specifically about carbon 
markets, there is no previous work in the time-frequency domain. 
One common feature to all the above cited papers is that they rely on uni and bivariate wavelet 
analysis. So far, multivariate wavelet analysis has never been applied to economic data. This is 
an important shortcoming, because when the association between two series is to be assessed, 
it is often important to account for the interaction with the other series. To estimate the inter-
dependence, in the time-frequency domain, between two variables after eliminating the effect 
of other variables, we will rely on the concept of partial wavelet coherence and partial phase-
difference. 
 
In our research, we consider daily data of phase II and III of the European carbon market and the 
pre-start and first stage of the market in California. We removed the values of phase I of the EU 
ETS (2005-2007) from the European study, although available, because they refer to the pre-
Kyoto period. At that time, not only the EU had not yet mandatory emission limits, as the pol-
luters realization of an oversupply of allowances in 2006 led to a drop in prices to values near ‘0’ 
until the end of this period. Sufficient data from more mature phases of the market is available, 
so we chose to disregard EU ETS phase I information. We include carbon spot prices in this study 
because they are a better mirror of daily expectations regarding variations of remaining energy 
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prices (Alberola and Chevallier 2009, Daskalakis et al. 2009). Those remaining energy prices, de-
scribed in sections 3.2.2 and 3.3.2, were selected as the most indicative of European and Cali-
fornian realities. We also included an index of economic performance and the daily average 
temperatures, the latter as a proxy for variations in demand. 
On the methodology, as mentioned, our study extends the previous work by Fezzi and Bunn 
(2009), Chevallier (2011d) and García-Martos et al. (2013), also encompassing the work by 
Keppler and Mansanet-Bataller (2010), for a more comprehensive analysis of the interactions of 
energy and carbon markets. We capture multivariate interaction between variables through a 
VAR model and analyse the data in a time-frequency dimension, through multivariate wavelet 
analysis. 
In section 3.2 we analyse the EU market and in 3.3 Californian market. 
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3.2 Part I – Europe: EU ETS 
Based on papers: 
“Dynamics of CO2 price drivers” 
“Carbon Financial Markets: a time-frequency analysis of CO₂ prices” 
 
3.2.1 EU ETS main features 
The Kyoto Protocol is a contract ratified by several industrialized countries that imposes a limit 
on their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. It also provides three flexibility mechanisms to help 
countries to reach their goal. Those mechanisms are the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), 
Joint Implementation (JI) and Emissions Trading. The first two regard project instruments, where 
it is possible to obtain emission certificates by developing mitigation projects. The third mecha-
nism, Emissions Trading, distributes emission permits by countries, known as Assigned Amount 
Units (AAUs) and allows them to exchange those permits in order to fulfil the predetermined 
carbon cap. In theory, emission markets allocate reduction efforts where they are least expen-
sive.  
The Kyoto Protocol also allows for the implementation of regional emission trading schemes, 
like the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS). In this market the trading unit is the 
European Union Allowance (EUA), developed to be a fungible16 unit with the AAUs from the 
Kyoto countries trading scheme. The EU ETS is operational since 2005: 2005-2007 was called 
Phase I, a test phase, while Phase II, 2008-2012, was a binding phase for it was at the same time 
the Kyoto Protocol commitment period, in which European countries had to internationally fulfil 
Kyoto obligations. 2013-2020 is the third phase, and in this period, with the new EU ETS Di-
rective, and Climate and Energy Package (Directive 2009/29/EC), the rules changed substan-
tially. The market has now a wider scope with the introduction of new gases and new sectors. 
The inclusion of the aviation sector in the EU ETS brings new policy possibilities, since it falls 
within a sector of transport activity, not included in the Kyoto Protocol. Finally, it is important 
                                                          
 
 
16 Fungibility is an asset's property that allows it to be exchanged with other individual asset of the same 
type. In Kyoto particular case, EUAs may serve as AAUs when it comes to the country’s compliance. 
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for carbon prices’ analysis to note that another novelty in the 3rd phase was that the total quan-
tity of emission in the EU is determined at Community level, and allowances are mostly allocated 
through auctions. 
More recently, on 22/01/2014, the European Commission presented to the European Parlia-
ment the “2030 climate and energy goals for a competitive, secure and low-carbon EU economy” 
(EC 2014). The EC proposal has six key energy-climate elements, including the reduction in GHG 
emissions by 40% below the 1990 level and the reform of the EU ETS. Regarding changes in the 
EU ETS, the EC (2014), p.1 “proposes to establish a market stability reserve […] that would both 
address the surplus of emission allowances that has built up in recent years and improve the 
system's resilience to major shocks by automatically adjusting the supply of allowances to be 
auctioned”. 
However, even with all the referred changes in market features, and constant new climate policy 
goals, the EU ETS market principals have remained the same. And after almost 9 years of EU ETS, 
it is possible to say that unreasonably low carbon prices and their causes are the main concerns 
for keeping the market operational while actually reducing GHG emissions.  
Briefly recalling the existing research presented in section 3.1, several authors have studied as-
pects of carbon prices formation usually using EU ETS carbon data, most of them after the end 
of Phase I, the test phase. Granger causality tests have been the most common methodology for 
interconnection analysis between CO2 prices and other variables. Furthermore, previous anal-
yses usually only consider a one-way influence of variables related to CO2. More recent studies 
have focussed on volatility analysis and high frequency prices suggesting the use of GARCH mod-
els (Aatola et al. 2013b, Byun and Cho 2013, García-Martos et al. 2013, Lutz et al. 2013, Koch 
2014, Medina et al. 2014). Others use VAR models to detect and overcome the endogeneity 
problem and estimate the impact of innovations with respect to other variables (Gorenflo 2012, 
Kumar et al. 2012, Aatola et al. 2013b). 
Focussing on studies that look at the origins of variations in carbon price, relevant research con-
firm the impact of the variation of industrial production in EUA price changes (Alberola et al. 
2009a), and that the relationship between the carbon price and the economy is robust to the 
introduction of energy market shocks (Chevallier 2011d). Keppler and Mansanet-Bataller (2010) 
and Aatola et al. (2013b) show that electricity prices Granger-caused CO2 prices. Keppler and 
Mansanet-Bataller (2010) also find significance in the causality from gas price to carbon. Aatola 
et al. (2013b) finds a relationship between coal prices with the carbon price in 2005-2010. And 
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finally, Lutz et al. (2013) conclude that the most important EUA price drivers are changes on the 
stock market and coal, gas and oil prices. 
On carbon and energy prices effects, the results are not as many as in the carbon price drivers: 
Fezzi and Bunn (2009), Mansanet-Bataller et al. (2007) find that both carbon and gas prices drive 
electricity prices. Kirat and Ahamada (2011) find evidence of carbon prices influence in electricity 
prices in Germany and France. (Pinho and Madaleno 2011) also study origins and effects of car-
bon and energy prices at a country level. 
Looking at data from 2008-201317, in this section we aim to characterize CO2 prices interrelation 
with the most relevant energy, economy, substitute goods and weather variables influencing 
this market. First we specify a dynamic vector auto-regressive (VAR) model, which is usually used 
to analyse and display interdependencies between different time series. With this model, we 
can estimate response functions of CO2 prices to impulses in other variables. These impulse-
response functions (IRF) allow us to observe the impact of other variables in CO2, in terms of 
duration, direction and magnitude. We also use with data from the Kyoto commitment period, 
when companies and countries had international obligations to reduce emissions, as they still 
have now. Secondly we present the results of the multivariate wavelet analysis to estimate the 
long run coherence between variables. 
 
3.2.2 Selected data 
Controlling for GHG emissions through markets implies that emissions are limited, have a price 
and may be exchanged. The emissions limit is the fixed emissions allowances supply. Therefore, 
in this market, the expected price drivers for emission allowances will include main emitters’ 
activity, and variables that affect their production. That is to say energy prices, economic activity 
and variations in the demand. Considering the previous idea, and taking into account previous 
work on CO2 price causality (Alberola et al. 2009a, Fezzi and Bunn 2009, Keppler and Mansanet-
Bataller 2010, Sijm et al. 2012, Aatola et al. 2013b, Lutz et al. 2013, Nazifi 2013) our model con-
siders eight variables: CO2 price, Certified Emission Reduction (CER) price, base and peak elec-
tricity price (Elect_b and Elect_p), gas and coal prices (Gas and Coal), average temperature (that 
                                                          
 
 
17 We do not include information from Phase I of the EU ETS because it was not a compliance period, as it 
was almost a ‘test’ phase. Given the price break that occurred under those specific conditions, there is a 
high possibility that the data would bring noise to our analysis. 
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provides a proxy for days with higher energy demand) and a European economy stock market 
index (Econ). Variables as the Clean Spark Spread, the Clean Dark Spread or the «carbon switch» 
were not considered because they are linear combinations of variables already included. 
In Figure 7, we can see the emission data variables in levels. As in Figure 8, regarding energy 
prices, one can observe the abrupt decline between mid-2008 until mid-2009, due essentially to 
external economy conditions. After one year and a half recovery, it is visible a slower but con-
stant deterioration in prices. 
 
 
Figure 7 : EU carbon prices, 2008/2013. 
 
CO2 
The European Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) is the first and the largest international 
system for trading greenhouse gas emission allowances. 2008-2013 is the time length of this 
study representing EU ETS Phase II (2008/2012) and one year of Phase III (2013-2020). Consid-
ering this, as CO2 variable we used the European Union Allowance (EUA) spot price, the unit of 
the EU ETS, referring to the emission of one tonne of CO2 equivalent. EUA future prices were not 
included because of spot-future high correlation level (99%).  
Data for CO2 was available from 2008/02/26 up to 2012/11/01, from Bluenext, the most im-
portant EUA spot market in volumes, then. Although Bluenext closed permanently its spot and 
derivatives trading operations as from December 5, 2012, the environmental trading exchange 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
Fe
b
-0
8
M
ay
-0
8
A
u
g-
0
8
N
o
v-
0
8
Fe
b
-0
9
M
ay
-0
9
A
u
g-
0
9
N
o
v-
0
9
Fe
b
-1
0
M
ay
-1
0
A
u
g-
1
0
N
o
v-
1
0
Fe
b
-1
1
M
ay
-1
1
A
u
g-
1
1
N
o
v-
1
1
Fe
b
-1
2
M
ay
-1
2
A
u
g-
1
2
N
o
v-
1
2
Fe
b
-1
3
M
ay
-1
3
A
u
g-
1
3
Eu
ro
CO2s CERs
 
-51- 
has hosted the largest amount of spot trades, totalling 29.4 million tons in 201218. From Nov-
2012 until 12/11/2013 prices were collected from SendeCO2 19 . There is data missing from 
around 40 days, which did not prove to be of any concern, given the almost 5 years of daily data 
available. 
 
Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) 
Installations covered by the EU ETS have the possibility to accomplish their emission targets sur-
rendering Certified Emission Reductions (CERs), in addition to EUAs. A CER is an emission unit 
concerning reductions within the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), a market-mechanism 
under the Kyoto Protocol. Within this mechanism, emission reductions are issued from mitiga-
tion projects in least developed, and developing countries that ratified the Protocol. The market 
supply of CERs is controlled by the Executive Board to the CDM that evaluates those projects. 
CERs are then traded in secondary markets.  
Although there is currently a political debate on the role of CERs because of the continuous price 
fall since 2012, Phase II market rules accepted CERs as partial substitutes for EUAs. This rule has 
been maintained in post-Kyoto phase. . The price spread between EUAs and CERs was of high 
importance at least until 2012 (Nazifi 2013). For this reason we considered its spot daily price in 
this study. Data was gathered from Bluenext for after 12/8/2008. From Nov-2012 until 
12/11/2013 prices were collected from SendeCO2. Minor missing data did not pose a problem. 
 
Energy 
Prices of EU energy variables included in this study are presented in Figure 8. Greenhouse gas 
emissions considered in the European carbon market come from fossil fuels burning and follow 
a top-down accounting methodology. In the end, more than 11000 power stations, industrial 
plants and airlines, in Europe, operate under GHG emission limits. Hence, energy markets have 
an expected importance in the variations of CO2 price, and, because of this, energy prices were 
considered in our model. We included typical prices for natural gas, coal and electricity in Europe 
as energy variables. For all, one month future contract was selected. This choice is in line with 
                                                          
 
 
18  In http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-26/bluenext-carbon-exchange-to-shut-after-losing-eu-
auction-bid-1-.html , retrieved 11/03/2012. 
19 www.sendeco2.com , Iberian carbon emission stock exchange, retrieved 15/11/2013. 
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the established notion that, in energy, future prices lead spot prices essentially due to the diffi-
culty of storage, and consequent ease of shorting. 
 
 
Figure 8 : EU selected energy prices, 2008/2013. 
(On the left vertical axis we refer to electricity and oil prices. The right axis refers to gas and coal prices. Data sources: 
referred in text.) 
 
Regarding natural gas prices we used The Intercontinental Exchange Futures20 (The ICE) data. 
Originally in £/therm, the data was transformed to Euros/MMBTU for compatibility with other 
variables and better perception21. As for coal one month future prices, they were also retrieved 
from The ICE database. Coal prices are cost, insurance and freight (CIF) with delivery in Amster-
dam, Rotterdam and Antwerp (ARA). They were originally in USD/tcoal and were converted to 
EUR/tcoal. For electricity, the Phelix baseload and peak prices22 were retrieved from the Euro-
pean Energy Exchange (EEX)23, in Euros/MWh. Baseload and peak prices reflect different elec-
tricity generation mixes and thus are relevant in our analysis. The Phelix prices regard the Ger-
man/Austrian market area. They were selected as representatives of the European base and 
                                                          
 
 
20 We thank The ICE from providing us the data for natural gas and coal used in this paper. 
21 Historical exchange rates available at the European Central Bank website: www.ecb.int. 
22 Because electricity needs are not constant all through the day, and it is a non-storable good, we consid-
ered two typical electricity prices: peak, that represent prices for a time of day when supply is significantly 
higher than average levels, and base, an average for the rest of the day. 
23 We thank EEX for providing the data on electricity prices used in this paper. 
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peak electricity prices since Germany is the largest electricity producer in Europe, which com-
bined with Austria reached 680TWh24 of generated electricity in 201125. Also, correlation levels 
between Phelix data and other electricity prices (tested for France and UK) range from 0,87 to 
0,95. So, variations presented through Phelix prices should appropriately represent variations in 
other European electricity prices, in spite of aspects such as market structure and energy-mix. 
Finally, there are almost no gaps in energy prices (only 14 days missing data). 
 
Economic activity 
Noting that industries involved in the EU ETS are energy intensive, and thus their production 
levels are highly associated with general economic growth, we considered necessary the inclu-
sion of a variable which mirrored economic activity. This is in line with several previous authors 
in the subject (Alberola and Chevallier 2009, Chevallier 2009, Keppler and Mansanet-Bataller 
2010). For this purpose we considered the FTS Eurofirst 300 Index (E3X.L), available at YahooF-
inance. It is a capitalization-weighted price tradable index measuring the performance of Eu-
rope's largest 300 companies. Daily price returns were included, and there is no missing data. 
Weather 
Average daily European temperatures were considered in this study. They were calculated based 
on the average daily temperatures from regions of 7 representative EU countries (Austria, Ger-
many, France, Italy, Netherlands, Spain and United Kingdom), retrieved from the European Cli-
mate Assessment & Dataset26. It is a weighted average considering the population of each re-
gion27. The result is a European average daily temperature index, which was included in the 
model as the only a priori exogenous variable. Data is available until 30/09/2013. For consider-
ation of global warming effects, temperature would have to be endogenous. However, this as-
pect would only be relevant if we had data for several decades, which is not the case. 
                                                          
 
 
24 BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2012 www.bp.com/statisticalreview  
25 Regarding market power structure, the German market is relatively non-concentrated, when comparing 
to other EU electricity markets Scheepers, M., Wals, A. and Rijkers, F. (2003). Position of large power 
producers in electricity markets of north Western Europe. Draft Rep. ECN-C-03-003, Amsterdam, The 
Netherlands., although large mergers around 2005 have increased vertical market concentration 
Domanico, F. (2007). Concentration in the European electricity industry: The internal market as solution? 
Energy Policy 35(10): 5064-5076.. 
26 European Climate Assessment & Dataset official page: eca.knmi.nl  
27  Following the methodology used by Tendances Carbone for the European Temperature Index 
www.cdcclimat.com/-Tendances-Carbone-.html  
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3.2.3 VAR analysis 
The initial VAR system model with log differenced variables may be written in a compact form 
that includes a set of linear dynamic equations, one for each variable. Each equation is specified 
as a function of its past values, and equal number of past values of all other variables. The final 
goal is to estimate how CO2 responds to impulses in other variables, and vice versa. 
We have seven endogenous variables and one exogenous variable, the average temperatures. 
The seven endogenous variables include representative prices of CO2, CERs, peak and base elec-
tricity, gas, coal, and an economy stock index. To account for non-stationarity issues, all variables 
were transformed to first differences of log data. Stationarity of these time series was estab-
lished by typical tests. We rely on likelihood ratio test statistic to decide on the number of sig-
nificant lags to include in the VAR model. The test points towards the consideration of 21 
days/lags, corresponding roughly to one month of daily data. 
 
3.2.3.1 Causality and feed-back relations 
A central question in VAR models is the endogeneity or exogeneity of variables, as discussed in 
the previous section. In this study, temperature was the only variable considered exogenous a 
priori. For all other variables, we ran Granger causality/block exogeneity tests to perceive if any 
variable should be treated as exogenous. In these tests, a χ2 Wald statistics is given for each 
equation for the joint significance of each other lagged endogenous variables in the equation, 
as well as a statistic for joint significance. The results are described below in Figure 9. 
As we may see in Figure 9, we found interdependencies in several variables, and some recurring 
influence cycles. Recall that the purpose of the Wald test is not to quantify any relation, but 
instead to identify multiple relations. This analysis allows surpassing the problem of missing var-
iables, present in bivariate causality tests. Additionally, looking at the results of individual and 
joint significance of lagged endogenous variables, there is no variable that should be considered 
exogenous in this model.  
Regarding CO2, its returns are significantly caused by the economy returns, peak/base electricity 
price returns and CERs prices. Fezzi and Bunn (2009) and Mansanet-Bataller et al. (2007) find a 
direct influence of gas and coal prices in CO2 prices, but in our model those influences are cap-
tured through the electricity price. It is also worthwhile to note some indirect channels. For ex-
ample, gas influences both peak and base electricity, which in turn influences economic activity, 
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which causes CO2. Therefore, even if we do not find a direct influence running from gas and coal 
prices to CO2 prices, we do find indirect linkages. 
 
 
Figure 9 : EU prices - Granger causality tests 
Data: 02/01/2008 - 30-09-2013. Dashed/continuous arrows indicate causality at 10%/5% significance. 
 
In the case of peak electricity, gas price has significant explanatory power, a result in line with 
the findings of Fezzi and Bunn (2009). This is an adequate result given that natural gas is an 
important primary energy for thermal electricity production. Natural gas has a lower GHG emis-
sion intensity (469gCO2/kWhe28), and more flexible supply, when comparing to coal. In this 
model gas and peak (and base) electricity returns have a feedback effect meaning that past val-
ues of each one influence both contemporaneous values. This is also an acceptable result given 
that utilities define their generation mix looking at past values of electricity and primary energy 
prices. In the particular case of the electricity prices considered, one should note that the energy 
mix for power generation associated with the Phelix price is intensive in coal (lignite and hard 
                                                          
 
 
28 Moomaw, W. et al, 2011, “Annex II: Methodology. In IPCC: Special Report on Renewable Energy 
Sources and Climate Change Mitigation” (ref. page 10), http://srren.ipcc-wg3.de/re-
port/IPCC_SRREN_Annex_II.pdf , retrieved 18/03/2013 
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coal are important fuels). Its effects are being transmitted through the gas price, as we will see 
below in Figure 15 and Figure 16. 
Regarding energy variables we only found evidence for a significant influence of CO2 in coal re-
turns, in 2008-2013. To some extent this result follows the current general opinion that carbon 
prices are too low to have an impact on electricity prices.  
Finally, the economy, gas and CO2 price returns influence coal price returns. This last result could 
benefit from further study, given the very high emission intensity levels (1001gCO2/kWhe28) of 
electricity generation with coal. However it is an aspect that falls out of this study main purpose, 
and so we leave it for further developments. 
 
3.2.3.2 Impulse-response analyses 
As discussed earlier, it is necessary to choose a Cholesky ordering of the variables for the con-
temporaneous impact. We considered gas being influenced only by its own innovation, then coal 
to have its own and be influenced by the gas innovation, then peak electricity, following the 
same reasoning having its own innovation, and the ones from coal and gas, after, base electric-
ity, then the economy, CO2, and finally CERs. This choice reflects carbon market price principles 
by which it captures influences of industrial output levels, effects of mitigation actions, and eco-
nomic circumstances. Also, it follows suggestions in Granger causality tests presented above. In 
the end, this particular ordering is not important as our results revealed to be robust to different 
orderings. 
 
Variance decomposition 
The Cholesky order is also needed when calculating the variance decomposition. This is auxiliary 
evidence of the amount of the forecast error variance of each variable that can be explained by 
innovations in other variables. That is saying, how much each variable contributes to each other 
in the model. Below, in Figure 10, we present the variance decomposition of carbon and elec-
tricity (other variance decompositions are available in the appendix section A.3). 
In the CO2 graph (a) we may observe the growing importance of other variables over the carbon 
price itself. In the baseload electricity graph (b), the most important variable is the peak elec-
tricity price (in red). In the first periods there is a growth in the importance of gas over peak 
electricity, but, globally, the role of all other variables remain rather constant. 
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Figure 10 : Variance decomposition of carbon and electricity prices - EU 
 
However, our main purpose is to look to the effects in carbon prices, when having a shock in 
other variables, or, to the effects in other prices, when having a shock in carbon. These can be 
seen through impulse-response functions. 
There are 49 (7×7 variables) IRF in this model. It would be purposeless to show them all. We find 
relevance to look at the influence of carbon prices in primary and secondary energy prices, for 
these results would sustain market fundamentals. Recalling the goal of this study to analyse CO2 
responses to shocks in other variables it is also of interest to analyse the effect in carbon prices 
of energy prices, emission permits substitutes prices, and the economy. We will first look to the 
seven IRF that show this. 
 
CO2 response functions 
For IRF display we selected the accumulated responses because variables are in first log differ-
ences, so the interpretation should be clearer. We also tested for several response periods, and 
10 days revealed to be enough to show the response asymptote to a non-zero constant. 
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Figure 11 : CO2 price returns accumulated responses to impulses in other variables - EU 
(Blue line is the IRF; red dashed lines the limits of the 95% confidence interval. Grey circles indicate significance, 
whenever the function has both significative and non-significative values.) 
 
Figure 11 above represents the accumulated response of CO2 price returns to one standard de-
viation innovation of gas, coal, peak electricity, economy, CO2, CER, +/- 2 standard errors. 
In Figure 11 a), we see that the impact of CO2 innovations on itself is always positive and signif-
icant. After two days this impact almost stabilizes, and then, though still positive, it slows down 
in the 6th to the 7th day, only to start rising again and stabilizing. Because these are accumulated 
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responses, it is possible to see that an impulse from CO2 will positively change CO2 returns and 
that this change will endure, which was an expected result. 
In Figure 11 b) we may see the response of CO2 price returns to an innovation in peak electricity 
price returns. The impact is significant in all periods and increasingly positive. Globally this is also 
an expected result, for electricity generation emits a large part of the CO2 considered in the 
market. So, if there is a positive change in peak electricity prices variation, it is expected that 
CO2 prices variation will act accordingly. There is a visible response in the next 10 days, and in 
the end the change in CO2 price levels will sustain. 
Regarding the role of the economy, in Figure 11 c), the contemporaneous and the 2nd day impact 
in CO2 returns is positive. That is saying that economy and emissions move in the same direction. 
This is the third expected result of this study: as CO2 emissions origin is energy intensive 
production, and this production is known to be highly related with economy levels, it is expected 
that a positive change in the economy returns has a positive response from CO2 returns. The 
novelty is that this impact is transitory, significant only in the first two days.  
Looking at natural gas, we see a marginally significant positive impact in CO2 returns, in the first 
period. After the second day the results are not significant. This result from the natural gas shock 
is in line the findings of Fezzi and Bunn (2009), and consistent with the definitions of Clean Dark 
and Spark Spreads that analysts and utilities consider in their decisions for the generation mix. 
As referred in the data description section, these spreads are linear combinations of electricity, 
carbon, coal and gas prices, displaying the most cost-efficient option for electricity generation 
in one period, either using coal or gas power plants. What we show in this result is that changes 
in the natural gas prices are immediately considered in the carbon price variation.  
Finally, in Figure 11 f), changes in certified emission reductions prices, or CER, associated with 
clean development mitigation projects in developing and least developed countries, have no 
immediate impact in CO2 price changes. It is an important result that CER price changes had no 
expected impact in the European carbon market during 2008-201329, confirming Mansanet-
Bataller et al. (2011) previous results regarding EUA-CER spread.  
                                                          
 
 
29 However, the CDM market is undergoing a phase with over-registration of projects, which caused CER 
prices to start falling since the beginning of 2012. In 2013 they reached the lowest levels ever recorded. 
Knowing this, emitters started to buy swaps CER-EUA derivatives for they have an immediate profit margin 
in buying CERs and selling EUAs. This event may be reflected in the next few years in the EUA carbon price, 
and then a change in the presented IRF function may be expected. 
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A final result is that significant impacts from CO2 and peak electricity price returns don’t fade 
overtime. This means that whatever impact in CO2 a shock from these variables has; it will with-
stand in future periods. 
 
CO2 impulses 
 
 
Figure 12 : Impulses in CO2 prices and accumulated responses of selected EU prices 
(Blue line is the IRF; red dashed lines the limits of the 95% confidence interval. Grey circles indicate significance, 
whenever the function has both significative and non-significative values.) 
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Once more, accumulated responses were selected, and 10 days response period was considered 
for the same reasons. In Figure 12 above we represent the second view in the interaction be-
tween carbon and energy prices. It shows the accumulated response of all variables to one 
standard deviation innovation of CO2, +/- 2 standard errors.  
Following emission markets fundamentals we should anticipate a positive and possibly larger 
impact of CO2 in the most polluting variables. However a significant impact is only visible in two 
variables: base electricity (b) and CERs (d).  
On base electricity (Figure 12 b) the CO2 impact is almost negligible. It is only significant at day 2 
and shows positive but very low values, becoming insignificant afterwards. This means that a 
positive change in CO2 returns causes a positive change in base electricity returns. There being 
no direct influence of CO2 on primary energy price returns (coal c) and gas d)), it is expected that 
an impact, however small, may be visible in the base electricity variable. This final energy comes 
from thermal power plants, emitters of GHG (except for nuclear, not included in emission mar-
kets), whereas peak electricity energy-mix is composed of non-polluting renewable energy (hy-
dro) and a small percentage of gas-fired plants. In this sense, looking at the minimal positive 
impact on base electricity returns, we may consider that CO2 price is on the right path for influ-
encing GHG emissions, although lacking in magnitude. 
On CERs, there is a significant, yet small, positive impact from EUAs returns, the data represent-
ing CO2 variable. This is visible in almost all 10 periods, and continues in the future. As observed 
in the previous section of CO2 responses, this confirms previous results where EUA-CER have a 
positive one direction relation, only from EUA to CER, because the European carbon market is 
the largest source of CER demand (Mansanet-Bataller et al. 2011). The spread between the two 
prices increased on a large scale mainly due to the large fall in CERs prices (visible in Figure 7) 
 
Other impulse-response functions, cycles and feedback 
The five graphs in Figure 13 provide us with additional evidence on transmission mechanisms of 
information between different prices, also known as cost pass-through information. We tested 
situations previously proposed by the Granger causality analysis (Figure 9). 
We may see that the responses are mostly significant, and positive, with the exception of the 
gas response to the baseload electricity impulse. Although this relation is not very easy to ex-
plain, we may say that gas prices are responding negatively to rises in the baseload electricity 
price, to compensate coal’s lower prices. 
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Figure 13 : Other accumulated impulse-response functions of energy prices - EU 
(Blue line is the IRF; red dashed lines the limits of the 95% confidence interval. Grey circles indicate significance, 
whenever the function has both significative and non-significative values.) 
 
The graphical representation of causality provided in the VAR model on Figure 9, is particularly 
interesting when checking for cycles of influence between different variables, such as the one 
mentioned before. We briefly present the significant cycles found between variables, validated 
by impulse-response functions (of Figure 11, Figure 12, Figure 13): 
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Figure 14 : Causality cycles between electricity and gas prices - EU 
 
Among others, it is possible to identify the following sequences in Granger causality analysis in 
the EU market that support the result that primary energies only affect the carbon market indi-
rectly via final energy prices (electricity prices). In Figure 15 we observe the role of coal and its 
relation to CO2, and in Figure 16 we include the gas price in the analysis. 
 
 
Figure 15 : Other causality cycles: the role of coal – EU 
 
On the role of the economy, we find rebound effects regarding this variable, arguing (Chevallier 
2011d), although via an indirect path. However, we agree that this relation is robust to shocks 
in other variables (Hintermann 2010, Chevallier 2011d). 
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Figure 16 : Other causality cycles: the role of gas - EU 
 
There are other cycles present in the Granger causality analysis, but our study is focussed on the 
carbon relations, which we study with thorough detail, so we leave it for other analysis of energy 
markets. 
 
3.2.4 Wavelets analysis 
The variables for this analysis are depicted in Figure 17, left-hand-side panel, together with their 
wavelet power spectrum. They include carbon, gas, coal, electricity and the economy. CERs were 
not considered because of the recent downfall in the CDM market. Expected results of this var-
iable would never be sufficiently important to justify the additional computation needed. 
The wavelet power indicates, for each moment of time the intensity of the variance of the time-
series for each frequency of cyclical oscillations. This provides a first assessment of the behav-
iour of each variable in the time-frequency domain. 
 
-65- 
 
Figure 17 : EU prices - time-series plot and time-series wavelet power spectrum 
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(The black/grey contour designates the 5%/10% significance level. The cone of influence, which indicates the region 
affected by edge effects, is shown with a black line. The color code for power ranges from blue (low power) to red 
(high power). The white lines show the maxima of the undulations of the wavelet power spectrum.) 
 
Looking at Figure 17, it is interesting to note that the market for CO₂ is much less volatile than 
the other markets. Additionally, the periods of high volatility do not coincide. While markets for 
gas, electricity, coal and FTSE exhibit high levels of volatility until 2010, especially at 4 months 
frequencies (and also at longer run cycles, such as cycles with a periodicity of 20 months). Vola-
tility in the CO₂ market is only apparent after 2012 and, especially, during 2013, at very high 
frequencies. Based on the wavelet power spectra is difficult to discern any inter-relations be-
tween these markets. 
 
As we said before, we use daily price returns for each variable of interest. While the price levels 
seem to follow a unit root, the daily returns exhibit no unit root, both according the traditional 
ADF and KPSS unit root tests, or a more robust wavelet based unit root test (Fan and Gençay 
2010). 
We performed two more tests. First, for every variable, with the exception of the daily returns 
of CO₂, we tested and rejected the null of no serial correlation using a multi-scale test for serial 
correlation proposed by Gencay and Signori (2012). Then we estimated Hurst coefficients and 
found them very close to zero. This means that while the daily returns show some linear de-
pendency they do not show any discernible long-range dependency. We also estimated an 
ARMA model with GARCH errors, to deal with the linear dependency and time evolving variance, 
as several others have done with financial data. However, even after doing so, the hypothesis 
that the standardized residuals follow a white noise is severely rejected. We tested this latter 
hypothesis using the BDS statistic (Broock et al. 1996) and the null was rejected in every single 
case. This suggests that some non-linearities are robust to this traditional modelling and pro-
vides one more reason to rely on wavelet analysis. 
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Figure 18 : EU prices - wavelet coherence and phase-differences 
(On the left we find the wavelet coherence. The thick/thin black contour designates the 5%/10% significance level. The 
color code for coherence ranges from blue (low coherence --- close to zero) to red (high coherence --- close to one). On 
the right we represent the phase-differences between CO2 and another variable (top: 2∼8 frequency band, bottom : 
8∼20 frequency band)). 
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In Figure 18, we estimate the coherence between CO2 and other variables. It is interesting to 
note that before 2010, at longer run frequencies (corresponding to cycles of periodicity between 
8 and 20 months) we observe a statistically significant coherence. Looking at the phase-differ-
ence, and focusing in particular in the 8∼20 frequency band, we observe very stable lead-lag 
relationships30. Between CO₂ and the energy variables the phase-difference is typically between 
0 and π/2, indicating that the variables are in phase (positive correlation), with CO₂ leading. Be-
tween CO₂ and FTSE we see that the phase-difference is very close to zero, indicating an almost 
simultaneous relationship. If anything, the phase difference is slightly negative, suggesting that 
the lead variable is FTSE. 
The relations described in the previous paragraph should not be taken as much more than de-
scriptive statistics. In fact, when more than two series are given and the association between 
two of them is to be assessed, it is important to account for the interaction with the other series, 
otherwise one risks incurring an omitted variable bias. To estimate the interdependence, in the 
time-frequency domain, between two variables after eliminating the effect of other variables, 
we rely on the concepts of partial coherence and partial phase-difference, described in the pre-
vious section. 
 
In Figure 19, we have the partial coherence between CO₂ and each of the other variables, after 
controlling for all the others. 
Comparing Figure 18 with Figure 19, we see that the results change somewhat and that not 
considering the partial coherence would lead us to erroneous conclusions. First, the relation 
between CO₂ and gas is almost nonexistent, once we control for the other variables. The other 
two variables that reflect energy markets exhibit quite different dynamics. 
On the one hand, the region of (statistically significant) high partial coherence between CO₂ and 
Electricity is situated in the 8∼20 frequency band and is observable across most of the sample. 
For that frequency range, the partial phase-difference is consistently between 0 and π/2, which 
shows that the series move in-phase, with CO₂ leading. 
 
                                                          
 
 
30 It is difficult to attach any meaning to the phase-different in regions where coherence is not statistically 
significant. Therefore, we refrain from interpreting the phase-differences at the shorter run frequencies. 
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Figure 19 : EU prices - partial wavelet coherence and partial phase-differences 
(On the left we find partial wavelet coherence. The thick/thin black contour designates the 5%/10% significance level. 
The color code for coherence ranges from blue (low coherence --- close to zero) to red (high coherence --- close to one). 
On the right the partial phase-differences between CO2 and the other variable are represented (Top: 2∼8 frequency 
band. Bottom : 8∼20 frequency band)) 
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On the other hand, partial coherence between CO₂ and Coal is stronger after 2011, especially 
after 2012. It is also interesting to note that this relation is also clearly visible at higher frequen-
cies. Moreover, the partial phase-difference is very close to π at the lower frequency band and 
it switches between -π and π at higher frequencies. This shows that the variables are almost 
perfectly out-of-phase and that, if anything, coal is the lead variable along the 8∼20 frequency 
band. 
Finally, the partial coherence between CO₂ and economic activity, measured by FTSE, is particu-
larly stronger between late 2011 and early 2013, especially for cycles with periodicities slightly 
above 8 months. In this time-frequency range, the partial phase-difference is between -π/2 and 
0 suggesting that the variables are in-phase with CO₂ lagging or following FTSE. 
 
3.2.5 EU ETS synthesis of results 
In this section we aimed at characterizing the relation between CO2 prices and energy prices, 
certified emission reduction prices and economy index prices. We estimated a VAR model con-
sidering all variables endogenous. We included temperatures as the only exogenous variable. 
Daily data from Phase II and one year of Phase III (2008-2013) of the EU ETS was used.31 
Regarding effects on CO2 price returns, we found significant effects from electricity price returns 
and the economy index. This supports the idea that main power utilities could have influenced 
CO2 price in 2008-2013. When we consider a positive impulse in variables our results suggest a 
positive response of CO2 returns in all cases except for CER and coal. Looking at the other varia-
bles, an impulse of electricity price had a 10 days impact in CO2 returns, and of gas a 1 day impact. 
The economy had 2 days impact. Finally, CO2 returns also had a 10 days impact in itself. In the 
opposite perspective, CO2 returns have a very small one day impact in base electricity price re-
turns, and a consistent effect in CERs variable. 
No evidence was found of CO2 influence in primary energy variables but only in base electricity 
price returns.  
On the wavelet analysis, we observed several situations relating carbon prices to energy prices 
that are consistent with a growing maturity of the European carbon market. We found evidence 
                                                          
 
 
31 Restricting our analysis to 2008-2012 would yield similar results. 
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that, in cycles between 8 and 20 months, CO₂ and electricity variables are correlated, with CO₂ 
leading, contributing to the accomplishment of the main objective of the market, which is to 
penalize emissions from emitting energy use. 
Surprisingly we do not find a significant relation between CO₂ and gas in the longer time-cycles 
referred. Instead, we observed a high partial coherence between CO₂ and electricity, with CO₂ 
leading, and between CO₂ and coal, with coal leading. This result suggests that carbon pricing is 
having effects in the final good, electricity, instead of on primary fuels, gas and coal. It seems 
that power suppliers are passing on the emission cost of using coal in their generation mix to 
the consumers through the electricity price. This is consistent with a low price demand elasticity 
of this good. 
We also find higher volatility in carbon prices only after 2012, which may relate to the political 
uncertainties over the third phase of the market, starting in 2013. At the same time, we observe 
that the carbon price follows the economy trends, in line with previous studies. 
With the results presented, namely the in-phase relations of CO₂ with electricity prices around 
a 12 months cycle, CO₂ leading, and of the economy with CO₂, in the same frequency band, with 
the economy leading, regulators should consider that the intended effects of the carbon market 
are present, even if only in longer cycles.  
Also, results show us that there is no evidence that penalizing CO₂ emissions depleted economic 
activity in the time frame considered, controlling for final and primary energy variables. When 
the relation between carbon and the economy is significant, from mid-2011 almost until the end 
of our sample data, both variables move in phase, with the economy leading. In short, in our 
data frame, carbon prices are related with energy prices, and they follow the economy tenden-
cies. 
It is important to note that this study was conducted using data from 2008 to 2013, in Europe, 
meaning that the current economic and financial crisis has possibly influenced our results. This 
is one main reason why we included the Californian market in this study, a market with different 
operation and accounting methodologies and economic conditions. Further policy implications 
of our results in the EU ETS are referred in the discussion in chapter 4. 
To conclude, the idea that carbon prices are capturing coal and gas price information and re-
flecting it in electricity prices, allow us to say that the EU ETS is reaching stability, operating 
towards the right goal. However, we suggest tackling the need to overcome the recognized over-
supply of allowances, in order to allow for CO2 prices to directly influence primary energy prices, 
and incite further emissions reductions.   
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3.3 Part II – California: AB32 
Based on papers: 
“California Carbon Allowances Price Drivers - First Evidences” 
“CO2 price dynamics in Californian Carbon Financial Markets” 
 
3.3.1 AB32 main features 
First microeconomic computer simulations of cap-and-trade systems for cities and their emis-
sions were designed by Burton and Sanjour between 1967 and 1970 (Burton and Sanjour 1970, 
Burton et al. 1973) for the US National Air Pollution Control Administration (now called the US 
Environmental Protection Agency's Office of Air and Radiation - EPA). In subsequent years the 
first “cap-and-trade” system was implemented, under the Clean Air Act, as part of the US Acid 
Rain Program. “Acid rain”32 was mainly caused by sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides, from fossil 
fuel-burning power plants, especially coal power plants. The cap-and-trade system was con-
ceived by C. Boyden Gray, and trading started in 1995. Results show that the initial limit or ‘cap’ 
goal was reached in 2007, almost three years before the deadline, and at one fourth of the ini-
tially expected costs (EPA 2007, Napolitano et al. 2007). 
After this first example, in the last 20 years, carbon markets have become officially implemented 
in international trade. In the USA, carbon trading proposals have not yet been taken up at the 
federal level, although the Waxman-Markey bill came close. Nevertheless, state action on car-
bon markets continued, including the launch of the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI)33, 
a trading system for emissions of power generators that started in 2009, aiming to reduce green-
house gas (GHG) pollution by 10 % by 2018 based in 2009. RGGI encompasses nine Northeastern 
US states and all obligations for power plants with more than 25 MW of installed capacity.  
                                                          
 
 
32 http://www.epa.gov/airmarkt/progsregs/arp/ 
33 Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative: http://www.rggi.org/ 
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The Western Regional Climate Action Initiative34 (WRCI), 2007, formed by seven Western US 
states and four Canadian provinces, arises from the confluence of the West Coast Global Warm-
ing Initiative (2003) with the Southwest Climate Change Initiative (2006). It aims to reduce re-
gional GHG emissions to 15% below 2005 levels by 2020, using a cap-and-trade system35. How-
ever, six of the states that were initially involved preferred to act together under another agree-
ment: the “North America 2050: A Partnership for Progress” (NA2050)36. After their withdrawal, 
in 2011 the WRCI was materialized in the “Western Climate Initiative”37, a non-profit corporation 
that helps in the implementation of regional cap-and-trade schemes. In parallel, the NA2050 
was launched in March 2012 and is open to all US states, Canadian provinces and Mexican states. 
This initiative does not entail emission markets, while pursuing efforts towards the creation of 
a low-carbon economy through the collaboration in 6 thematic working groups (benefits; power; 
industry; sequestration; sustainable biomass and offsets). 
Nevertheless, California continued its tasks to implement a regional carbon market, thus keep-
ing to the original WCI milestones in the «California Cap-and-Trade Program»38, also known as 
Assembly Bill 32 (AB32): first period – 2012-2014 (compliance started in 2013); second compli-
ance period – 2015-2017, including new fuels, namely from transports; and finally 2018-2020 
the third and last period. 
California is the state responsible for the largest share of the USA gross domestic product, 13% 
in 2012, corresponding to 2 trillion US$. It is one of the largest economies in the world. Private 
services comprise 29% of its GDP in 2012. In fact, if we add other services sectors within the 
industry category we reach 62% across all services (excluding Government services)39. California 
is also the top exporting state, highly dependent on both interstate trade and international ex-
changes. Main sales sectors include electronic products and agriculture goods. 
On energy, California consumption of 7858.4 trillion BTU (2011) by end-use sectors is shared by 
residential (19%), commercial (20%), industrial (23%) and transportation (38%)40, in line with the 
                                                          
 
 
34 Western Regional Climate Action Initiative: http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/history 
35 http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/designing-the-program 
36 North America 2050 official page: http://na2050.org 
37 Western Climate Initiative, corporation: http://www.wci-inc.org/ 
38 California Cap and Trade Program: http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/capandtrade.htm 
39 All statistic economic data retrieved from US Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA) at >Interactive Data > GDP from: http://www.bea.gov/ on 7th January 2014. 
40 Energy data previous to 2012 retrieved from U.S. Energy Inf. Administration’s (EIA) > State Energy Data 
System (SEDS), http://www.eia.gov/state/data.cfm?sid=CA#ConsumptionExpenditures, 8th January 2014. 
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important role of the tertiary sector in this economy. Looking at the energy source of consump-
tion, we find a 28% share for natural gas, hence the largest energy source in the state, followed 
by motor gasoline excl. ethanol (22%) and fuels (residual, distillate and other) (21%). In smaller 
shares we find 11% from net interstate flow of electricity, 7% from biomass and other renewa-
bles, and finally, 5% from nuclear electric power, 5% from hydroelectric power, 1% from liquid 
petroleum gas (LPG) and 1% from. Final electricity use totalizes 21%40. California largely consid-
ers the need for rapid intervention capacity in these markets, consequence of the electricity 
supply crisis of 2000-2001 (Wolak 2003). 
On the production of primary energy, California produced around 2624.5 trillion BTU, 2011. Hav-
ing the largest oil fields in USA, crude oil and natural gas account for 43% and 11% of CA energy 
production. 15% from nuclear electric power and 32% for renewables complete the share. Cali-
fornia's electricity system generates more than 200 000 GWh per year. The current shares of 
generation per energy source include approximately 63% natural gas, 9% hydroelectric, 18% 
other renewables, 9% nuclear and 1% coal coal40. In fact, California produces 70% of the elec-
tricity it uses. The state imports the remaining amount from the Pacific Northwest (10%) and 
the U.S. Southwest (20%)41. Currently, electricity in California is provided by about 75 load-serv-
ing entities, including 6 large investor-owned utilities and 48 publicly-owned42. 
California challenge on electricity under AB32 is to secure supply with 33% renewable sources, 
while reducing GHG emissions. In this context and for the purpose of this paper, it is important 
to acknowledge the primary energy mix for imported electricity. In Table 1 we present power 
generation per source and geographic origin, and it is worth noting the percentage increase in 
coal and natural gas fuels, when including imports. Also, the unspecified power sources account 
for 16.40% of total generation. 
Having presented the economic and energy background of US state of California, the associated 
greenhouse gas emissions, mainly resulting from fossil fuel burning, come as no surprise43: of a 
                                                          
 
 
41 Electricity data from 2012 retrieved from CA Energy Almanac, 8th January 2014, http://energyalma-
nac.ca.gov/electricity/  
42 Load serving entities: Investor-Owned Utilities - 6; Publicly Owned Utilites - 48; Rural Electricity Coop-
eratives - 4; Native American Utilities - 3 
Other Electricity Service Providers - 14. The five largest utilities and total electricity consumption (in 2007) 
are: Southern California Edison Company (SCE) - 88,208 MMkWh; Pacific Gas and Electric Company 
(PG&E) - 85,057 MMkWh; Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP) - 24,317 MMkWh; San 
Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E) - 20,300 MMkWh; Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD) - 10,917 
MMkWh. Information in: http://energyalmanac.ca.gov/electricity/utilities.html. 
43 Methodologies used in the inventory are consistent with the 2006 IPCC guidelines, and use global warm-
ing potential (GWP) values from the IPCC Second Assessment Report. 
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total of 448 MMTCO2eq. (million metric tonnes of CO2 equivalent) emitted in 2011, 38% origi-
nates in transportation, 23% from industrial sources, 19% from electricity generation (10% im-
ported plus 9% in state), 7% from residential, other 7% from agriculture and forestry and 5% 
from commercial sectors (data: California's Greenhouse Gas Inventory by Sector & Activity44). 
 
Fuel Type 
In-State  
Generation 
Imports  
NW 
Imports  
SW 
Total Power 
Supply 
% In Total 
CA mix 
% in  
In-State mix 
Coal 1580 561 20545 22685 7,50% 0,80% 
Large Hydro 23202 12 1698 24913 8,30% 11,70% 
Natural Gas 121716 37 9242 130995 43,40% 61,10% 
Nuclear 18491  - 8763 27254 9,00% 9,30% 
Oil 90  -  - 90 0,00% 0,00% 
Other 14  -  - 14 0,00% 0,00% 
Renewables 34007 9484 3024 46515 15,40% 17,10% 
Unspecified N/A 29376 20124 49500 16,40% N/A 
Total 199101 39470 63396 301966 100% 100% 
Table 1 : Power generation in California, per source and geographic origin 
(Data source: CA Energy Almanac) 
 
California’s emission goal under AB32 is 427 MMTCO2e in 2020, i.e. equalling 1990 estimated 
emissions. The strategy to achieve this reduction (and an 80% reduction in 2050 below 1990 
levels), is presented in AB32. It includes the implementation of a cap-and-trade scheme that sets 
a limit on emitters that are globally responsible for 85% of total GHG emissions reported in the 
California inventory. Phase 1 of CA carbon market occurs between 2012 and 2014, including as 
participants, electric utilities (both producers and importers), and industrial facilities that emit 
more than 25MtCO2 per year. From 2015 on, distributors of transportation fuel, of natural gas 
and other fuels are also included. The emission permit unit is the CCA or California Carbon Al-
lowance. On initial allowances distribution, there is initially free allocation for electric utilities 
(not generators) and industrial facilities to benefit ratepayers, but which decreases over time. 
                                                          
 
 
44 California's Greenhouse Gas Inventory official page: http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/inven-
tory/data/data.htm  
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There will also be quarterly auctions of CCAs with a minimum price of $10 in 2012, rising 5% 
annually over inflation.  
An “Allowance Price Containment Reserve” (APCR) is a strategic reserve of up to 7% of all emit-
ted permits. These permits will be available for sale at auctions dates, priced at 40$/45$/50$ in 
2013, that will also increase by 5% per year above inflation (i.e. in real terms). Because these 
sales are set at pre-defined prices, a measure of knowledge and stability is provided to the mar-
ket, reducing opportunities for carbon price peaks. The APCR acts thus as a price volatility con-
trol mechanism. Also, banking of CCAs is allowed, but not borrowing from future periods. 
On the access to offset credits (credits generated by emission reduction projects that reduce 
emissions of GHG outside of California), they are allowed for compliance up to 8% of the emis-
sion limit, per emitter. They must originate in CARB approved protocols. To date, these include 
forestry, urban forestry, dairy digesters, and destruction of ozone-depleting substances pro-
jects45. They are also initially limited to projects within the country. The use of Certified Emission 
Reductions (CERs) from the Kyoto Clean Development Mechanism, the world largest offset mar-
ket, is not allowed for compliance. Finally, AB32 linked its system with that of Quebec, Canada, 
on January 2014. 
California Carbon Allowances, or CCAs, are traded in the Intercontinental Futures Exchange US 
(The ICE Futures US)46 a leading trade for commodity markets. Currently, traded products are 
CCAs Vintage Futures for 2013-2016, and corresponding options on futures. Only very recently 
the full time series for ICE CCA 2013 futures was made available by Climate Policy Initiative47. 
For this reason there still isn’t any research published on actual California carbon prices. 
 
There are only two carbon markets quoted in stock exchanges that enable access to daily prices. 
The oldest one is the European Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS). The latest emerging GHG 
market is in California, under the Assembly Bill 32 (AB32). Whereas there has been extensive 
research on carbon prices, built mainly on data from EU ETS, we present a first econometric 
analysis of the California carbon allowances prices, after they started to be traded in August 
                                                          
 
 
45 CA Compliance Offset Program official page: http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/offsets/off-
sets.htm  
46 CCA at The ICE: https://www.theice.com/productguide/ProductSpec.shtml?specId=6747556#  
47 Climate Policy Initiative official page: http://climatepolicyinitiative.org/  
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2011. The emerging greenhouse gas (GHG) market in California is an important instrument to 
meet the goal of reaching the state’s 1990 emission levels by the end of this decade. 
So far, studies on USA carbon markets have focused on design features, initially looking at na-
tional level, proposing the use of auctions for allowance allocation (Fischer et al. 1998) and later, 
modelling the Lieberman-Warner Bill (Peace and Juliani 2009). A topic that has received more 
attention has been the consideration of electricity imports when accounting GHG emissions, to 
prevent carbon leakage. Bushnell (2007), Bushnell and Chen (2012) and Bushnell et al. (2014) 
compare GHG accounting at load-serving level, «first-seller» approach and pure source-based 
system and considers that including imports has only marginal benefits in California market. The 
analyses of the power market performed by Hobbs et al. (2010) and Chen et al. (2011) also con-
clude that downstream regulation is not necessarily the most efficient. Finally, Thurber and 
Wolak (2013) simulate impacts of high-carbon-price conditions, thus also advocating permits 
auctions. 
Other sectoral features on the California carbon market and climate policy have been studied 
by Sivaraman and Moore (2012), who look at the impact of CO2 pricing on photovoltaic (PV) 
systems, and Fine et al. (2012), who study the result of avoided expenditures originated by gas-
oline and diesel fuel price spikes, due to the existence of a carbon market.  
Further literature review on carbon prices research was previously noted in the introduction of 
chapter 3. Briefly, carbon price variations origins and effects have been studied mostly through 
Granger causality tests, in a one-direction analysis. GARCH models have more recently been 
used on carbon prices volatility analysis and some use vector autoregressive models (VAR) to 
estimate the impulse-response functions between several variables, namely, stock prices of 
clean energy firms, energy and carbon markets. Previous studies of European Union Allowances 
(EUA), the carbon license unit in the EU ETS, relate carbon prices with industrial production 
(Alberola et al. 2009a) and causality from electricity prices to CO2 (Keppler and Mansanet-
Bataller 2010), from natural gas to CO2, and from CO2 and gas prices to electricity prices 
(Mansanet-Bataller et al. 2007, Fezzi and Bunn 2009). More recently Aatola et al. (2013b) show 
strong relationship between German electricity prices and gas, and coal with the European car-
bon price in 2005-2010. Lutz et al. (2013) conclude that the most important EUA drivers are 
changes on the stock market and on energy prices. To our knowledge, there is no previous study 
of the Californian carbon market prices. 
Our aim in section 3.3 is to describe what drives CCA prices in these early stages of the Califor-
nian carbon market, and the effects that these prices are already having. Looking at data from 
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CCA futures, and the AB32 accounting obligations, we relate it with variables affecting economic 
decision of emitters: primary and secondary energy prices and an economy activity index. In the 
VAR model we also include temperatures as the exogenous proxy for energy demand, in line 
with Keppler and Mansanet-Bataller (2010).  
 
3.3.2 Selected data 
Recalling the rationale presented in the similar section for the EU analysis, the main purpose of 
an emission's market is to reduce emissions at the lowest overall cost, by assigning property 
rights where they previously did not exist. So, to allocate a limited number of emission permits, 
and allowing the exchange at a price, rational agents will allocate reductions to the most cost-
effective solutions. An emitting facility will plan its emissions considering costs (e.g carbon 
price), the selling price of its good and expected trading quantities. So, carbon prices, energy 
prices, weather and the economic activity are variables that should be interconnected. 
An important difference between CA market and EU ETS regards the inclusion of crude petro-
leum and natural gas extraction sector that does not exist in Europe. All other CA trading sec-
tors48 are, in their essence, energy intensive and/or high emission sectors, such as the EU sec-
tors. Also, electricity imports are considered in CA trading through its primary energy source 
mix. Considering these AB32 market fundamentals and other previous work on European CO2 
prices causality (Alberola et al. 2009a, Fezzi and Bunn 2009, Keppler and Mansanet-Bataller 
2010, Sijm et al. 2012, Aatola et al. 2013b, Lutz et al. 2013, Nazifi 2013) our model considers 
seven variables: CO2 price (CCA), electricity, gas, coal, oil and gasoline prices, average state tem-
perature and an economic activity index ― Dow Jones Utility Index, DJU. Given a previous anal-
ysis of prices in California that showed no significant results regarding coal, gasoline and the 
economy performance, the wavelet analysis only considers the relation between carbon, elec-
tricity, oil and gas. 
 
                                                          
 
 
48 Sectors included in AB32 carbon trading: Petroleum Refineries; Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas Ex-
traction; Cement; Industrial Gas; Mineral Mining and Lime; Fruit and Vegetable Canning; Glass; Paper; 
Dairies; Iron, Steel, and Aluminium; Chemical, Biological, and Pharmaceutical; Breweries, Wineries, and 
Juice. In: http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/allowanceallocation/allowanceallocation.htm  
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CO2 
The carbon market of California (AB32) started operations in 2012, with emissions compliance 
from 2013. Currently AB32 has 3 planned phases to reduce emissions: 2012-2014, 2015-2017 
and 2018-2020. The unit of this market quoted on the stock exchange is the California Carbon 
Allowances Vintage Futures and options on these futures, for 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016. The 
products are available at The ICE46, and their daily rate is published weekly. In this study, we 
used the available daily series on the CCA Future Vintage 2013 released by Climate Policy Initia-
tive S. Francisco of The ICE data. Data was available from 29/08/2011, and 563 observations 
were included, without missing information. Average value was of 15,05 US$ per CCA, reaching 
a maximum level of 23,75 US$ and a minimum of 11,55 US$ per CCA, visible in Figure 20: 
 
 
Figure 20: California carbon prices, 2011/2013 
(Data source: The ICE46, retrieved from CPI, California Carbon Dashboard49) 
 
We represent the emission prices (CCAs), in Figure 20. The limits on US$ axis are intentionally 
10 - 40 US$, for these are the expected CCA price thresholds. 10US $ is the minimum CCA value 
at auctions and 40 US$ is the minimum price from the strategic price containment reserve. 
 
                                                          
 
 
49 California Carbon Dashboard: http://calcarbondash.org/ 
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Energy 
The AB32 program covers nearly 600 emitting facilities, responsible for 85% of CA emissions. 
Phase one includes electric utilities and large industrial facilities that emit more than 25 
MtCO2/year, and in phase two distributors of transportation, natural gas and other fuels will also 
be added. Therefore, in line with market fundamentals and mentioned authors, we expect en-
ergy markets to have an expected relation with carbon markets and energy prices were included 
in our model. We include in this category representative electricity prices, oil, natural gas and 
coal prices, and gasoline prices. 
Regarding the electricity variable, we considered the wholesale day ahead price of SP15 EZ Gen-
eration Hub, located in California. Data source is The ICE exchange. It was retrieved from the US 
Energy Information Association (EIA) information page for ten major electricity trading hubs in 
USA50. Prices are in US$/MWh and were included from 29/08/2011 to 08/11/2013, with only 19 
days of missing data. 
Oil prices regard the West Texas Intermediate (WTI) Light Sweet Crude Oil Futures (one month 
future), exchanged and available at The ICE, at US$ per US barrel ($/USbbl). No missing data. 
For natural gas prices we used Natural Gas Futures Contract 1 (Dollars per MillionBTU - MMBTU), 
or one month futures, available from the US Energy Information Association (EIA)51. The source 
is the New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) and the prices are based on delivery at the Henry 
Hub in Louisiana. Minor missing data (9 days) for the time length considered, totalizing 555 ob-
servations. 
As for coal, Powder River Basin Coal Futures, front month, were also collected from The ICE 
database. Quotation is in US$/tonne of Coal. Again, there is almost no missing data (563 obs).  
Gasoline prices are Los Angeles Reformulated RBOB Regular Gasoline spot prices, available from 
the US Energy Information Association52, in US$/gallon. One month futures are only available 
for the New York Harbor area. We selected the LA prices because spot and futures prices have 
a correlation value of 0.80, and we consider the geographic reason important. 
 
                                                          
 
 
50 EIA electricity data: http://www.eia.gov/electricity/data/browser/ 
51 EIA natural gas data: http://tonto.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/rngc1d.htm 
52 EIA gasoline data: http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_spt_s1_d.htm 
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In Figure 21, we can see the evolution of previously referred energy prices. Like in the previous 
section, we did not consider variables as the Clean Dark and Spark Spreads, or the «carbon 
switch» because they are linear combinations of variables included. 
 
 
Figure 21 : California selected energy prices, 2011/2013 
(On the left vertical axis we refer to electricity and oil prices. The right axis refers to gas and coal prices. Data sources: 
referred in text.) 
 
Economic activity 
Industries in California AB32 market are energy intensive and/or emission intensive, such as in 
the EU ETS. So, it is reasonable to expect a linkage between economic growth and their produc-
tion levels. Following Chevallier (2009), Alberola and Chevallier (2009), Keppler and Mansanet-
Bataller (2010), we included a stock exchange index as an economy performance proxy. For this 
study we chose the Dow Jones Utility Index53 (DJU), a stock index that tracks the financial activity 
of 15 large US utility companies, available at YahooFinance. Daily price returns were included, 
with only 10 days missing since 29/08/2011. There is a total of 553 observations in this time 
series. 
                                                          
 
 
53 DJU official description page: http://www.djaverages.com/index.cfm?go=utility-overview  
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Weather  
Following Keppler and M. Mansanet-Bataller (2010) we included in this work daily California 
temperatures. Using RAWS USA Climate Archive54 we gathered average values from eight rep-
resentative weather stations (Kneeland, Lassen Lodge, Black Diamond, San Jose, La Panza, Oak 
Creek, Apple Valley). Daily average of this temperatures was then calculated from 29/08/2011, 
totalizing 563 observations, without missing information. As in the EU model, this variable is 
considered in the model as exogenous. For accountability of global warming effects, tempera-
ture would have to be endogenous. However, this aspect would only be relevant if we had data 
for several decades, which is not the case. 
 
3.3.3 VAR analysis 
To estimate the dynamics amongst various variables, we will rely on a VAR model and on a set 
of impulse-response functions and Granger causality tests. We have seven endogenous variables 
and one exogenous variable, the average temperatures. The seven endogenous variables in-
clude representative prices of CO2, electricity, gas, coal, oil, gasoline and an economy stock in-
dex. To account for non-stationarity issues, all variables were transformed to first differences of 
log data. Stationarity of these time series was established by typical tests. We rely on likelihood 
ratio test statistic to decide on the number of significant lags to include in the VAR model. The 
test points towards the consideration of 18 days/lags, corresponding roughly to one month of 
daily data. 
 
3.3.3.1 Causality and feed-back relations 
The endogeneity or exogeneity of variables is a central question in VAR models, as discussed in 
section 2.1. As in the EU ETS case, temperature was the only variable considered exogenous a 
priori. For all other variables, we ran Granger causality/block exogeneity tests to perceive if any 
variable should be treated as exogenous. In these tests, a χ2 Wald statistics is given for each 
                                                          
 
 
54 Remote Automated Weather Stations (RAWS) USA Climate Archive official page: 
http://www.raws.dri.edu/  
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equation for the joint significance of each other lagged endogenous variables in the equation, 
as well as a statistic for joint significance. The results are described in Figure 22: 
 
 
Figure 22 : California prices - Granger causality tests 
Data: 29/08/2011 – 08/11/2013. Dashed/continuous arrows indicate causality at 10%/5% significance. 
 
Regarding CO2 price returns, we find significant causality from oil, gas and electricity. These are 
expected results in line with finding from other authors (Alberola et al. 2008, Creti et al. 2012, 
Aatola et al. 2013b, Lutz et al. 2013), even though these are all studies based on European data. 
However, these studies often find other and differing significant causality relations towards CO2 
that are not visible in our work. 
In a reverse view, we find a significant impact of CO2 price returns in coal, gasoline and economic 
activity. The observed influence in coal is in line with the previous section regarding European 
data. This is possibly due to the inclusion in the AB32 market of emissions from imported elec-
tricity, its energy mix (Table 1), and the high emission intensity levels (1001gCO2/kWhe55) of 
electricity generation with coal. The other energy variable where we find CO2 influence is on 
                                                          
 
 
55 Moomaw, W. et al, 2011, “Annex II: Methodology. In IPCC: Special Report on Renewable Energy 
Sources and Climate Change Mitigation” (ref. page 10),  
http://srren.ipcc-wg3.de/report/IPCC_SRREN_Annex_II.pdf , retrieved 18/03/2013  
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gasoline price returns. In fact oil refining and fuel transportation are activities already included 
in the market, so it is an expected result. Finally, our study somewhat surprisingly finds a cau-
sality relation from CO2 to the economic activity, presented as the stock index for large utility 
companies. This is an interesting result that falls out of this paper scope, and should be left for 
further studies. 
 
3.3.3.2 Impulse-response analyses 
Our most interesting results come from the impulse-response analysis. Our model requires the 
pre-definition of an order in which the variables affect each other contemporaneously. After this 
initial moment, the model runs without further assumptions. Our Cholesky order of influence 
takes into account the VAR Granger causality tests, the AB32 carbon market fundamentals and 
the current economic situation. In this model with seven endogenous variables, we propose 
that, in moment zero, oil is only impacted by its own innovation, then coal is influenced by oil’s 
innovation and its own, then natural gas, electricity, the economic activity and gasoline, follow 
the same logic, by the denoted order. Lastly, we consider carbon licences to be impacted by all 
innovations. 
 
Variance decomposition 
As referred in section 2.1.2.2, the Cholesky order is also needed when calculating the variance 
decomposition. We recall that this is auxiliary evidence of how much each variable contributes 
to each other in the model. As in the EU case, we present below, in Figure 23, the variance 
decomposition of carbon and electricity (others are available in the appendix section B.3). 
It is visible in Figure 23, graph a), regarding CO2 variance decomposition, that over time all other 
variables gain an almost similar importance. On electricity (b), around periods 5 to 10, we see 
an increase in the proportion of the economy and gasoline roles, over the electricity itself. Oil, 
carbon and other variables also gain a role in the electricity variance. 
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Figure 23 : Variance decomposition of carbon and electricity prices - CA 
 
However, our main purpose is to look to the effects in carbon prices, when having a shock in 
other variables, or, to the effects in other prices, when having a shock in carbon. These can be 
seen through impulse-response functions. 
Overall, we obtain 49 Impulse-Response Functions (IRFs). It is neither relevant nor prudent to 
analyse them all, because all our choices, such as the Cholesky ordering, were contingent on our 
interest in CO2. Therefore, we focus on the IRFs associated with this variable.  
First we look at the impact that an innovation in primary and secondary energy prices and econ-
omy performance has in CCAs. This would provide us information on the origin of California 
carbon prices. Secondly, recalling a carbon market goal of pricing emissions, we analyse the re-
sult of a CCA innovation in energy prices. Recalling that variables are in first log differences, we 
provide accumulated responses in the impulse-response functions for easier interpretation. 
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CO2 response functions 
 
 
Figure 24 : CO2 price returns accumulated responses to impulses in other variables - CA 
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(Blue line is the IRF; red dashed lines the limits of the 95% confidence interval. Grey circles indicate significance, 
whenever the function has both significative and non-significative values.) 
 
Figure 24 represents the accumulated response of CO2 to one standard deviation innovations in 
each variable. The last graph (g) in Figure 24 shows the response of a CO2 impulse to itself. In 
the first three graphs (a,b,c) we see the impact in CO2 of innovations in primary energy variables. 
All of them have periods of significative influence. Looking at natural gas we find a positive sig-
nificative impact in the 3rd and 4th day after the innovation. In the next days we don’t find signif-
icant results. It is a result that also occurs in Europe (Fezzi and Bunn 2009), and consistent with 
emission market notion that when gas prices increase there is an incentive to produce electricity 
with other fossil fuel, namely coal, that is more emission intensive, thus requiring more emission 
allowances for the same quantity of electricity produced. This is the idea behind the concepts of 
dark and spark spreads that decision makers consider when choosing the energy generation 
mix56. However, coal impulse response function does not follow this rationale. In this graph, only 
in the first period, we see a marginally significant response of CO2 to an impulse in coal. Although 
very small, the response is surprisingly positive, meaning that a positive impulse in coal prices 
has a CO2 response of the same signal. This is possibly related to the indirect connection 
indicated in Figure 22 where the coal impact reaches carbon prices via an indirect path, through 
gas prices, suggesting that, in the first instant, a rise in carbon prices would increase demand for 
natural gas, thus following the same reasoning mentioned before.  
It is worthy of notice that an impulse from the electricity price (d) has no significative result in 
CO2 in any period, contradicting the Granger causality results presented earlier. This means that 
the causal mechanism identified earlier is not related to innovations in the electricity price, sug-
gesting that electricity prices are relevant as a propagation mechanism of innovations on other 
variables. 
In short, when looking at coal (b), gas (c) and electricity (f), in California, we are analysing the 
power market. It is possible to say that mostly primary energies influence carbon prices, while 
electricity may have an indirect impact. The result that coal, gas and electricity influence carbon 
prices is very well stated in previous research about European markets (Alberola et al. 2008, 
Fezzi and Bunn 2009, Keppler and Mansanet-Bataller 2010, Mansanet-Bataller et al. 2011, 
                                                          
 
 
56 Clean dark and spark spreads display the cost-efficient option for electricity generation in one period, 
either using coal or gas power plants, considering electricity, carbon, coal and gas prices. 
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Aatola et al. 2013b, a, García-Martos et al. 2013, Lutz et al. 2013). We validate the same idea for 
the Californian market. 
Looking at oil (a) and gasoline (f) variables, more related to the transport sector, we find no 
significant response of CO2 prices to an impulse in gasoline, in any period. This is an expected 
result given that the transport sector will only be included in the emissions market in January 
2015. It should be interesting to re-analyse this feature with future data. However, we suggest 
that the importance of the future integration of the transport sector in the carbon market may 
be seen via oil prices. In the oil-carbon IRF we note a significative negative response after the 
16th period that does not fade over time. This result reinforces the idea that when there is a rise 
in the price of energies with high emission levels associated, carbon prices will decrease because 
emissions are automatically being reduced. Also, the oil price impact will withstand in future 
periods, contrasting to gas and coal impacts that disappear.  
 
CO2 impulses 
In Figure 25 we show the functions that represent the response of the several variables to inno-
vations in carbon prices. The only IRF with significant results is the one associated with coal 
prices. The coal price reaction is coherent with the result in the causality analysis (Figure 22), 
and with other European causality studies (Keppler and Mansanet-Bataller 2010).The result is 
consistent with market fundamentals: when emission price increases, then emission intensive 
fuel, such as coal, is less demanded, so its price will decrease. This is a plausible justification 
essentially because AB32 includes imported electricity emissions, which is the main origin of coal 
use. So, it is likely that CCAs are, in some small level, in a day near the impulse, negatively influ-
encing coal prices, considering at the same time the impact of all other variables in all periods. 
However, the  response becomes insignificant after the 3rd day. 
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Figure 25 : Impulses in CO2 prices and accumulated responses of CA prices. 
(Blue line is the IRF; red dashed lines the limits of the 95% confidence interval. Grey circles indicate significance, 
whenever the function has both significative and non-significative values.) 
 
Other impulse-response functions, cycles and feedback 
The following figures provide us with additional evidence on transmission mechanisms of infor-
mation between different prices. Namely, between primary and final energies, previously iden-
tified as relevant. 
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Figure 26 : Other accumulated impulse-response functions of energy prices - CA 
 
The only significant evidence appears to be the response of gas prices to a coal impulse. 
This is visible on the single cyclical relationship we find in the Granger analysis of the AB32 mar-
ket, presented in Figure 27: 
 
 
Figure 27 : Other causality relations of CO2 - CA 
 
Other interesting relation is the role of gas prices in this market. Its effect is rather scattered 
over other variables. This dubious relation is once again noted in the long-cycle analysis, in the 
following section. 
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3.3.4 Wavelets analysis 
In this section we characterize CO₂ prices interrelation with energy prices in California. We work 
in the time-frequency domain, estimating how carbon prices behave at different frequencies 
and how it evolves over time. 
We follow the previously referred studies and consider CO2 prices interrelation with energy 
prices (in our case, gas, oil and electricity). We also included an economic activity index, but 
ended up excluding it because of statistically insignificant results. These are the critical variables 
for carbon market factors. In section 3.1 we already argued that multivariate wavelet analysis is 
particularly well suited for type of study. 
The several variables are depicted in Figure 28, on the left-hand side panel, together with their 
wavelet power spectrum, on the right-hand side. The wavelet power indicates, for each moment 
of time the intensity of the variance of the time-series for each frequency of cyclical oscillations. 
This provides a first assessment of the behaviour of each variable in the time-frequency domain. 
It is interesting to note that the electricity prices are much less volatile than the other prices, 
with the blue colour dominating the most of the picture. 
In the case of carbon prices, most of the volatility is observed before early 2013, and it is espe-
cially strong in the second half of 2012, period in which the wavelet power spectrum is statisti-
cally significant simultaneously at several frequencies. It is also worth referring that there is a 
statistically significant cycle, with period of about 12 months that runs from the beginning of the 
sample until the first quarter of 2013. Additionally, the periods of high volatility do not coincide. 
While markets for gas, electricity, coal and FTSE exhibit high levels of volatility until 2010, espe-
cially at 4 months frequencies (and also at longer run cycles, such as cycles with a periodicity of 
20 months). Volatility in the CO₂ market is only apparent after 2012 and, especially, during 2013, 
at very high frequencies. Based on the wavelet power spectra it is difficult to discern any inter-
relations between these markets. 
The case of the other energy prices, gas and oil, is interesting. There are several regions of warm 
colours, both at several frequencies and several periods, but these are rarely statistically signif-
icant. In the case of Gas, the main significant region happens at high frequencies and slightly 
before mid-2012. In the case of Oil, the statistically significant region occurs for most of 2012 
(and runs until early 2013) and is concentrated in the frequencies that correspond to cycles of 
periods of about 4 to 6 months. 
Based on this preliminary analysis, it is difficult to guess how these variables relate. 
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Figure 28 : CA prices - time-series plot and time-series wavelet power spectrum 
(The black/grey contour designates the 5%/10% significance level. The cone of influence, which indicates the region 
affected by edge effects, is shown with a black line. The color code for power ranges from blue (low power) to red 
(high power). The white lines show the maxima of the undulations of the wavelet power spectrum.) 
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In Figure 29, we have the wavelet coherence between CO₂ and each of the other variables. Sev-
eral conclusions can be drawn from these results. First, and perhaps surprisingly after Figure 28, 
there are large regions of high coherence. Between Carbon and Electricity prices, coherence, at 
low frequencies, corresponding to about one-year period cycles, coherence is statistically signif-
icant across the entire sample. For these frequencies, the phase-difference is essentially zero, 
showing that the two variables co-move together. 
 
 
 
Figure 29 : CA prices - wavelet coherence and phase-differences 
(On the left we find the wavelet coherence. The thick/thin black contour designates the 5%/10% significance level. The 
color code for coherence ranges from blue (low coherence --- close to zero) to red (high coherence --- close to one). On 
the right we represent the phase-differences between CO2 and another variable (top: 2∼8 frequency band, bottom : 
8∼20 frequency band)). 
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Between carbon and Gas prices the relation is not stable across time and frequencies. Until 2013, 
for frequencies corresponding to cycles of period eight or more months, coherence is statisti-
cally significant and the phase-difference, consistently between 0 and π/2, suggests that the 
variables are in-phase with the Carbon prices leading. However, the picture changes somewhat 
when we look at higher frequencies, corresponding to period of 4 to 6 month cycles. For these 
frequencies, coherence is statistically significant from mid-2012 onwards. The phase difference 
is consistently between -π and -π/2, suggesting that variables are out-of-phase with carbon still 
leading. 
The pattern for the relation between Oil and Carbon is not homogenous either. Again, we ob-
serve a statistically significant region until late 2012 for low frequencies, with the phase-differ-
ence being very close to -π, suggesting an almost perfect out-of-phase relation -- at most with a 
slight lead for Carbon prices.  However, at higher frequencies, between 4 and 6 month period 
cycles, and running from early 2012 to early 2013, coherence is also statistically significant and 
the phase-difference is between 0 and π/2 telling us that the variables are in-phase with carbon 
prices leading. 
 
Finally, in Figure 30, we have the wavelet partial coherence between CO₂ and each variable, 
after controlling for the other variables. The results are now much cleaner. In the first half of the 
sample, the regions of high coherence are situated at 8 months frequencies for gas and oil, 
slightly stronger in this case. The phase-difference is consistently between π/2 and π for such 
frequencies showing that the variables are out-of-phase, with gas and oil leading. 
There is a rather small significant area in 4~8 months’ frequencies where gas and CO₂ are out-
of-phase with CO₂ leading, although this result should be considered with caution because of its 
size and location near the COI. 
Coherence between CO₂ and electricity is stronger for frequencies above eight months after 
2013. The phase-difference between 0 and π/2 suggests that variables are in-phase, with Carbon 
prices leading. 
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Figure 30 : CA prices - partial wavelet coherence and partial phase-differences 
(On the left we find partial wavelet coherence. The thick/thin black contour designates the 5%/10% significance level. 
The color code for coherence ranges from blue (low coherence --- close to zero) to red (high coherence --- close to one). 
On the right the partial phase-differences between CO2 and the other variable are represented (Top: 2∼8 frequency 
band. Bottom: 8∼20 frequency band)) 
 
3.3.5 AB32 synthesis of results 
In the USA there is a history of regional and sectoral emissions trading schemes, in theory and 
practice, even though the country did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol. The latest emerging GHG 
market is in California, where, under the Assembly Bill 32 (AB32), the State signed a goal of 
reaching 427 MMTCO2e in 2020, equalling 1990 estimated emissions. The proposed sustaina-
bility measures include the implementation of a carbon market.  
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In this section we present a first analysis of the carbon prices in AB32, the emerging California 
emission market. After describing the market main features, we study the interaction between 
carbon prices, energy prices including oil, gas, coal and electricity, and finally an economy per-
formance index. We also considered average temperatures in California as the only exogenous 
variable that acts as a proxy for changes in energy demand. 
In our VAR model, we first analysed Granger causality. Here, we find significant relations from 
oil, gas and electricity to CO2 price returns. In a reverse view, we find a significant connection of 
CO2 price returns in coal, gasoline and economic activity. In the IRF and MWA studies the results 
are similar, with the exception of electricity and the economy.  
On CO2 price formation we have natural gas, coal and oil significative impact of innovations. Our 
data suggests that mostly primary energies influence carbon prices, while electricity may have 
an indirect impact. In short, natural gas price has a positive result, showing an incentive to pro-
duce electricity with the more emitting thermal fuel alternative, which is coal. However, coal 
impulse does not follow this rationale, and even though the results are only very marginally 
significant, and in only one period, the response is surprisingly positive. On the variables more 
related to the transport sector, we find a negative response of carbon to an oil innovation, after 
3 weeks, which does not fade over time. The oil result of the Granger causality and IRF analysis 
is consistent with the wavelet analysis, that shows and out-of-phase, oil leading, result. How-
ever, gas shows also an out-of-phase relation, leading until half of the sample, and following at 
two irregular intervals in the last year. In fact, the gas-CO2 result is rather inconsistent. We con-
sider the possibility of this long term relation being of spurious nature. 
Regarding the impact of a carbon innovation, we find 5% significant results in the CO2-coal rela-
tion, in the daily IRF analysis, and in CO2-electricity analysis at eight month frequency. Coal is the 
fuel with highest emission intensity level for producing electricity, and electricity is 20% of Cali-
fornia total emissions. Other industries already included in the market may not have had the 
flexibility to fuel-switch, and transports, corresponding to 38% of emissions will only be included 
in the market next year. However, AB32 includes imported electricity emissions, which is the 
main use of coal. Thus, it hardly comes as a surprise the possibility that CCAs are, in some small 
level, in a day near the impulse, negatively influencing coal prices, considering at the same time 
the impact of all other variables in all periods. Also, extreme cold weather was noted during 
2013, requiring more power generation using coal, due to the insufficiency of gas. In the long 
term the direction of the result is similar to EU ETS, with electricity showing an in-phase relation 
with CO2 with CO2 leading, in the first half of the sample, at around eight months’ frequency.  
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In future research, we should consider other carbon assets such as licences for future periods, 
not yet available, as well as other variables related to the transport sector, to be included in 
2015. This is an important feature of this market, different from the EU ETS, the largest carbon 
market presently active. Further policy implications of our results in the AB32 market are re-
ferred in the discussion in chapter 4. 
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4 DISCUSSION 
Carbon markets have multiplied around the world in recent years, and are now one of the key 
policies to fight climate change. Because of this, research on prices of carbon financial assets 
grew interest as did the number of polluting facilities facing GHG emission caps. 
The work developed in previous chapters answers to two research questions about what causes 
changes in the carbon prices, i.e., what are the origins of its variations, and, on the other hand, 
what effects these variations have. These questions are divided into six sub-questions concern-
ing the role and effect of primary and final energies.  
This research is of major relevance to polluters, regulators of the carbon market, and consumers 
of energy intensive goods. In a cap-and-trade system, prices are a signal that guide the polluting 
companies' investments towards the use of cleaner fuels and energy efficiency. With the devel-
opment of the carbon markets and higher liquidity levels, the consideration of the carbon price 
on polluters' production decisions should increasingly be transmitted to their products prices. 
In our analysis, we considered two carbon markets, for higher robustness of results: the Euro-
pean EU ETS, oldest and largest, and the Californian AB32, very recent but expected to become 
one of the largest. To our knowledge, this is the first study to analyse the AB32. 
On selected data, the rationale for choosing which variables to include was similar for both mar-
kets and followed previous studies and market fundamentals. Given a pre-defined quantity cap, 
prices are what reflects the marginal cost of abatement in an emissions trading scheme. Ex-
changed quantities may give us a notion of market liquidity, but not of correlation, causality nor 
subsequent cost-pass-through information. So, to analyse the dynamics of carbon prices we in-
cluded the return rates of carbon prices, gas, coal, electricity and of a stock market index. CDM 
offsets (licences from projects that reduce emissions outside the market) were only considered 
in the European study, since the only allowed projects in the Californian market do not have 
quoted prices in the stock market. On the other hand, the California study includes oil and gas-
oline prices, variables directly related to the transport sector, which the AB32 considers under 
the market emissions cap, unlike the EU ETS. Average daily temperatures are considered as ex-
ogenous variable, in both models, as a proxy for variations in power demand. They are only 
indirectly connected to our research questions, and given the dynamic nature of our analysis, it 
would not be justifiable to consider this variable in any other form. But since previous authors 
show temperatures as a variable with significant effects in carbon and energy prices, we 
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acknowledge its effects in the impulse-response analysis. Looking to other studies, the only var-
iables not included in our research, because they are linear combinations of other variables, 
were the clean dark and spark spreads (CDS and CSS) and the switching price of carbon, indica-
tors for power utilities of the benefit of using gas or coal in power generation. 
Still regarding selected data, in particular electricity prices in the EU, it is worth noting that emis-
sions’ abatement in the power sector may refer to the replacement of lignite for hard coal, as it 
is expected to occur in Germany. However, more expensive abatement solutions may happen 
with the exchange of hard coal by gas, e.g. in Spain and the UK (Fezzi and Bunn 2009). Although 
the study of the impact of carbon in different energy mixes is interesting, as noted by Pinho and 
Madaleno (2011), our aim was to globally analyse the European carbon market. Our choice for 
the combined electricity price index “Phelix” between Austria and Germany conveys a larger 
sensitivity to changes in carbon prices, mostly because the EU carbon prices have been low. Also, 
the high level of correlation between the considered Phelix electricity price index and other 
electricity prices in Europe (ranging from 0,85 to 0,92), provided us with the right input regarding 
Europe’s power prices relation to carbon. 
We use daily prices, spot whenever possible, which García-Martos et al. (2013) regards enough 
for forecasting studies of 12, 24 or 36 months horizons. Also, in wavelet analysis, other frequen-
cies are captured through daily prices. This follows the information that abatement cost curve 
for power utilities is uncertain throughout the year, reflecting the changing demand and the 
costs of switching primary fuel. Although only having to submit emission allowances once per 
year, stakeholders operate in the daily market, buying and selling carbon permits under their 
own expectation of what the annual balance will be.  
 
On the methodology, the vector autoregression models built and the multivariate wavelet anal-
ysis are similar for Europe and California.  
In the VAR models, by allowing each of the endogenous variables to be explained by its and all 
other variables’ past values, we consider the possibility of feedback effects. From the VARs, we 
obtain Granger causality information that considers the simultaneous effects of all variables. 
Here, we observe that the variables should all be considered endogenous (Figure 9 and Figure 
22), which indicates our modelling choice. We also obtain impulse response functions, which 
allow us to analyse what happens, for example, to energy prices when there is an innovation in 
the carbon price. In spite of relying on a VAR model, because the carbon markets are very recent, 
 
-101- 
we do not consider the hypothesis of the presence of a long-term trend. Hence, we discarded 
the VECM approach. 
The multivariate wavelet analysis (MWA) is also applied to both EU and CA markets considered 
and is particularly well suited for this purpose. Energy price dynamics is nonstationary and so it 
is important to use methods that do not require stationarity. Moreover, there is evidence show-
ing that several energy markets display consistent nonlinear dependencies. The MWA tools pur-
pose is to analyse the correlation between the various prices at different frequencies. It goes 
beyond the study of daily cycles that the VAR allows. To change power supply quantities, on a 
large scale, is neither easy nor quick, so, it makes sense to consider the possibility of correlations 
in longer temporal cycles, i.e., corresponding to lower frequencies. This information, not previ-
ously examined by any author, is retrieved by multivariate wavelets analysis, which also pro-
poses causality indications that we compare with the VAR results. 
 
Below, we present a joint review of all short and long cycles results, in both markets, EU ETS and 
AB32, regarding: a) the influence of energy prices and the economy on carbon prices, and b) 
vice-versa. After, we look at the feedback relations. Observations on offsets, only considered in 
the European market, are also briefly noted. We finalize the chapter with comments on stake-
holders’ interests and policy implications 
 
The results 
For clarity purposes, we start with a summary table (Table 2) where we pinpoint the statistically 
significant results by methodology. This table indicates the importance of the variables: 
 
 
Table 2 : Outline of obtained significant results of variables relationships with carbon price 
AB32 only AB32 only EU ETS only
CO2 Electricity Gas Coal Economy Oil Gasoline CER
Cause in CO2 / 
Consequence 
of CO2
EU ETS AB32
Granger causality Granger causality
Impulse-response Impulse-response
Wavelets Wavelets
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Although Table 2 is useful to point out relations with CO2, it is obviously too simplified. It does 
not identify the directions of the relationships, indirect associations, nor the time cycle of cor-
relations. So, we now articulate the obtained results, by variable, to better understand the an-
swers to our research questions. 
An initial analysis of the power spectrum of each variable shows that the features of energy and 
carbon markets are different between EU and CA. Volatilities in CA were significative in 2012, 
while, in the EU, they were more visible until 2011. In this background, considering both these 
markets in our analysis provides us with more robust results. 
 
a) The origin of carbon prices variations 
Here we look at the upper triangles of Table 2. Electricity, gas, oil and the economy outdo other 
variables in explaining the variations of CO2.  
These results are in line with Chevallier (2011d) regarding the direct and fading effect of the 
economy, but refute Keppler and Mansanet-Bataller (2010) that only find direct effects from 
electricity and coal. Although only referring to the EU ETS phase I, Fezzi and Bunn (2009) find 
immediate impact of gas prices, but not of electricity. 
First, we note that, in EU ETS carbon price, we found higher volatility after 2012, which may 
relate to the political uncertainties over the third phase of the market, starting in 2013. In AB32 
market, the volatility of carbon price returns is rather dispersed after 2012, the beginning of the 
market and not as evident as in the EU ETS.  
In more detail, looking at electricity effects, we find Granger causality, for daily cycles, in both 
markets. The European result of the impulse-response function is consistent and proposes a 
positive impact of permanent effects. This is in line with the information that power generation 
emits a large part of CO2e emissions. So, if the electricity price rises, the CO2 price is expected to 
act accordingly. However, in California, an electricity shock does not have a significant response, 
opposing the Granger causality result.  
The economy shows an important positive role towards the carbon price, at all levels (causality 
in short and long cycles, and impulse-response) in the European market. However, in daily cy-
cles, the impact is of short duration, fading after the first periods. On eight to twenty months’ 
cycles, after the start of phase III (2012), we find evidence suggesting the existence of a yearly 
association between these variables. This is possibly due to changes in the carbon market that 
make it more able to react to macroeconomic factors, including the ending of free allocation of 
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carbon allowances to the power sector. We also find indirect rebound effects on the economy 
(Figure 9 : EU prices - Granger causality tests), arguing Chevallier (2011d), though he is only re-
ferring to the carbon-economy connection. However, we agree that this relationship is robust 
to shocks in other variables (Hintermann 2010, Chevallier 2011d). No evidence is presented of 
any influence of the economy variable in California.  
On primary fuels effects on CO2 price, namely gas and oil, we see they are much more significant 
in the AB32 market.  
Oil price analysis provides the most coherent results. It shows a direct Granger causality, nega-
tive and permanent at daily and longer cycles. It is an expected result, not yet analysed by pre-
vious authors. One could argue the importance of oil in the economy, and a correlation/causality 
inaccuracy, but in AB32 we see that the economy does not have a significant effect on carbon 
prices, while oil does. So they are most likely independent results. This result reinforces the idea 
that when there is a rise in the price of energies with high emission levels associated, carbon 
prices will decrease because emissions are automatically being reduced. Also, the oil price im-
pact will withstand in future periods, contrasting to gas and coal impacts that disappear. This 
variable was not considered in the EU analysis because the distributors of transport and heating 
fuels are not included in the EU ETS.  
On gas prices, the results are significative for daily cycles, in Europe and California. Although, in 
Europe, we do not find a direct causality connection, it may be observed through an indirect 
path via electricity prices (Figure 16), sustained by the respective IRF (Figure 13). As expected, 
in both EU and CA, the relation is positive but of very short duration, disappearing after the first 
periods. This is coherent with the idea that the marginal cost of emissions abatement is equal 
to the gas price, when referring to the management of the dispatch order in power utilities. 
However, we didn’t find significant evidence of correlation in longer cycles, in the EU ETS, and 
the evidence found in AB32 is most possibly of a spurious nature. 
Finally, we also look at coal prices, although they only present significative impact in carbon in 
the impulse analysis in CA, and in long-cycles analysis in EU. Furthermore, the response of CO2 
to a coal innovation in CA is surprisingly positive. The explanation that presents itself regards 
the indirect relationship via cycle identified in the Granger causality (Figure 15), an idea that we 
validate through an impulse-response function between coal and gas (Figure 13). In contrast, 
the EU wavelet analysis results showed a negative relation, at lower frequencies (cycles 8 ~ 20 
months), in line with the energy and carbon market fundamental idea that when a very polluting 
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source has a price increase, the carbon price does not need to follow, and may even decrease, 
for emissions are already being controlled. 
 
It can be said that European carbon prices mostly reflect electricity price variations and eco-
nomic developments, and therefore only consider information on the price of final energy. 
While in California, prices of gas and oil are the most important. This difference may be ex-
plained by the lag between the ages of both markets, and by the inclusion of the transport sec-
tor, and electricity imports, per fuel, in CA carbon market. 
 
b) Conversely, significant influences of CO2 are less than desired. 
Now we interpret the lower triangles of Table 2. Briefly, only electricity, coal and CERs present 
evidence of the impact of variations in carbon price return rates. The remaining relations arise 
only in the Granger causality relations, of the AB32 market, and are neither supported by signif-
icant impulse-response functions, nor by the analysis of longer cycles. Once more, the eight 
month cycle relation with gas is briefly visible in the AB32 market. However, as mentioned in the 
previous analysis, we support the idea that this relation is of spurious nature, because of its lack 
of consistency. 
On coal, in Europe and California, there is evidence of Granger causality from carbon. This result, 
while statistically valid, is only supported by the respective impulse-response function in the 
AB32 market, where an innovation in the carbon price has significant response of the price of 
coal. In principle, the coal market is a global market driven by global developments (Keppler and 
Mansanet-Bataller 2010), an evidence reflected in the significant impact of stock market devel-
opments in coal prices, consistent with Keppler and Mansanet-Bataller (2010). This is also em-
phasised in Europe by the impact of gas prices, a coal 'substitute', in electricity generation. How-
ever, in the AB32 market, the coal result is not present in longer cycles’ analysis. Our theory is 
that this may be due to the inclusion of electricity imports, by fuel origin, in the California carbon 
market. Half of the electricity used is GHG emitter, and of this half, almost one third comes from 
coal. So, it is possible to assess that the price of the final 7% of electricity used in California 
originating from coal is influenced by information on the variation of carbon prices, in the first 
days after a shock in CO2. 
We also found another indication of causality concerning impacts of changes in carbon prices 
on electricity prices. The result arises in EU when there is an innovation in carbon pricing, and 
in both EU and CA studies at lower frequencies, which captures relations in longer cycles. In EU 
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shorter cycles, it occurs indirectly via coal prices or developments in the economy, disappearing 
after the first days following the innovation. This outcome follows the current general opinion 
that carbon prices are too low to have an immediate impact. However, the results are significant 
at eight months’ frequency in CA and eight to twenty months frequency in EU. This result refutes 
previous analysis made with EU ETS phase I data, where an immediate and permanent causation 
is found from carbon to electricity (Fezzi and Bunn 2009, Keppler and Mansanet-Bataller 2010, 
Pinho and Madaleno 2011). However, with phase II daily-cycle data, even if only for the first 
years, Keppler and Mansanet-Bataller (2010) fail to find this relation, supporting our result.  
With our results, we may suggest that only on a yearly basis power producers and regulators are 
inputting information of carbon prices in electricity prices. This is new information not captured 
by previous authors, which contributes to better understand the timing of price effects in a car-
bon market. 
Resuming the two most significant impacts of carbon prices, our work notes an explicit effect on 
electricity, but not so explicit on coal. It seems that power suppliers are passing on the emission 
cost of using coal in their generation mix to the consumers through the electricity price, which 
is consistent with a low price demand elasticity of this good. 
Finally, and only in California, an indication of carbon influence arises in gasoline prices, and the 
stock market index, as Granger causality indications. 
It is also important to note that results show us that there is no evidence that penalizing CO₂ 
emissions depleted economic activity in the time frame considered. In short, in EU, carbon 
prices are related with energy prices, and they follow the economy tendencies, as mentioned 
above. No significant information on the direction of effects was found in the CA market. 
On CERs, we recall they regard offset emissions of projects developed under the Clean Develop-
ment Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol. This mechanism aims to assist developing coun-
tries in their sustainable development journey by allowing Annex I countries (industrialized 
countries) to finance projects to reduce emissions in Annex II (developing) countries. For these 
projects, emissions credits (CERs) are generated. CERs are only recognized in the EU ETS, so they 
were not considered in the AB32 analysis.  
The CERs price, independent of the European carbon market, is shown to be influenced by the 
carbon price, as our initial hypothesis poses. This is because the EU ETS recognizes CERs in the 
fulfilment of an installation cap, up to a maximum of 10%. It is a positive relation, which meets 
the definition of a substitute good. The reverse is not visible because the developing country 
party that receives CERs, whenever harbouring a mitigation project, does not necessarily sells it 
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to European companies. CERs were not considered in the MWA because of the recent downfall 
in the CDM market. Expected results of this variable would never be sufficiently important to 
justify the additional computation needed. 
 
One evident indirect result of carbon markets is the strengthening of the link between gas and 
electricity prices (Fezzi and Bunn 2009), visible in the respective impulse-response functions. 
There is a clear indication, as it is supposed to happen, for power producers to exchange the use 
of coal by gas, at the margin, visible in the carbon price effects on primary energy.  
With our results in mind, in a very wider approach, we may say that carbon should reflect the 
marginal cost of gas. In this line of thought, Fezzi and Bunn (2009) even recall the real possibility 
of gas inheriting the geopolitical risk characteristics of oil via carbon markets. However, one 
must not forget that the marginal abatement cost, in the end, is guided by supply and demand 
of abatement itself. This aspect is very closely related to the problems associated with over-
allocation of licenses that happened in the EU ETS. The amount to which this overallocation is 
mitigating the carbon price effect is being analysed by proper institutions, such as the EC, and is 
a topic for future research.  
 
Research answers 
Given the critical role that the included variables have, not only on a sectoral perspective but 
also considering their essential role in the economy of any country, our multivariate analysis at 
different frequencies provides evidence that the dynamic cross-correlations between variables 
are significant, therefore, useful for forecasting in future research. This work led to important 
results, namely the discovery of new relationships between energy, carbon and the economy 
variables, synthesized in the following answers to our research questions: 
 
On carbon price drivers 
1. Do final energy prices impact carbon price? 
Yes, in case of electricity. No significant results are found regarding gasoline. The electricity has, 
however, an undeniable positive impact on carbon, for daily prices, immediate and permanent 
in the European case. In this case, our hypothesis is supported. 
2. Do primary energy prices impact carbon price? 
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Yes, but only oil has permanent effects, and influence in longer cycles. We also found evidence 
of the immediate and short-duration influence from gas and coal prices. This relation mostly 
occurs in California. The direction is the expected, from gas (positive) and oil (negative). How-
ever, the positive connection with coal comes by an indirect path via gas prices.  
 
3. Finally, on the macroeconomic perspective, does the level of economic activity trans-
lates into the carbon market?  
Yes, positively, in the early periods and also longer time cycles, in the European market. This 
result is less robust than expected, because it does not have permanent effects, and it is not 
significant in the AB32 study. However it makes sense to be especially significant in the analysis 
of longer cycles. 
 
On carbon price effects 
1. Does carbon price influences final energy prices, including electricity and gasoline?  
Yes, there is a positive impact on electricity prices, in both markets for longer cycles (4~8 in AB32 
and 8~10 in EU ETS). It is also visible in the EU ETS daily analysis, disappearing after the first days. 
As for gasoline, there is only an indication of causality in the California market, not sustained by 
any other analysis. 
 
2. Does carbon prices influence primary energy prices, including natural gas, coal and oil? 
Only in the case of coal. This is visible in the Granger causality analysis in both markets, and in 
the AB32 coal response. As expected, the relation is negative.  
 
3. Does the permit price impact the offset price (CER) in the EU ETS? 
Yes, in a positive direction. As these licenses are substitutes of the EU ETS allowances to comply 
with the emission target, up to a limit of 10%, and are not recognized in any other market, the 
positive relationship found from the EUA to CER proves our original hypothesis. 
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Comments on stakeholders’ interests and policy implications 
The study and results presented here have tangible utility for companies under emission limits, 
for financial traders involved in carbon markets, for carbon and energy regulators, and also for 
consumers of energy intensive goods. 
On the one hand, we obtained information on responses to shocks in different prices, key data 
for financial decisions of polluting companies and brokers. Hedging strategies in energy and car-
bon markets, to offset the risk of any adverse price movements, should consider that the rela-
tionships between prices are not constant. Our results demonstrate the need to take into ac-
count temporal information and direction of different shocks as well as the correlation at differ-
ent frequencies. Concisely, our evidences from the short cycle’s analysis facilitate the portfolio 
risk management of energy and carbon financial market players. 
On the other hand, carbon prices origins and effects are also needed information to study and 
analyse the market operation and efficiency. In this perspective, the results we obtain in MWA 
for lower frequencies are of particular relevance to market regulators, States and also emitting 
companies, because they provide a perception of the annual relationships between decision 
variables. In the following paragraphs, we briefly comment on policy implications of our results 
in the EU and CA markets, and propose recommendations for the improvement of both emis-
sions trading schemes. 
Recently, Europe proposed a new policy framework for climate and energy, for 2030, where a 
reform of the EU ETS is presented. It is the regulator reaction to low carbon price levels, conse-
quence of an overallocation of permits. It includes the establishment of a market stability re-
serve and an automatic adjustment of the allowances available in each allocation auction. The 
proposal refers that, starting in 2021, 12% of the total allowances in year x-2, shall be placed in 
the reserve. With the results from this study we consider that the intended effects of the carbon 
market are present, even if only in longer cycles. Knowing this, we propose that the EU ETS mar-
ket stability reserve percentage (currently 12%), should be reviewed yearly or, at least, every 
two years, to account for the effects observed of carbon price in the electricity price, of coal and 
carbon relation, and finally, of the economy in the carbon price. It should not have an effect in 
the overall economic level variations. Recalling that the reserve amount is calculated using the 
allowances’ number from two years before, it is relevant to repeat this study closer to 2019, and 
observe if new results are consistent with the ones presented here. Shorter cycle measures ap-
plied to the carbon market, such as the cancellation of a limited number of privately owned 
auctions, shouldn't have a significant effect in energy prices. Only structural, long-term 
 
-109- 
measures, such as a retirement of a number of allowances or early revision of the linear reduc-
tion factor should matter. 
Regarding the recent Californian market, by the end of the first year of compliance (2013), the 
main source of information on financial carbon markets indicates an average of 1.8 MM weekly 
traded licenses in 2013, reaching 2.5 by the end of the year (The ICE, 201457), which displays an 
increase in market liquidity. However, a simultaneous fall in prices since the start of the year 
indicates that the market is probably facing an allowances’ surplus. Three other aspects may be 
contributing to this surplus: first, the banking rules of AB32, allowed for future periods, though 
subject to some limits; second, the growing renewable power production, and increase in rain, 
in the Spring, fuelling hydro power plants; and finally, more recently, fewer than expected emis-
sions originating in Québec, recently linked to the California carbon market. These three reasons 
may cause the prices to remain near the bottom limit until 2020. The surplus problem has also 
been affecting the European market for almost eight years, and California tried to overcome it 
by defining, in advance, market mechanisms to control the prices. They include a price floor at 
auctions and a price containment reserve to ‘slow down’ peaks. Despite this potential problem, 
there has been a growth of sales of licenses for future years, conveying the idea that the AB32 
market will continue to operate, with credibility. 
However, a possible dissatisfaction in AB32 is expected after 2015, in the 2nd period, when con-
sumers will be directly affected by greenhouse gas emissions limits in transport and home heat-
ing fuels (by the inclusion of their distributors in the carbon market). The causal link between 
CO2 and gasoline is already apparent in our study, although not significant when we cause a 
shock in the price of carbon. We expect this relationship to intensify and gain significance when 
new phase data is included. Until now, the carbon market was only tangible to consumers in a 
‘positive’ way, when residents and small merchants received their 'climate' credits in the elec-
tricity bills. These credits regard the devolutions of values of sold carbon allowances that were 
allocated for free in the beginning of the year, and that the power generators did not use. Rules 
of the market state that they should be sold and its value given to customers. This is in line with 
our results that the carbon price did not influence the price of electricity in California in the first 
year.  
                                                          
 
 
57 Carbon market North America available at https://www.point-
carbon.com/polopoly_fs/1.3478414!CMNA20131220.pdf  
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Free allocation is not currently planned for fuels distributors, though one could argue that the 
licenses not used by the power sector could be channelled to them. Our evidence shows causal-
ity in variations from carbon towards gasoline prices, as an expected outcome of the carbon 
market, in future periods. However, attending the possible situation of a licences surplus, free 
allocation is an approach that may escalate the problem. Another option is to recommend cos-
tumers to save their ‘climate credits’ to accommodate the expected increase in gasoline and 
heating fuel prices. In this case, it would be an indirect way of supporting an increase in fuel 
prices, and even in future electricity prices, if that is to be the case, without tampering with the 
climate goal. 
Looking to our results, the first year of compliance of the AB32 market may revive emissions’ 
trading as a favoured measure for climate change mitigation, under the doubts mainly brought 
by licenses’ surplus issues in the EU ETS and now in the AB32 market. But even in the recent 
AB32 there were significant relations between variables, most in the right directions (namely 
from carbon to coal and to gasoline) and the case of electricity reflecting the situation of allow-
ances surplus (from electricity to carbon). 
One should note some main structural differences between the EU ETS and AB32 market that 
are advantageous in terms of market efficiency. In AB32, the inclusion of fuels distributors, the 
accounting of electricity imports per fuel, the existence of a price floor and ceiling, and the re-
turn to consumers of the selling value of free allocated licences that have not been used. In EU 
ETS, the no-banking of licenses rule between periods. The AB32 features mean that the carbon 
price contains more information on GHG emitting activities and, more importantly, allows con-
sumers of energy-intensive goods to be more aware of the cost of emissions. These are aspects 
that each market should be aware of in the other. 
To finalize, we note that the results obtained in this study allow further knowledge on carbon 
markets and enhance previous research in three perspectives: 
• A complete analysis of the multiple direction relationships between energy prices and 
carbon, considering effects of the economy and temperature; 
• The study of effects on different frequencies that a single multivariate analysis does not 
show, using an innovative application of wavelets simultaneously to carbon and energy 
markets; 
• More consistent information about carbon markets, by including phase III of EU ETS, 
excluding the test phase (I), and by considering the results in the new AB32.  
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5 FINAL REMARKS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
In the current economic uncertainty context with climate change concerns, rise of primary en-
ergy prices, and numerous carbon markets that have multiplied around the world in recent 
years, there is an urge to develop quantitative tools that allow us to model and understand the 
origins and effects of variations in carbon prices. With this mission, this work answers to two 
major research questions about what causes changes in carbon prices, and what impacts those 
changes have on energy prices. It provides a complete and coherent analysis of carbon prices’ 
variations vs. the role and effect of primary and final energies. Results have operational and 
political implications, highly relevant to main players in the market: polluters and regulators.  
Previous research on carbon markets proliferated after EU ETS phase I (mostly published post 
2009) and focussed on the study of the market itself, in aspects such as the sources of price 
variation, market design including allocation or offsets role, volatility, etc. Few have analysed 
both origins and implications of carbon prices in energy markets.  
On the methodology, most preceding studies on carbon prices essentially explain the price or 
volatility of one variable in terms of others. This exogeneity assumption is very controversial in 
energy markets, so, to overcome this issue, we consider a multiple direction approach by devel-
oping a VAR model, and applying multivariate wavelet analysis. The use of VAR models for time 
series analysis is customary in macroeconomics or finance research (Silvestrini and Veredas 
2008), but not in the analysis of energy vs carbon markets relation (García-Martos et al. 2013). 
There are only four studies that consider effects between variables – energy prices and carbon 
prices – in both directions. Fezzi and Bunn (2009) and Pinho and Madaleno (2011) both build a 
VECM that analyses mutual relationships between electricity, gas and carbon prices. However, 
the scope of the research by Fezzi and Bunn (2009) is gas, electricity and carbon prices in the 
United Kingdom. Pinho and Madaleno (2011), on another perspective, aim to analyse the effects 
on the energy-mix of several EU countries. Chevallier (2011d) builds a VAR Markov-Switching 
model, to analyse the connection between macroeconomics and carbon prices. And finally, 
García-Martos et al. (2013) build a conditionally heteroscedastic dynamic factor model and com-
pare prediction accuracy between a multivariate and univariate model of energies, carbon, and 
offset prices, suggesting that the multivariate model improves forecasting accuracy. On another 
approach, Keppler and Mansanet-Bataller (2010) use repeated standard Granger causality tests 
to analyse carbon and energy prices causality. Although it is in its core an independent equa-
tions’ analysis, the authors propose interesting causality connections between variables. 
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Building on preceding research on carbon prices, in particular in the above mentioned authors, 
our study makes a solid approach to the causes and effects of a carbon price and its variations. 
For that, we follow two complementary approaches: first we develop a VAR model, to capture 
multivariate interaction between variables, and second, we analyse the data in a time-frequency 
dimension, through multivariate wavelet analysis (MWA) tools recently developed by Aguiar-
Conraria and Soares (2014). The MWA purpose is to analyse the correlation between the various 
prices at different frequencies. Energy price dynamics is nonstationary and so it is important to 
use methods that do not require stationarity. MWA tools allow to go beyond the study of daily 
cycles that the VAR allows, using an adequate methodology, indicative of existent relationships 
in other, longer, cycles than daily. We note that changes in power supply quantities, on a large 
scale, are neither easy nor quick. So, it makes sense to consider the presence of long-term deci-
sions, or at lower frequencies, i.e., correlations in longer temporal cycles. This information is 
retrieved by MWA, which also proposes causality indications that we compare with the VAR 
results. Also, to our knowledge, the MWA has never been applied before in any study. 
Furthermore, previous research related to the development of carbon markets, mentioned 
throughout the chapters, only include EU ETS data for obvious availability reasons. This is a mar-
ket characterized throughout its life by an oversupply of allowances. In this work, we additionally 
included the analysis of AB32, the Californian carbon market, for comparison and to assess more 
robust conclusions. Also, the vast majority of cases also includes data from EU ETS Phase I (2005-
2007), the pre-Kyoto period, which we discarded, for consistency reasons. In short, the included 
endogenous variables were carbon prices, electricity prices (peak and baseload in EU), gas, coal, 
oil (CA only) and gasoline (CA only) prices, an economy performance index and CER prices (EU 
only). 
From this work, we obtain a more comprehensive analysis of the interactions of energy and 
carbon markets than those presented in previous research, in particular Fezzi and Bunn (2009), 
Keppler and Mansanet-Bataller (2010), Chevallier (2011d), and García-Martos et al. (2013), the 
closest to the object of this work. 
 
Our proposed hypothesis of carbon price drivers included positive immediate reactions from 
impacts of electricity and gasoline. This hypothesis is substantiated in the electricity analysis. No 
significant results are found regarding gasoline. The electricity has, however, an undeniable pos-
itive impact on carbon, for daily prices, immediate and permanent in the European case.  
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On primary energy, we hypothesized a positive connection originating from gas prices and neg-
ative from oil and coal. However, only oil showed permanent effects and influence in longer 
cycles. We also found evidence of the immediate and short-duration impact from gas and coal 
prices. This relation mostly occurs in California. The direction is the expected, from gas (positive) 
and oil (negative). However, the positive connection with coal comes by an indirect path via gas 
prices.  
Regarding the existence of substitutes for carbon licences, we did not expect, nor did find, a 
significant effect on the carbon price.  
On the economy role, we expected a positive, fast, reaction from the carbon market, which we 
found. However, the result is not as robust as anticipated because the impact does not have 
permanent effects in EU, and it is not significant in the AB32 study at any level. Nevertheless, it 
makes sense to be especially significant in the analysis of longer cycles, which we found in EU. 
In short, our results showed us that electricity, gas, oil and the economy outdo other variables 
in explaining the variations of CO2 prices, electricity and economy in Europe and gas and oil in 
California. 
 
On carbon price effects, we hypothesized a positive relation from carbon to final energies, which 
we found in electricity at longer cycles (4~8 in AB32 and 8~10 in EU ETS). The impact is also 
visible in the EU ETS daily analysis, disappearing after the first days. As for gasoline, there is only 
an indication of causality in the California market, not sustained by any other analysis. 
We also expected a negative relationship from carbon towards coal prices and positive relation-
ship towards gas and oil. However, the only significant relation found was in the case of coal. 
This is visible in the Granger causality analysis in both markets and in the AB32 coal response, 
which we consider to be related to the inclusion of imported electricity per fuel. As expected, 
the relation is negative.  
Also, results show us that there is no evidence that penalizing CO₂ emissions depleted economic 
activity in either market. 
Finally, as hypothesized, we also found a positive impact of carbon prices from the EU ETS in 
offset prices (from emission reduction projects outside the EU ETS). As these licenses are sub-
stitutes of the EU ETS allowances to comply with the emission target, up to a limit of 10%, and 
are not recognized in any other market, the positive relationship found from the EUA to CER 
proves our initial hypothesis. 
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Briefly, electricity, coal and CERs present evidence of the impact of variations in carbon price 
return rates. The economy does not present effects of the carbon markets. Electricity effects 
are visible in both markets whereas coal effects are more evident in AB32. CERs were only ana-
lysed in EU ETS. 
 
Our results have policy implications for both carbon markets. For the EU ETS, we propose that 
the market stability reserve percentage (currently 12%), should be reviewed yearly or, at least, 
every two years, to account for the effects observed of the carbon price in the electricity price, 
of coal and carbon relation, and finally, of the economy in the carbon price. The results also 
suggest that short cycle measures applied to the carbon market, such as the cancellation of a 
limited number of privately owned auctions, shouldn't have a significant effect in energy prices. 
Regarding the AB32 market, we expect gasoline prices to reflect the carbon price with more 
significance in future years. However, we advise against free allocation of licenses to fuel dis-
tributors in 2015, given the possible surplus of licenses in the market. Instead, we recommend 
costumers to save their ‘climate credits’ to accommodate the expected increase in gasoline and 
heating fuels prices.  
On the main structural differences between the EU ETS and AB32 market, we consider that, in 
AB32, the carbon price contains more information on GHG emitting activities and allows con-
sumers to be more aware of the cost of emissions. This happens because of the inclusion of fuels 
distributors, the accounting of electricity imports per fuel, the existence of a price floor and ceil-
ing, and the return to consumers of the selling value of free allocated licences that have not 
been used. However, in EU ETS, the banking of licenses is not allowed between periods, while in 
AB32 is, which is not beneficial to the problem of overallocation. Both markets have aspects to 
learn from each other. 
Comparing the overall EU and CA results obtained in our study, we note that the results of AB32 
are dimmer than those of EU ETS. This evidence was expected, since the AB32 is extremely re-
cent (2012), and we included data prior to its start. It will be interesting in future studies to verify 
the development of reactions of final energy to the price of carbon. Finally, regarding our study, 
the most inquisitive relationships that we found regard carbon-to-gas and carbon-to-coal prices. 
These relations will benefit from a deeper analysis when more data is available. Furthermore, in 
addition to the price analysis, we recommend that a market liquidity analysis via quantities of 
exchanged allowances would support this study. Unfortunately, at this time, the allowances vol-
ume data was not yet publicly available from stock exchanges. 
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It is also important to note that this study was conducted using data from 2008 to 2013, in Eu-
rope, meaning that the current economic and financial crisis may have had an influence. It will 
be interesting to complete this analysis with data from other carbon markets, namely with dif-
ferent economic conditions, such as the Chinese. 
There are other interesting features that were not addressed by this study because they do not 
relate directly to the goal of our research. Nevertheless, they are central enough to be noted as 
subject for further studies. Transversely, future work may include analysis of the implications 
that arise on structural differences between the European and Californian carbon markets. Spe-
cifically, the analysis of the impact of the existence of upper and lower limits for carbon prices 
in AB32, unlike in the EU ETS, in the price differential between the two markets, and the effect 
that may have on prices of final and primary energy. Moreover, the impact on the European 
carbon price of considering electricity imports emissions, by source, and of fossil fuel distribu-
tors’ emissions regarding the transport sector. On another view, the linkage of markets happen-
ing now, namely the connection established between the AB32 and Québec in January 2014 and 
the possible future link of the EU ETS to the Australian market, may also bring consequences to 
the price of carbon.  
Finally, our results should also experience modifications in the case of technology develop-
ments, namely in carbon capture and storage, because the emission factor of a power plant 
equipped with this technology will be much less than the standard EF considered. Currently 
there are only pilot projects operating, so, to study its impact is our last recommendation for 
further studies. 
 
On stakeholders’ interests, the presented results and methodology have tangible utility for com-
panies under emission limits, for financial traders involved in carbon markets, for carbon and 
energy regulators, and also for consumers of energy intensive goods. Main practical applications 
include portfolio optimization for utilities, development of hedging strategies in energy and car-
bon markets, and market regulation and enhancement. Knowledge on origins and effects of car-
bon prices will improve the quality in decision making of all parties involved. 
 
To conclude, the obtained results allow further knowledge on carbon markets and enhance pre-
vious research in three perspectives: first, we present a complete analysis of the multivariate 
relationship between energy prices and carbon, considering effects of the economy and tem-
perature. Second, we study effects on different frequencies that a single multivariate analysis 
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does not show, using an innovative application of wavelets simultaneously to carbon and energy 
markets. And finally, third, we consider more consistent information about carbon markets, by 
including phase III of the European market, excluding the test phase (I), and by considering the 
results of the new California carbon market. 
Among previously referred specific conclusions, we finalize stating that electricity, gas, oil and 
the economy drive variations of CO2 prices, and CO2 prices are impacting electricity mostly in 
longer cycles and coal, in daily analysis, but with very short-timed effects. This is valuable 
knowledge that will improve decision making quality of all parties involved in energy and carbon 
markets. 
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APPENDIX - DATA OUTPUT AND ECONOMETRIC TESTS 
A European data 
A.1 Econometric data tests 
Stationarity data analysis 
Below we present the results of unit root testing. We use the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test 
(Dickey and Fuller 1979) , with the MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values. For lag selection we 
consider the Akaike Info Criterion. 
Variable (levels) Integration order Differentiated variable 
ADF t-stat 
log(CO2) I(1) -8.587657 
log(CER) I(1) -7.315691 
log(ele_p) I(1) -34.71840 
log(ele_b) I(1) -26.61462 
log(gas) I(1) -12.93957 
log(coal) I(1) -7.912795 
log(econ) I(1) -18.93649 
 
Other unit root tests such as Phillips-Perron (1988) and Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin 
(KPSS, 1992) yield similar results at 1% significance. 
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A.2 VAR Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
VAR Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
Date: 12/07/13   Time: 16:08  
Sample: 1/02/2008 9/30/2013  
Included observations: 807  
    
    
    
Dependent variable: CERS2  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    CO2S2  99.02701 21  0.0000 
COAL2  18.42716 21  0.6218 
ELECT_B2  24.44686 21  0.2719 
ELECT_P2  20.23657 21  0.5063 
FTSE_3002  11.59575 21  0.9499 
GAS2  5.442039 21  0.9997 
    
    
All  172.6456 126  0.0037 
    
        
Dependent variable: CO2S2  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    CERS2  63.20821 21  0.0000 
COAL2  22.57589 21  0.3670 
ELECT_B2  34.64928 21  0.0308 
ELECT_P2  33.42373 21  0.0417 
FTSE_3002  36.34624 21  0.0200 
GAS2  16.32755 21  0.7510 
    
    All  182.9404 126  0.0007 
    
    
    
Dependent variable: COAL2  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    CERS2  9.885429 21  0.9804 
CO2S2  36.51699 21  0.0191 
ELECT_B2  16.95910 21  0.7136 
ELECT_P2  17.02325 21  0.7097 
FTSE_3002  34.61127 21  0.0311 
GAS2  54.99657 21  0.0001 
    
    
All  191.3412 126  0.0002 
    
        
Dependent variable: ELECT_B2  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    CERS2  14.79532 21  0.8331 
CO2S2  20.61268 21  0.4828 
COAL2  15.01395 21  0.8223 
ELECT_P2  28.77608 21  0.1195 
FTSE_3002  34.88607 21  0.0291 
GAS2  47.86061 21  0.0007 
    
    
All  176.3949 126  0.0021 
    
        
Dependent variable: ELECT_P2  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    CERS2  11.85070 21  0.9436 
CO2S2  11.39516 21  0.9545 
COAL2  18.01230 21  0.6482 
ELECT_B2  18.00957 21  0.6484 
FTSE_3002  24.10306 21  0.2881 
GAS2  57.88432 21  0.0000 
    
    All  151.4116 126  0.0611 
    
    
    
Dependent variable: FTSE_3002  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    CERS2  9.323784 21  0.9864 
CO2S2  16.25709 21  0.7550 
COAL2  38.89758 21  0.0101 
ELECT_B2  30.79992 21  0.0771 
ELECT_P2  41.34748 21  0.0051 
GAS2  44.93163 21  0.0018 
    
    
All  202.1573 126  0.0000 
    
        
Dependent variable: GAS2  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    CERS2  8.915378 21  0.9899 
CO2S2  13.02263 21  0.9078 
COAL2  21.51825 21  0.4277 
ELECT_B2  35.74538 21  0.0233 
ELECT_P2  39.74374 21  0.0080 
FTSE_3002  15.51662 21  0.7962 
    
    All  145.1583 126  0.1166 
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A.3 Variance decomposition 
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A.4 VAR output 
 Vector Autoregression Estimates      
 Date: 12/07/13   Time: 16:08      
 Sample (adjusted): 9/17/2008 9/30/2013     
 Included observations: 807 after adjustments     
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]     
        
         CERS2 CO2S2 COAL2 ELECT_B2 ELECT_P2 FTSE_3002 GAS2 
        
        CERS2(-1) -0.108282 -0.014941  0.005033  0.022918  0.017669 -0.005203  0.002303 
  (0.04104)  (0.02383)  (0.01180)  (0.01342)  (0.01565)  (0.00920)  (0.02273) 
 [-2.63820] [-0.62695] [ 0.42660] [ 1.70768] [ 1.12869] [-0.56588] [ 0.10132] 
        
CERS2(-2)  0.086973  0.044040 -0.009110  0.001580  0.008476 -0.003234  0.002296 
  (0.04163)  (0.02417)  (0.01197)  (0.01361)  (0.01588)  (0.00933)  (0.02306) 
 [ 2.08915] [ 1.82199] [-0.76132] [ 0.11609] [ 0.53382] [-0.34680] [ 0.09959] 
        
CERS2(-3)  0.006987  0.037952  0.007215  0.001479  0.008117  0.001058 -0.004910 
  (0.04001)  (0.02323)  (0.01150)  (0.01308)  (0.01526)  (0.00896)  (0.02216) 
 [ 0.17463] [ 1.63384] [ 0.62746] [ 0.11306] [ 0.53194] [ 0.11804] [-0.22159] 
        
CERS2(-4) -0.089048 -0.081262 -0.000843  0.015773  0.013783  0.006919  0.001681 
  (0.04009)  (0.02327)  (0.01152)  (0.01311)  (0.01529)  (0.00898)  (0.02220) 
 [-2.22147] [-3.49151] [-0.07312] [ 1.20339] [ 0.90154] [ 0.77043] [ 0.07573] 
        
CERS2(-5)  0.051606 -0.006858 -0.000324  0.003503 -0.007640  0.002891 -0.003979 
  (0.04119)  (0.02392)  (0.01184)  (0.01347)  (0.01571)  (0.00923)  (0.02281) 
 [ 1.25280] [-0.28675] [-0.02738] [ 0.26009] [-0.48627] [ 0.31324] [-0.17440] 
        
CERS2(-6)  0.055624  0.035562 -0.004245  0.005955  0.007330 -0.002613  0.012357 
  (0.04041)  (0.02346)  (0.01162)  (0.01321)  (0.01541)  (0.00905)  (0.02238) 
 [ 1.37643] [ 1.51561] [-0.36544] [ 0.45070] [ 0.47557] [-0.28864] [ 0.55211] 
        
CERS2(-7) -0.029311  0.016034 -0.014890  0.011501  0.012582 -0.003869  0.019411 
  (0.04005)  (0.02325)  (0.01151)  (0.01309)  (0.01527)  (0.00897)  (0.02218) 
 [-0.73191] [ 0.68956] [-1.29353] [ 0.87828] [ 0.82375] [-0.43120] [ 0.87517] 
        
CERS2(-8)  0.035476  0.000277  0.000244  0.009775 -0.000154 -0.001551 -0.004276 
  (0.03939)  (0.02287)  (0.01132)  (0.01288)  (0.01502)  (0.00882)  (0.02181) 
 [ 0.90067] [ 0.01210] [ 0.02154] [ 0.75893] [-0.01028] [-0.17572] [-0.19600] 
        
CERS2(-9) -0.098367 -0.022698 -0.003813  0.015137  0.015387 -0.004874  0.004454 
  (0.03933)  (0.02284)  (0.01131)  (0.01286)  (0.01500)  (0.00881)  (0.02178) 
 [-2.50082] [-0.99387] [-0.33723] [ 1.17691] [ 1.02563] [-0.55313] [ 0.20448] 
        
CERS2(-10) -0.109344  0.021834  0.003242  0.007700  0.010725  0.000313  0.010102 
  (0.03938)  (0.02286)  (0.01132)  (0.01288)  (0.01502)  (0.00882)  (0.02181) 
 [-2.77687] [ 0.95500] [ 0.28640] [ 0.59808] [ 0.71416] [ 0.03547] [ 0.46326] 
        
CERS2(-11)  0.117629  0.052883  0.001553  0.005389  0.004854  0.003687  0.017730 
  (0.03938)  (0.02287)  (0.01132)  (0.01288)  (0.01502)  (0.00882)  (0.02181) 
 [ 2.98677] [ 2.31267] [ 0.13722] [ 0.41852] [ 0.32317] [ 0.41793] [ 0.81286] 
        
CERS2(-12)  0.013135  0.080274 -0.000472  0.001865  0.003014  0.001011  0.002393 
  (0.03903)  (0.02266)  (0.01122)  (0.01276)  (0.01489)  (0.00874)  (0.02162) 
 [ 0.33651] [ 3.54208] [-0.04208] [ 0.14616] [ 0.20243] [ 0.11558] [ 0.11071] 
        
CERS2(-13) -0.063460  0.078233  0.014126  0.017471  0.012688  0.013720  0.014302 
  (0.03928)  (0.02281)  (0.01129)  (0.01284)  (0.01498)  (0.00880)  (0.02175) 
 [-1.61557] [ 3.43028] [ 1.25110] [ 1.36032] [ 0.84690] [ 1.55913] [ 0.65746] 
        
CERS2(-14)  0.075441 -0.039629  0.004711  0.000695 -0.004129  0.002650  0.022785 
  (0.03970)  (0.02305)  (0.01141)  (0.01298)  (0.01514)  (0.00889)  (0.02199) 
 [ 1.90034] [-1.71928] [ 0.41286] [ 0.05357] [-0.27268] [ 0.29799] [ 1.03636] 
        
CERS2(-15)  0.093429  0.012707  0.007090 -0.006606  0.002411  0.012502  0.016009 
  (0.03961)  (0.02300)  (0.01139)  (0.01295)  (0.01511)  (0.00887)  (0.02194) 
 [ 2.35856] [ 0.55248] [ 0.62272] [-0.50999] [ 0.15960] [ 1.40883] [ 0.72974] 
        
CERS2(-16)  0.096956  0.017077 -0.016903 -0.010621 -0.010876 -0.006986  0.007275 
  (0.03966)  (0.02303)  (0.01140)  (0.01297)  (0.01513)  (0.00889)  (0.02197) 
 [ 2.44450] [ 0.74154] [-1.48267] [-0.81898] [-0.71898] [-0.78626] [ 0.33117] 
        
CERS2(-17)  0.101727 -0.003741 -0.004962 -0.003907 -0.010491  0.000995  0.004479 
  (0.03887)  (0.02257)  (0.01117)  (0.01271)  (0.01483)  (0.00871)  (0.02153) 
 [ 2.61687] [-0.16574] [-0.44411] [-0.30735] [-0.70756] [ 0.11425] [ 0.20804] 
        
CERS2(-18) -0.079401  0.073771 -0.003727  0.022283  0.016097 -0.003078  0.036459 
  (0.03902)  (0.02266)  (0.01122)  (0.01276)  (0.01488)  (0.00874)  (0.02161) 
 [-2.03478] [ 3.25604] [-0.33232] [ 1.74646] [ 1.08159] [-0.35212] [ 1.68706] 
        
CERS2(-19) -0.168452 -0.016946  0.002503  0.007676  0.005771 -0.004183  0.015716 
  (0.03954)  (0.02296)  (0.01137)  (0.01293)  (0.01508)  (0.00886)  (0.02190) 
 [-4.26007] [-0.73809] [ 0.22018] [ 0.59369] [ 0.38266] [-0.47224] [ 0.71763] 
        
CERS2(-20)  0.074949  0.018686  0.007067  0.002812  0.007132  0.004654  0.007668 
  (0.03978)  (0.02309)  (0.01143)  (0.01301)  (0.01517)  (0.00891)  (0.02203) 
 [ 1.88430] [ 0.80912] [ 0.61814] [ 0.21625] [ 0.47011] [ 0.52233] [ 0.34809] 
        
CERS2(-21) -0.085776  0.001207  0.009075 -0.017188 -0.020669  0.004132 -0.019256 
  (0.03825)  (0.02221)  (0.01100)  (0.01251)  (0.01459)  (0.00857)  (0.02118) 
 
-134- 
 [-2.24239] [ 0.05433] [ 0.82539] [-1.37425] [-1.41669] [ 0.48221] [-0.90896] 
        
CO2S2(-1)  0.062368  0.084257 -0.000869  0.052092  0.024706  0.012256 -0.040031 
  (0.07468)  (0.04336)  (0.02146)  (0.02442)  (0.02848)  (0.01673)  (0.04136) 
 [ 0.83517] [ 1.94326] [-0.04047] [ 2.13338] [ 0.86743] [ 0.73259] [-0.96792] 
        
CO2S2(-2) -0.297643 -0.195483 -0.036649 -0.037770 -0.045530 -0.022960 -0.048101 
  (0.07367)  (0.04277)  (0.02117)  (0.02409)  (0.02810)  (0.01650)  (0.04080) 
 [-4.04040] [-4.57034] [-1.73083] [-1.56806] [-1.62048] [-1.39124] [-1.17899] 
        
CO2S2(-3)  0.015673 -0.045555 -0.015123  0.005886  0.000635  0.004945  0.013819 
  (0.07396)  (0.04294)  (0.02126)  (0.02418)  (0.02821)  (0.01657)  (0.04096) 
 [ 0.21192] [-1.06085] [-0.71137] [ 0.24339] [ 0.02253] [ 0.29848] [ 0.33737] 
        
CO2S2(-4)  0.186426  0.154347  0.011172  0.014134  0.015847 -0.022204 -0.035737 
  (0.07165)  (0.04160)  (0.02059)  (0.02343)  (0.02733)  (0.01605)  (0.03968) 
 [ 2.60195] [ 3.71021] [ 0.54249] [ 0.60332] [ 0.57989] [-1.38334] [-0.90062] 
        
CO2S2(-5) -0.190032 -0.070114  0.000985 -0.038867 -0.043218  0.017639 -0.006546 
  (0.07243)  (0.04205)  (0.02082)  (0.02368)  (0.02762)  (0.01623)  (0.04011) 
 [-2.62370] [-1.66726] [ 0.04732] [-1.64115] [-1.56446] [ 1.08709] [-0.16318] 
        
CO2S2(-6) -0.072254 -0.059833  0.024071  0.009013  0.011925  0.001292 -0.036076 
  (0.07102)  (0.04123)  (0.02041)  (0.02322)  (0.02709)  (0.01591)  (0.03933) 
 [-1.01740] [-1.45103] [ 1.17921] [ 0.38815] [ 0.44026] [ 0.08124] [-0.91722] 
        
CO2S2(-7)  0.064766 -0.020319 -0.041452 -0.030680 -0.028326 -0.002794  0.034152 
  (0.07111)  (0.04129)  (0.02044)  (0.02325)  (0.02712)  (0.01593)  (0.03938) 
 [ 0.91078] [-0.49214] [-2.02800] [-1.31950] [-1.04441] [-0.17538] [ 0.86719] 
        
CO2S2(-8)  0.112685  0.025090 -0.043964  0.010529  0.011679  0.000651  0.007955 
  (0.07050)  (0.04093)  (0.02026)  (0.02305)  (0.02689)  (0.01579)  (0.03904) 
 [ 1.59847] [ 0.61300] [-2.16970] [ 0.45678] [ 0.43436] [ 0.04121] [ 0.20375] 
        
CO2S2(-9)  0.011813  0.015660 -0.038916  0.000232 -0.008838 -0.017410  0.018439 
  (0.07212)  (0.04187)  (0.02073)  (0.02358)  (0.02751)  (0.01616)  (0.03994) 
 [ 0.16379] [ 0.37399] [-1.87732] [ 0.00984] [-0.32132] [-1.07755] [ 0.46165] 
        
CO2S2(-10)  0.299859  0.020410  0.008026 -0.000575 -0.013162  0.001206  0.003211 
  (0.07145)  (0.04149)  (0.02054)  (0.02336)  (0.02725)  (0.01601)  (0.03957) 
 [ 4.19669] [ 0.49197] [ 0.39078] [-0.02462] [-0.48296] [ 0.07533] [ 0.08115] 
        
CO2S2(-11)  0.036285 -0.014729 -0.008412 -0.030015 -0.000466  0.008247  0.031601 
  (0.07895)  (0.04584)  (0.02269)  (0.02581)  (0.03011)  (0.01769)  (0.04372) 
 [ 0.45961] [-0.32131] [-0.37070] [-1.16272] [-0.01547] [ 0.46629] [ 0.72274] 
        
CO2S2(-12) -0.024422 -0.198249  0.046914 -0.021217 -0.028001 -0.008757 -0.025299 
  (0.08118)  (0.04714)  (0.02333)  (0.02654)  (0.03096)  (0.01819)  (0.04496) 
 [-0.30083] [-4.20590] [ 2.01045] [-0.79928] [-0.90433] [-0.48149] [-0.56270] 
        
CO2S2(-13)  0.266153 -0.020045  0.028090  0.000490 -0.000915  0.011871  0.005512 
  (0.08236)  (0.04782)  (0.02367)  (0.02693)  (0.03141)  (0.01845)  (0.04561) 
 [ 3.23156] [-0.41918] [ 1.18658] [ 0.01818] [-0.02914] [ 0.64338] [ 0.12085] 
        
CO2S2(-14) -0.112990 -0.037986 -0.000158 -0.040293 -0.044553 -0.005249  0.008133 
  (0.08428)  (0.04894)  (0.02423)  (0.02756)  (0.03215)  (0.01888)  (0.04668) 
 [-1.34062] [-0.77624] [-0.00650] [-1.46210] [-1.38599] [-0.27800] [ 0.17424] 
        
CO2S2(-15) -0.190485  0.005950  0.001700  0.046833  0.022911 -0.013967 -0.046954 
  (0.08278)  (0.04807)  (0.02379)  (0.02707)  (0.03157)  (0.01855)  (0.04585) 
 [-2.30101] [ 0.12379] [ 0.07144] [ 1.73020] [ 0.72565] [-0.75310] [-1.02415] 
        
CO2S2(-16) -0.011381 -0.176945  0.031312  0.022687  0.030482  0.029079  0.033443 
  (0.08350)  (0.04848)  (0.02400)  (0.02730)  (0.03185)  (0.01871)  (0.04625) 
 [-0.13629] [-3.64953] [ 1.30454] [ 0.83090] [ 0.95707] [ 1.55444] [ 0.72314] 
        
CO2S2(-17) -0.003701 -0.094481  0.006731 -0.010433 -0.006404  0.014947  0.056476 
  (0.08294)  (0.04816)  (0.02384)  (0.02712)  (0.03164)  (0.01858)  (0.04594) 
 [-0.04462] [-1.96184] [ 0.28233] [-0.38468] [-0.20243] [ 0.80439] [ 1.22944] 
        
CO2S2(-18)  0.245217 -0.088393  0.044440 -0.004664 -0.008207  0.013446 -0.062201 
  (0.08292)  (0.04814)  (0.02383)  (0.02711)  (0.03163)  (0.01858)  (0.04592) 
 [ 2.95731] [-1.83600] [ 1.86457] [-0.17201] [-0.25951] [ 0.72384] [-1.35447] 
        
CO2S2(-19) -0.115144  0.106890  0.007870 -0.031239 -0.031893  0.005949  0.013857 
  (0.08323)  (0.04833)  (0.02392)  (0.02722)  (0.03175)  (0.01865)  (0.04610) 
 [-1.38339] [ 2.21182] [ 0.32897] [-1.14783] [-1.00465] [ 0.31905] [ 0.30061] 
        
CO2S2(-20) -0.152271 -0.110836  0.009129 -0.024618 -0.030123 -0.010781  0.011351 
  (0.08457)  (0.04910)  (0.02431)  (0.02765)  (0.03226)  (0.01895)  (0.04684) 
 [-1.80051] [-2.25718] [ 0.37556] [-0.89026] [-0.93389] [-0.56901] [ 0.24235] 
        
CO2S2(-21)  0.056631 -0.010020 -0.050090 -0.025091 -0.007033  0.035021 -0.038822 
  (0.08021)  (0.04657)  (0.02306)  (0.02623)  (0.03059)  (0.01797)  (0.04442) 
 [ 0.70600] [-0.21515] [-2.17252] [-0.95663] [-0.22988] [ 1.94885] [-0.87389] 
        
COAL2(-1)  0.210650 -0.000470 -0.037482  0.035174 -0.019409  0.001429  0.010010 
  (0.13728)  (0.07970)  (0.03946)  (0.04489)  (0.05236)  (0.03075)  (0.07603) 
 [ 1.53450] [-0.00589] [-0.94991] [ 0.78364] [-0.37070] [ 0.04647] [ 0.13167] 
        
COAL2(-2) -0.029185  0.013011 -0.062605  0.045719  0.022890  0.035413 -0.000624 
  (0.13805)  (0.08015)  (0.03968)  (0.04514)  (0.05265)  (0.03093)  (0.07646) 
 [-0.21141] [ 0.16232] [-1.57770] [ 1.01283] [ 0.43474] [ 1.14505] [-0.00816] 
        
COAL2(-3)  0.025106 -0.012679  0.064637 -0.003750 -0.041601 -0.009095  0.020614 
  (0.14986)  (0.08701)  (0.04308)  (0.04900)  (0.05716)  (0.03357)  (0.08300) 
 [ 0.16753] [-0.14571] [ 1.50054] [-0.07652] [-0.72783] [-0.27092] [ 0.24837] 
        
 
-135- 
COAL2(-4)  0.008542  0.185485 -0.036790 -0.018879 -0.024055  0.069765  0.052483 
  (0.13182)  (0.07654)  (0.03789)  (0.04310)  (0.05028)  (0.02953)  (0.07301) 
 [ 0.06480] [ 2.42345] [-0.97096] [-0.43800] [-0.47845] [ 2.36239] [ 0.71889] 
        
COAL2(-5)  0.140550 -0.034782 -0.001688 -0.020956 -0.013236  0.051301 -0.045991 
  (0.13005)  (0.07551)  (0.03738)  (0.04252)  (0.04960)  (0.02913)  (0.07202) 
 [ 1.08076] [-0.46064] [-0.04515] [-0.49283] [-0.26686] [ 1.76085] [-0.63856] 
        
COAL2(-6)  0.124945  0.059570 -0.037753 -0.047717 -0.070181 -0.039949 -0.087008 
  (0.12721)  (0.07386)  (0.03657)  (0.04160)  (0.04852)  (0.02850)  (0.07045) 
 [ 0.98216] [ 0.80649] [-1.03246] [-1.14713] [-1.44645] [-1.40174] [-1.23496] 
        
COAL2(-7) -0.046014  0.054808 -0.007843 -0.032414 -0.040392 -0.001476  0.057028 
  (0.12863)  (0.07469)  (0.03697)  (0.04206)  (0.04906)  (0.02882)  (0.07124) 
 [-0.35772] [ 0.73385] [-0.21211] [-0.77068] [-0.82332] [-0.05122] [ 0.80053] 
        
COAL2(-8) -0.019772 -0.061808  0.043311  0.040990  0.063085  0.034621  0.018814 
  (0.12818)  (0.07442)  (0.03684)  (0.04191)  (0.04889)  (0.02872)  (0.07099) 
 [-0.15425] [-0.83049] [ 1.17553] [ 0.97800] [ 1.29041] [ 1.20564] [ 0.26502] 
        
COAL2(-9)  0.237825 -0.063851  0.051318 -0.016222 -0.024504  0.063252  0.066909 
  (0.13100)  (0.07606)  (0.03765)  (0.04283)  (0.04996)  (0.02935)  (0.07255) 
 [ 1.81546] [-0.83948] [ 1.36289] [-0.37873] [-0.49043] [ 2.15527] [ 0.92224] 
        
COAL2(-10)  0.081822  0.178458  0.043421 -0.010621 -0.018624  0.028325 -0.110542 
  (0.12573)  (0.07300)  (0.03614)  (0.04111)  (0.04795)  (0.02817)  (0.06963) 
 [ 0.65079] [ 2.44466] [ 1.20152] [-0.25835] [-0.38838] [ 1.00564] [-1.58755] 
        
COAL2(-11) -0.005226 -0.045628  0.036198 -0.071729 -0.115075 -0.039460  0.050594 
  (0.12742)  (0.07398)  (0.03663)  (0.04166)  (0.04860)  (0.02855)  (0.07057) 
 [-0.04101] [-0.61674] [ 0.98833] [-1.72160] [-2.36785] [-1.38233] [ 0.71695] 
        
COAL2(-12) -0.058909  0.041546 -0.011322 -0.007757  0.010814 -0.009475  0.012854 
  (0.12914)  (0.07498)  (0.03712)  (0.04223)  (0.04926)  (0.02893)  (0.07152) 
 [-0.45615] [ 0.55407] [-0.30500] [-0.18371] [ 0.21955] [-0.32751] [ 0.17972] 
        
COAL2(-13)  0.256524  0.114373  0.018085  0.007836  0.005311  0.029015  0.000822 
  (0.12962)  (0.07526)  (0.03726)  (0.04238)  (0.04944)  (0.02904)  (0.07179) 
 [ 1.97904] [ 1.51971] [ 0.48541] [ 0.18488] [ 0.10742] [ 0.99921] [ 0.01146] 
        
COAL2(-14)  0.083892  0.060744 -0.034061 -0.030518  0.005711  0.058409  0.072612 
  (0.12715)  (0.07382)  (0.03655)  (0.04157)  (0.04849)  (0.02848)  (0.07042) 
 [ 0.65981] [ 0.82283] [-0.93199] [-0.73406] [ 0.11777] [ 2.05059] [ 1.03119] 
        
COAL2(-15)  0.157303 -0.111088 -0.003681  0.000937 -0.016965 -0.040690  0.003385 
  (0.12848)  (0.07460)  (0.03693)  (0.04201)  (0.04900)  (0.02878)  (0.07116) 
 [ 1.22431] [-1.48912] [-0.09966] [ 0.02230] [-0.34620] [-1.41366] [ 0.04757] 
        
COAL2(-16) -0.134397  0.023037  0.009803  0.037009  0.020675  0.029204 -0.003496 
  (0.12689)  (0.07367)  (0.03647)  (0.04149)  (0.04840)  (0.02843)  (0.07027) 
 [-1.05916] [ 0.31269] [ 0.26876] [ 0.89200] [ 0.42720] [ 1.02733] [-0.04975] 
        
COAL2(-17)  0.162927  0.036892 -0.018829  0.074827  0.074414 -0.048944  0.153849 
  (0.13020)  (0.07559)  (0.03742)  (0.04257)  (0.04966)  (0.02917)  (0.07211) 
 [ 1.25140] [ 0.48804] [-0.50315] [ 1.75770] [ 1.49856] [-1.67804] [ 2.13367] 
        
COAL2(-18) -0.096931 -0.028067 -0.062757 -0.016960  0.005941 -0.026804  0.051878 
  (0.13166)  (0.07645)  (0.03785)  (0.04305)  (0.05022)  (0.02950)  (0.07292) 
 [-0.73619] [-0.36715] [-1.65825] [-0.39395] [ 0.11832] [-0.90872] [ 0.71144] 
        
COAL2(-19) -0.016866 -0.088799 -0.019775  1.85E-05  0.025366  0.050816  0.068883 
  (0.13002)  (0.07549)  (0.03737)  (0.04251)  (0.04959)  (0.02913)  (0.07201) 
 [-0.12971] [-1.17624] [-0.52911] [ 0.00043] [ 0.51151] [ 1.74451] [ 0.95657] 
        
COAL2(-20) -0.189115 -0.019382 -0.020628 -0.028823 -0.052891  0.010355  0.095243 
  (0.12862)  (0.07468)  (0.03697)  (0.04206)  (0.04906)  (0.02882)  (0.07123) 
 [-1.47029] [-0.25953] [-0.55793] [-0.68532] [-1.07815] [ 0.35936] [ 1.33703] 
        
COAL2(-21)  0.022177 -0.089743  0.048350  0.023929  0.013122 -0.028585 -0.139898 
  (0.13173)  (0.07648)  (0.03786)  (0.04307)  (0.05024)  (0.02951)  (0.07295) 
 [ 0.16836] [-1.17335] [ 1.27694] [ 0.55556] [ 0.26118] [-0.96863] [-1.91762] 
        
ELECT_B2(-1) -0.133876 -0.234779 -0.079504 -0.329161 -0.207196 -0.108007 -0.047399 
  (0.29325)  (0.17027)  (0.08429)  (0.09589)  (0.11185)  (0.06570)  (0.16241) 
 [-0.45652] [-1.37889] [-0.94321] [-3.43282] [-1.85251] [-1.64403] [-0.29185] 
        
ELECT_B2(-2)  0.059337 -0.009092  0.001709 -0.082066 -0.025715 -0.003232 -0.394800 
  (0.29309)  (0.17017)  (0.08424)  (0.09583)  (0.11178)  (0.06566)  (0.16232) 
 [ 0.20246] [-0.05343] [ 0.02029] [-0.85635] [-0.23005] [-0.04922] [-2.43227] 
        
ELECT_B2(-3) -0.226324 -0.229487 -0.122396 -0.153830 -0.018873 -0.050128 -0.137267 
  (0.28641)  (0.16629)  (0.08232)  (0.09365)  (0.10924)  (0.06416)  (0.15862) 
 [-0.79021] [-1.38001] [-1.48675] [-1.64262] [-0.17277] [-0.78125] [-0.86539] 
        
ELECT_B2(-4)  0.193694  0.083955  0.037926  0.000749  0.059868  0.016520 -0.332656 
  (0.25247)  (0.14659)  (0.07257)  (0.08255)  (0.09629)  (0.05656)  (0.13982) 
 [ 0.76719] [ 0.57272] [ 0.52262] [ 0.00907] [ 0.62173] [ 0.29207] [-2.37909] 
        
ELECT_B2(-5) -0.285561 -0.047146 -0.028429 -0.105109 -0.015580 -0.001960 -0.007036 
  (0.25534)  (0.14825)  (0.07339)  (0.08349)  (0.09739)  (0.05720)  (0.14141) 
 [-1.11837] [-0.31801] [-0.38736] [-1.25895] [-0.15998] [-0.03427] [-0.04976] 
        
ELECT_B2(-6) -0.515805 -0.233548 -0.008988 -0.017873  0.001078 -0.134374 -0.137224 
  (0.24792)  (0.14395)  (0.07126)  (0.08106)  (0.09456)  (0.05554)  (0.13730) 
 [-2.08052] [-1.62245] [-0.12613] [-0.22048] [ 0.01140] [-2.41936] [-0.99942] 
        
ELECT_B2(-7)  0.412585  0.122739 -0.029417  0.068616  0.108548 -0.103620  0.062445 
  (0.24575)  (0.14269)  (0.07064)  (0.08036)  (0.09373)  (0.05506)  (0.13610) 
 
-136- 
 [ 1.67887] [ 0.86019] [-0.41644] [ 0.85391] [ 1.15809] [-1.88210] [ 0.45881] 
        
ELECT_B2(-8)  0.149297 -0.014812 -0.037538 -0.137059 -0.088928 -0.030730 -0.003560 
  (0.25559)  (0.14840)  (0.07347)  (0.08357)  (0.09748)  (0.05726)  (0.14155) 
 [ 0.58412] [-0.09981] [-0.51096] [-1.63999] [-0.91224] [-0.53668] [-0.02515] 
        
ELECT_B2(-9) -0.107298 -0.022223  0.044000  0.039173  0.125676 -0.036088  0.101911 
  (0.25442)  (0.14772)  (0.07313)  (0.08319)  (0.09704)  (0.05700)  (0.14091) 
 [-0.42173] [-0.15044] [ 0.60167] [ 0.47089] [ 1.29513] [-0.63315] [ 0.72326] 
        
ELECT_B2(-10) -0.132639 -0.319327 -0.050027 -0.111865 -0.153326 -0.066858 -0.113003 
  (0.24981)  (0.14504)  (0.07180)  (0.08168)  (0.09528)  (0.05596)  (0.13835) 
 [-0.53097] [-2.20161] [-0.69672] [-1.36954] [-1.60927] [-1.19467] [-0.81680] 
        
ELECT_B2(-11) -0.307424 -0.035468  0.037551 -0.089365 -0.130406 -0.052821  0.168237 
  (0.25615)  (0.14873)  (0.07363)  (0.08376)  (0.09770)  (0.05738)  (0.14186) 
 [-1.20017] [-0.23848] [ 0.51002] [-1.06697] [-1.33481] [-0.92047] [ 1.18592] 
        
ELECT_B2(-12) -0.638892 -0.338788  0.020975  0.121638  0.131516 -0.016710  0.186470 
  (0.25948)  (0.15066)  (0.07459)  (0.08485)  (0.09897)  (0.05813)  (0.14371) 
 [-2.46215] [-2.24867] [ 0.28122] [ 1.43364] [ 1.32887] [-0.28744] [ 1.29756] 
        
ELECT_B2(-13) -0.052500 -0.095346 -0.079960  0.017244  0.049577 -0.055046 -0.346843 
  (0.25476)  (0.14792)  (0.07323)  (0.08330)  (0.09717)  (0.05707)  (0.14109) 
 [-0.20608] [-0.64458] [-1.09193] [ 0.20701] [ 0.51022] [-0.96447] [-2.45826] 
        
ELECT_B2(-14) -0.424773 -0.442059 -0.112215 -0.038185 -0.016903  0.005238 -0.310062 
  (0.26361)  (0.15306)  (0.07577)  (0.08620)  (0.10054)  (0.05906)  (0.14599) 
 [-1.61135] [-2.88817] [-1.48096] [-0.44300] [-0.16812] [ 0.08870] [-2.12379] 
        
ELECT_B2(-15) -0.517949 -0.141108 -0.070026  0.006573 -0.003742 -0.032424 -0.268966 
  (0.25795)  (0.14977)  (0.07415)  (0.08434)  (0.09838)  (0.05779)  (0.14286) 
 [-2.00792] [-0.94215] [-0.94444] [ 0.07793] [-0.03803] [-0.56108] [-1.88272] 
        
ELECT_B2(-16) -0.002259  0.086550  0.123726  0.090306  0.072914 -0.048800 -0.044260 
  (0.25178)  (0.14619)  (0.07237)  (0.08233)  (0.09603)  (0.05641)  (0.13944) 
 [-0.00897] [ 0.59204] [ 1.70961] [ 1.09693] [ 0.75929] [-0.86517] [-0.31741] 
        
ELECT_B2(-17) -0.111246  0.096430  0.015911  0.031764  0.066594  0.165963 -0.163911 
  (0.24860)  (0.14434)  (0.07146)  (0.08128)  (0.09481)  (0.05569)  (0.13768) 
 [-0.44750] [ 0.66808] [ 0.22267] [ 0.39077] [ 0.70236] [ 2.98001] [-1.19054] 
        
ELECT_B2(-18) -0.032090  0.358731 -0.093456  0.106046  0.132234 -0.021802 -0.117304 
  (0.25598)  (0.14862)  (0.07358)  (0.08370)  (0.09763)  (0.05735)  (0.14177) 
 [-0.12536] [ 2.41366] [-1.27018] [ 1.26699] [ 1.35445] [-0.38019] [-0.82745] 
        
ELECT_B2(-19)  0.125164 -0.044934 -0.048061  0.022686  0.045220  0.093423  0.042787 
  (0.24564)  (0.14262)  (0.07061)  (0.08032)  (0.09369)  (0.05503)  (0.13604) 
 [ 0.50955] [-0.31506] [-0.68069] [ 0.28246] [ 0.48267] [ 1.69768] [ 0.31452] 
        
ELECT_B2(-20) -0.125220  0.176938 -0.052014 -0.008961 -0.003250 -0.066782  0.036796 
  (0.25597)  (0.14862)  (0.07357)  (0.08370)  (0.09763)  (0.05734)  (0.14176) 
 [-0.48920] [ 1.19054] [-0.70696] [-0.10707] [-0.03329] [-1.16458] [ 0.25956] 
        
ELECT_B2(-21) -0.285773  0.148825  0.040676  0.102435  0.030093  0.058027 -0.182227 
  (0.25115)  (0.14582)  (0.07219)  (0.08212)  (0.09579)  (0.05626)  (0.13909) 
 [-1.13787] [ 1.02060] [ 0.56346] [ 1.24739] [ 0.31416] [ 1.03133] [-1.31013] 
        
ELECT_P2(-1)  0.086778  0.225533  0.157514  0.292778  0.198714  0.050775  0.210717 
  (0.25490)  (0.14800)  (0.07327)  (0.08335)  (0.09722)  (0.05710)  (0.14117) 
 [ 0.34045] [ 1.52390] [ 2.14988] [ 3.51283] [ 2.04400] [ 0.88916] [ 1.49268] 
        
ELECT_P2(-2) -0.141588 -0.026404  0.057234 -0.004822 -0.028886 -0.019200  0.362684 
  (0.25766)  (0.14960)  (0.07406)  (0.08425)  (0.09827)  (0.05772)  (0.14270) 
 [-0.54951] [-0.17649] [ 0.77279] [-0.05724] [-0.29393] [-0.33263] [ 2.54159] 
        
ELECT_P2(-3)  0.260843  0.260702  0.055808  0.053358 -0.052697  0.047613  0.146034 
  (0.25253)  (0.14662)  (0.07259)  (0.08257)  (0.09632)  (0.05657)  (0.13986) 
 [ 1.03292] [ 1.77804] [ 0.76885] [ 0.64620] [-0.54713] [ 0.84161] [ 1.04417] 
        
ELECT_P2(-4) -0.082191 -0.078987 -0.025371 -0.065028 -0.103559 -0.006964  0.289046 
  (0.23175)  (0.13456)  (0.06661)  (0.07578)  (0.08839)  (0.05192)  (0.12835) 
 [-0.35465] [-0.58700] [-0.38086] [-0.85813] [-1.17160] [-0.13413] [ 2.25201] 
        
ELECT_P2(-5)  0.174549  0.035559  0.015205  0.094503  0.002776  0.005990  0.141165 
  (0.23640)  (0.13726)  (0.06795)  (0.07730)  (0.09016)  (0.05296)  (0.13092) 
 [ 0.73837] [ 0.25907] [ 0.22377] [ 1.22260] [ 0.03079] [ 0.11310] [ 1.07824] 
        
ELECT_P2(-6)  0.459964  0.280879  0.050992  0.016799 -0.018585  0.122220  0.146393 
  (0.23062)  (0.13390)  (0.06629)  (0.07541)  (0.08796)  (0.05166)  (0.12772) 
 [ 1.99449] [ 2.09768] [ 0.76926] [ 0.22279] [-0.21130] [ 2.36565] [ 1.14620] 
        
ELECT_P2(-7) -0.411855 -0.051741  0.059048 -0.025085 -0.047823  0.120417  0.044948 
  (0.23248)  (0.13498)  (0.06682)  (0.07602)  (0.08867)  (0.05208)  (0.12875) 
 [-1.77154] [-0.38331] [ 0.88362] [-0.33000] [-0.53934] [ 2.31203] [ 0.34910] 
        
ELECT_P2(-8) -0.080635  0.111816  0.051905  0.135215  0.101088  0.064424  0.067160 
  (0.23663)  (0.13739)  (0.06802)  (0.07737)  (0.09025)  (0.05301)  (0.13105) 
 [-0.34077] [ 0.81386] [ 0.76314] [ 1.74761] [ 1.12009] [ 1.21529] [ 0.51248] 
        
ELECT_P2(-9)  0.143939  0.048992 -0.005836 -0.047119 -0.107526  0.022867 -0.015460 
  (0.23882)  (0.13866)  (0.06865)  (0.07809)  (0.09109)  (0.05350)  (0.13226) 
 [ 0.60271] [ 0.35332] [-0.08502] [-0.60340] [-1.18049] [ 0.42739] [-0.11689] 
        
ELECT_P2(-10) -0.043627  0.173947  0.049413  0.120366  0.165521  0.077416  0.149831 
  (0.23366)  (0.13567)  (0.06716)  (0.07640)  (0.08912)  (0.05235)  (0.12941) 
 [-0.18671] [ 1.28216] [ 0.73572] [ 1.57545] [ 1.85733] [ 1.47893] [ 1.15784] 
        
 
-137- 
ELECT_P2(-11)  0.172821  0.041026 -0.038651  0.125797  0.162387  0.078000 -0.104446 
  (0.23988)  (0.13928)  (0.06895)  (0.07843)  (0.09149)  (0.05374)  (0.13285) 
 [ 0.72045] [ 0.29456] [-0.56057] [ 1.60384] [ 1.77491] [ 1.45145] [-0.78619] 
        
ELECT_P2(-12)  0.508683  0.290146 -0.010765 -0.082632 -0.090776  0.006021 -0.121526 
  (0.24320)  (0.14121)  (0.06990)  (0.07952)  (0.09276)  (0.05448)  (0.13469) 
 [ 2.09163] [ 2.05478] [-0.15400] [-1.03912] [-0.97865] [ 0.11051] [-0.90227] 
        
ELECT_P2(-13)  0.066252  0.125234  0.053160  0.050292  0.026811  0.077310  0.387592 
  (0.23710)  (0.13767)  (0.06815)  (0.07753)  (0.09043)  (0.05312)  (0.13131) 
 [ 0.27942] [ 0.90969] [ 0.78001] [ 0.64870] [ 0.29648] [ 1.45545] [ 2.95166] 
        
ELECT_P2(-14)  0.470494  0.437812  0.106225  0.111736  0.085880  0.031092  0.278624 
  (0.24867)  (0.14438)  (0.07148)  (0.08131)  (0.09484)  (0.05571)  (0.13772) 
 [ 1.89207] [ 3.03236] [ 1.48617] [ 1.37423] [ 0.90551] [ 0.55812] [ 2.02317] 
        
ELECT_P2(-15)  0.374153  0.098761  0.049916  0.042026  0.055700 -0.012405  0.192854 
  (0.24453)  (0.14198)  (0.07029)  (0.07996)  (0.09326)  (0.05478)  (0.13543) 
 [ 1.53008] [ 0.69560] [ 0.71017] [ 0.52561] [ 0.59723] [-0.22644] [ 1.42404] 
        
ELECT_P2(-16)  0.012420  0.005669 -0.121148 -0.068002 -0.044253  0.079049  0.068841 
  (0.23914)  (0.13885)  (0.06874)  (0.07819)  (0.09121)  (0.05357)  (0.13244) 
 [ 0.05194] [ 0.04083] [-1.76251] [-0.86968] [-0.48519] [ 1.47553] [ 0.51979] 
        
ELECT_P2(-17) -0.003321 -0.099680 -0.040139 -0.029441 -0.074184 -0.173944  0.156395 
  (0.23722)  (0.13773)  (0.06819)  (0.07756)  (0.09048)  (0.05314)  (0.13138) 
 [-0.01400] [-0.72372] [-0.58868] [-0.37956] [-0.81993] [-3.27311] [ 1.19043] 
        
ELECT_P2(-18)  0.070543 -0.268759  0.082306 -0.054828 -0.097303  0.067171  0.145671 
  (0.23932)  (0.13895)  (0.06879)  (0.07825)  (0.09128)  (0.05361)  (0.13254) 
 [ 0.29477] [-1.93418] [ 1.19650] [-0.70066] [-1.06603] [ 1.25287] [ 1.09907] 
        
ELECT_P2(-19) -0.148148  0.046370  0.022239 -0.020589 -0.057045 -0.110607  0.068344 
  (0.23155)  (0.13444)  (0.06656)  (0.07571)  (0.08831)  (0.05187)  (0.12824) 
 [-0.63981] [ 0.34491] [ 0.33413] [-0.27194] [-0.64594] [-2.13224] [ 0.53295] 
        
ELECT_P2(-20)  0.098346 -0.107100  0.055918  0.057815  0.064516  0.039337 -0.091434 
  (0.24103)  (0.13994)  (0.06928)  (0.07881)  (0.09193)  (0.05400)  (0.13349) 
 [ 0.40803] [-0.76530] [ 0.80714] [ 0.73360] [ 0.70182] [ 0.72851] [-0.68497] 
        
ELECT_P2(-21)  0.154846 -0.126854 -0.047480 -0.074279  0.001574 -0.077082  0.360293 
  (0.23751)  (0.13791)  (0.06827)  (0.07766)  (0.09059)  (0.05321)  (0.13154) 
 [ 0.65194] [-0.91986] [-0.69548] [-0.95644] [ 0.01737] [-1.44863] [ 2.73902] 
        
FTSE_3002(-1) -0.273955 -0.133809  0.020731  0.012341  0.095735  0.030992 -0.053600 
  (0.17774)  (0.10320)  (0.05109)  (0.05812)  (0.06779)  (0.03982)  (0.09844) 
 [-1.54132] [-1.29660] [ 0.40578] [ 0.21235] [ 1.41223] [ 0.77832] [-0.54452] 
        
FTSE_3002(-2) -0.044258 -0.221201 -0.100654  0.099637  0.120257 -0.180922  0.068831 
  (0.17230)  (0.10004)  (0.04952)  (0.05634)  (0.06571)  (0.03860)  (0.09542) 
 [-0.25687] [-2.21115] [-2.03241] [ 1.76858] [ 1.83000] [-4.68717] [ 0.72133] 
        
FTSE_3002(-3) -0.071020  0.039522  0.082535 -0.039330 -0.072335 -0.025926  0.000971 
  (0.17497)  (0.10159)  (0.05029)  (0.05721)  (0.06673)  (0.03920)  (0.09690) 
 [-0.40589] [ 0.38903] [ 1.64107] [-0.68744] [-1.08391] [-0.66139] [ 0.01002] 
        
FTSE_3002(-4) -0.104259 -0.267608 -0.015811 -0.023228  0.019885 -0.085161  0.095338 
  (0.17357)  (0.10078)  (0.04989)  (0.05675)  (0.06620)  (0.03888)  (0.09613) 
 [-0.60068] [-2.65547] [-0.31692] [-0.40928] [ 0.30038] [-2.19013] [ 0.99181] 
        
FTSE_3002(-5) -0.275688 -0.144794  0.038404 -0.002426 -0.004741 -0.065781  0.004516 
  (0.17574)  (0.10204)  (0.05051)  (0.05746)  (0.06703)  (0.03937)  (0.09733) 
 [-1.56873] [-1.41903] [ 0.76027] [-0.04221] [-0.07073] [-1.67082] [ 0.04640] 
        
FTSE_3002(-6) -0.015747 -0.121100 -0.039735  0.061035  0.055933 -0.020025 -0.063594 
  (0.17325)  (0.10059)  (0.04980)  (0.05665)  (0.06608)  (0.03881)  (0.09595) 
 [-0.09089] [-1.20389] [-0.79793] [ 1.07744] [ 0.84648] [-0.51595] [-0.66280] 
        
FTSE_3002(-7) -0.141765 -0.079087  0.070599  0.017355  0.018415  0.008485 -0.008068 
  (0.17508)  (0.10165)  (0.05032)  (0.05725)  (0.06678)  (0.03922)  (0.09696) 
 [-0.80971] [-0.77799] [ 1.40287] [ 0.30316] [ 0.27577] [ 0.21632] [-0.08321] 
        
FTSE_3002(-8) -0.139604 -0.078790  0.039764  0.006935  0.014982 -0.059090 -0.068392 
  (0.17384)  (0.10093)  (0.04997)  (0.05684)  (0.06630)  (0.03894)  (0.09627) 
 [-0.80308] [-0.78062] [ 0.79580] [ 0.12200] [ 0.22597] [-1.51730] [-0.71038] 
        
FTSE_3002(-9)  0.018602  0.104485  0.125463  0.091070  0.081369 -0.038455 -0.050217 
  (0.17174)  (0.09971)  (0.04936)  (0.05615)  (0.06550)  (0.03847)  (0.09511) 
 [ 0.10831] [ 1.04784] [ 2.54159] [ 1.62178] [ 1.24226] [-0.99951] [-0.52797] 
        
FTSE_3002(-10) -0.238335 -0.037076  0.012874  0.032465  0.029354  0.036055 -0.133481 
  (0.16946)  (0.09839)  (0.04871)  (0.05541)  (0.06463)  (0.03796)  (0.09385) 
 [-1.40643] [-0.37682] [ 0.26429] [ 0.58591] [ 0.45417] [ 0.94971] [-1.42226] 
        
FTSE_3002(-11)  0.037163 -0.049672 -0.016771  0.105800  0.019679 -0.042320 -0.119344 
  (0.17444)  (0.10129)  (0.05014)  (0.05704)  (0.06653)  (0.03908)  (0.09661) 
 [ 0.21304] [-0.49042] [-0.33447] [ 1.85488] [ 0.29578] [-1.08290] [-1.23531] 
        
FTSE_3002(-12)  0.122596  0.248944  0.022642 -0.046377 -0.033127  0.033224  0.002284 
  (0.16986)  (0.09863)  (0.04883)  (0.05554)  (0.06479)  (0.03805)  (0.09407) 
 [ 0.72173] [ 2.52412] [ 0.46374] [-0.83500] [-0.51133] [ 0.87308] [ 0.02428] 
        
FTSE_3002(-13) -0.076237  0.004159  0.013902 -0.032857 -0.076478 -0.033271  0.056101 
  (0.17253)  (0.10017)  (0.04959)  (0.05641)  (0.06580)  (0.03865)  (0.09555) 
 [-0.44187] [ 0.04152] [ 0.28033] [-0.58242] [-1.16222] [-0.86079] [ 0.58713] 
        
FTSE_3002(-14)  0.041802  0.151853 -0.005391  0.079154  0.073034 -0.020710 -0.073897 
  (0.16757)  (0.09729)  (0.04817)  (0.05479)  (0.06391)  (0.03754)  (0.09280) 
 
-138- 
 [ 0.24946] [ 1.56076] [-0.11193] [ 1.44464] [ 1.14275] [-0.55168] [-0.79627] 
        
FTSE_3002(-15)  0.166811  0.064672 -0.100377 -0.135927 -0.087171 -0.058012 -0.074792 
  (0.16676)  (0.09682)  (0.04793)  (0.05453)  (0.06360)  (0.03736)  (0.09235) 
 [ 1.00032] [ 0.66794] [-2.09413] [-2.49287] [-1.37057] [-1.55285] [-0.80984] 
        
FTSE_3002(-16) -0.143559  0.132959 -0.023962  0.105620  0.103382 -0.001686  0.148923 
  (0.16815)  (0.09763)  (0.04833)  (0.05498)  (0.06413)  (0.03767)  (0.09312) 
 [-0.85378] [ 1.36188] [-0.49578] [ 1.92106] [ 1.61204] [-0.04476] [ 1.59920] 
        
FTSE_3002(-17)  0.152957  0.191716 -0.006152  0.061006  0.081936 -0.046046 -0.009236 
  (0.16838)  (0.09777)  (0.04840)  (0.05506)  (0.06422)  (0.03772)  (0.09325) 
 [ 0.90839] [ 1.96098] [-0.12712] [ 1.10805] [ 1.27585] [-1.22067] [-0.09905] 
        
FTSE_3002(-18)  0.009637  0.084091 -0.093223 -0.004641 -0.018800  0.001146 -0.117861 
  (0.16281)  (0.09453)  (0.04680)  (0.05323)  (0.06210)  (0.03647)  (0.09017) 
 [ 0.05919] [ 0.88958] [-1.99206] [-0.08718] [-0.30276] [ 0.03142] [-1.30714] 
        
FTSE_3002(-19)  0.034124  0.103485  0.100886  0.126332  0.102940  0.043240  0.079409 
  (0.16295)  (0.09461)  (0.04684)  (0.05328)  (0.06215)  (0.03651)  (0.09025) 
 [ 0.20941] [ 1.09377] [ 2.15390] [ 2.37100] [ 1.65630] [ 1.18446] [ 0.87991] 
        
FTSE_3002(-20) -0.139686 -0.123626  0.029508 -0.022214 -0.030167 -0.004029 -0.037317 
  (0.15687)  (0.09108)  (0.04509)  (0.05129)  (0.05983)  (0.03514)  (0.08688) 
 [-0.89048] [-1.35734] [ 0.65443] [-0.43310] [-0.50422] [-0.11465] [-0.42955] 
        
FTSE_3002(-21)  0.042848  0.065502  0.075563  0.123959  0.109171  0.027671  0.112029 
  (0.16367)  (0.09503)  (0.04704)  (0.05351)  (0.06242)  (0.03667)  (0.09064) 
 [ 0.26180] [ 0.68930] [ 1.60623] [ 2.31635] [ 1.74890] [ 0.75468] [ 1.23595] 
        
GAS2(-1) -0.068204 -0.073997  0.070868  0.128067  0.163622 -0.028061  0.025949 
  (0.07724)  (0.04484)  (0.02220)  (0.02525)  (0.02946)  (0.01730)  (0.04277) 
 [-0.88306] [-1.65007] [ 3.19220] [ 5.07111] [ 5.55446] [-1.62173] [ 0.60665] 
        
GAS2(-2)  0.014419 -0.007100 -0.026493  0.041458  0.029847  0.023343 -0.114281 
  (0.07727)  (0.04487)  (0.02221)  (0.02527)  (0.02947)  (0.01731)  (0.04280) 
 [ 0.18660] [-0.15825] [-1.19279] [ 1.64083] [ 1.01275] [ 1.34845] [-2.67041] 
        
GAS2(-3) -0.045777 -0.029659 -0.023026  0.052958  0.064883 -0.031444 -0.056469 
  (0.07985)  (0.04636)  (0.02295)  (0.02611)  (0.03045)  (0.01789)  (0.04422) 
 [-0.57332] [-0.63976] [-1.00330] [ 2.02845] [ 2.13057] [-1.75789] [-1.27699] 
        
GAS2(-4) -0.093309 -0.040999 -0.050218  0.004539  0.010021  0.045319 -0.152274 
  (0.07633)  (0.04432)  (0.02194)  (0.02496)  (0.02911)  (0.01710)  (0.04227) 
 [-1.22251] [-0.92514] [-2.28897] [ 0.18186] [ 0.34424] [ 2.65035] [-3.60233] 
        
GAS2(-5) -0.001544 -0.028922  0.030945  0.005022  0.018112 -0.038110 -0.057878 
  (0.07697)  (0.04469)  (0.02212)  (0.02517)  (0.02936)  (0.01724)  (0.04263) 
 [-0.02006] [-0.64719] [ 1.39874] [ 0.19956] [ 0.61697] [-2.21020] [-1.35779] 
        
GAS2(-6) -0.038909 -0.019114  0.039084 -0.002300  0.017196  0.032892  0.038425 
  (0.07860)  (0.04564)  (0.02259)  (0.02570)  (0.02998)  (0.01761)  (0.04353) 
 [-0.49501] [-0.41881] [ 1.72992] [-0.08951] [ 0.57361] [ 1.86792] [ 0.88269] 
        
GAS2(-7) -0.021644 -0.003334  0.020809  0.013998  0.027912 -0.005776 -0.035564 
  (0.07820)  (0.04540)  (0.02248)  (0.02557)  (0.02982)  (0.01752)  (0.04331) 
 [-0.27679] [-0.07343] [ 0.92582] [ 0.54746] [ 0.93589] [-0.32974] [-0.82120] 
        
GAS2(-8) -0.027864 -0.013770  0.023279 -0.055310 -0.066399  0.022403 -0.047626 
  (0.07960)  (0.04622)  (0.02288)  (0.02603)  (0.03036)  (0.01783)  (0.04408) 
 [-0.35006] [-0.29794] [ 1.01744] [-2.12511] [-2.18713] [ 1.25631] [-1.08036] 
        
GAS2(-9)  0.029982 -0.031170 -0.032997 -0.047169 -0.071519 -0.032971 -0.059221 
  (0.07881)  (0.04576)  (0.02265)  (0.02577)  (0.03006)  (0.01765)  (0.04364) 
 [ 0.38045] [-0.68122] [-1.45668] [-1.83052] [-2.37944] [-1.86754] [-1.35687] 
        
GAS2(-10) -0.069346 -0.058138  0.055723  0.022538 -0.001250 -0.014484 -0.059560 
  (0.07772)  (0.04513)  (0.02234)  (0.02541)  (0.02964)  (0.01741)  (0.04304) 
 [-0.89223] [-1.28834] [ 2.49431] [ 0.88685] [-0.04218] [-0.83185] [-1.38371] 
        
GAS2(-11) -0.001510 -0.017886  0.022565 -0.030403 -0.050040 -0.005439 -0.061990 
  (0.07874)  (0.04572)  (0.02263)  (0.02575)  (0.03003)  (0.01764)  (0.04361) 
 [-0.01918] [-0.39121] [ 0.99696] [-1.18086] [-1.66621] [-0.30834] [-1.42149] 
        
GAS2(-12)  0.042900  0.040530  0.023749 -0.004244 -0.015721 -0.038803 -0.083329 
  (0.07763)  (0.04507)  (0.02231)  (0.02538)  (0.02961)  (0.01739)  (0.04299) 
 [ 0.55266] [ 0.89926] [ 1.06439] [-0.16722] [-0.53099] [-2.23133] [-1.93831] 
        
GAS2(-13)  0.023455 -0.042926  0.028643 -0.031682 -0.037105 -0.022442 -4.67E-05 
  (0.07942)  (0.04611)  (0.02283)  (0.02597)  (0.03029)  (0.01779)  (0.04398) 
 [ 0.29532] [-0.93089] [ 1.25472] [-1.22000] [-1.22495] [-1.26130] [-0.00106] 
        
GAS2(-14)  0.024733 -0.032615  0.015280  0.005959  0.004582 -0.037959 -0.016095 
  (0.07973)  (0.04629)  (0.02292)  (0.02607)  (0.03041)  (0.01786)  (0.04416) 
 [ 0.31020] [-0.70451] [ 0.66672] [ 0.22855] [ 0.15067] [-2.12507] [-0.36449] 
        
GAS2(-15) -0.009016 -0.056605  0.065377 -0.047888 -0.054035  0.020612  0.036218 
  (0.07956)  (0.04619)  (0.02287)  (0.02601)  (0.03034)  (0.01782)  (0.04406) 
 [-0.11333] [-1.22543] [ 2.85899] [-1.84094] [-1.78081] [ 1.15652] [ 0.82203] 
        
GAS2(-16)  0.022327  0.014008 -0.045582 -0.035804 -0.023492 -0.025096 -0.053037 
  (0.07393)  (0.04293)  (0.02125)  (0.02417)  (0.02820)  (0.01656)  (0.04094) 
 [ 0.30199] [ 0.32633] [-2.14499] [-1.48111] [-0.83313] [-1.51526] [-1.29534] 
        
GAS2(-17) -0.028118 -0.041525  0.028439  0.016004  0.049553 -0.013261  0.047544 
  (0.07331)  (0.04257)  (0.02107)  (0.02397)  (0.02796)  (0.01642)  (0.04060) 
 [-0.38353] [-0.97552] [ 1.34955] [ 0.66762] [ 1.77217] [-0.80739] [ 1.17096] 
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GAS2(-18) -0.035941 -0.105652 -0.019910 -0.026148 -0.027269 -0.025846 -0.006808 
  (0.07241)  (0.04204)  (0.02081)  (0.02368)  (0.02762)  (0.01622)  (0.04010) 
 [-0.49633] [-2.51289] [-0.95658] [-1.10436] [-0.98734] [-1.59323] [-0.16976] 
        
GAS2(-19)  0.027685 -0.032592 -0.011928 -0.008817 -0.019838 -0.004428 -0.044059 
  (0.07157)  (0.04156)  (0.02057)  (0.02340)  (0.02730)  (0.01603)  (0.03964) 
 [ 0.38682] [-0.78430] [-0.57981] [-0.37677] [-0.72674] [-0.27618] [-1.11154] 
        
GAS2(-20) -0.027864 -0.021642  0.025736  0.008104  0.017206 -0.030919 -0.024948 
  (0.07102)  (0.04124)  (0.02041)  (0.02322)  (0.02709)  (0.01591)  (0.03933) 
 [-0.39234] [-0.52484] [ 1.26073] [ 0.34900] [ 0.63521] [-1.94334] [-0.63429] 
        
GAS2(-21) -0.038675 -0.032612  0.004700  0.001078  0.000542  0.001390  0.025282 
  (0.07233)  (0.04200)  (0.02079)  (0.02365)  (0.02759)  (0.01620)  (0.04006) 
 [-0.53471] [-0.77656] [ 0.22608] [ 0.04557] [ 0.01965] [ 0.08580] [ 0.63113] 
        
C -0.007700 -0.000293  0.001994 -0.001645 -0.002452  0.001489  0.002221 
  (0.00473)  (0.00275)  (0.00136)  (0.00155)  (0.00181)  (0.00106)  (0.00262) 
 [-1.62694] [-0.10674] [ 1.46595] [-1.06279] [-1.35819] [ 1.40431] [ 0.84738] 
        
TEMP  0.000506  9.17E-05 -0.000151  9.40E-05  0.000154 -2.43E-05 -9.77E-05 
  (0.00033)  (0.00019)  (9.6E-05)  (0.00011)  (0.00013)  (7.5E-05)  (0.00018) 
 [ 1.51608] [ 0.47296] [-1.57202] [ 0.86105] [ 1.21213] [-0.32497] [-0.52854] 
        
         R-squared  0.279998  0.308461  0.251699  0.245866  0.226639  0.264466  0.215922 
 Adj. R-squared  0.118053  0.152917  0.083388  0.076243  0.052691  0.099026  0.039564 
 Sum sq. resids  2.153301  0.725915  0.177905  0.230218  0.313234  0.108071  0.660457 
 S.E. equation  0.057206  0.033215  0.016443  0.018705  0.021818  0.012816  0.031682 
 F-statistic  1.728966  1.983116  1.495442  1.449488  1.302915  1.598566  1.224337 
 Log likelihood  1246.187  1684.923  2252.317  2148.305  2024.058  2453.448  1723.054 
 Akaike AIC -2.719176 -3.806500 -5.212682 -4.954906 -4.646983 -5.711147 -3.901000 
 Schwarz SC -1.852627 -2.939951 -4.346133 -4.088357 -3.780434 -4.844598 -3.034451 
 Mean dependent -0.003164 -0.000423  6.24E-05 -0.000801 -0.000718  0.000663 -9.53E-05 
 S.D. dependent  0.060914  0.036088  0.017175  0.019462  0.022417  0.013502  0.032328 
        
        
 Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  3.06E-24      
 Determinant resid covariance  7.33E-25      
 Log likelihood  14408.00      
 Akaike information criterion -33.12267      
 Schwarz criterion -27.05682      
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B California data 
B.1 Econometric data tests 
Stationarity data analysis 
Below we present the results of unit root testing. We use the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (1979) 
test, with the MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values. For lag selection we consider the Akaike 
Info Criterion. 
Variable (levels) Integration order 
Differentiated variable 
t-stat 
log(CO2) I(1) (p= 0.082) -22.86136 
log(coal) I(1) -5.749465 
log(gas) I(1) -25.30623 
log(ele) I(1) -9.892849 
log(gasoline) I(0) -25.00067 
log(oil) I(1) -14.47430 
log(econ) I(1) -22.64139 
 
One variable (gasoline) proved to be stationary in levels at 1% significance. Also, the log(CO2) 
variable may be considered stationary at 10% significance. Other unit root tests such as Phillips-
Perron (1988) and Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin (KPSS, 1992) yield similar results ex-
cept: log(CO2) is (I(1)) by both PP and KPSS tests, and log(ele) is I(0) at 1% significance by PP. 
As in the EU data, we consider first differences in all variables for clearer interpretation. 
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B.2 VAR Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
 
VAR Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests 
Date: 01/14/14   Time: 13:15  
Sample: 8/29/2011 11/08/2013  
Included observations: 296  
    
        
Dependent variable: D_LOG_CAA  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    D_LOG_COAL  20.96384 18  0.2812 
D_LOG_DJU  17.80549 18  0.4685 
D_LOG_ELE_SP  29.29311 18  0.0449 
D_LOG_GAS  32.22635 18  0.0207 
D_LOG_OIL  35.87685 18  0.0073 
D_LOG_GASO-
LINE  17.77699 18  0.4704 
    
    All  144.7298 108  0.0106 
    
        
Dependent variable: D_LOG_COAL  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    D_LOG_CAA  37.48191 18  0.0045 
D_LOG_DJU  17.80876 18  0.4683 
D_LOG_ELE_SP  12.59947 18  0.8148 
D_LOG_GAS  21.72335 18  0.2445 
D_LOG_OIL  12.81355 18  0.8025 
D_LOG_GASO-
LINE  11.21878 18  0.8848 
    
    All  113.5918 108  0.3375 
    
    
    
Dependent variable: D_LOG_DJU  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    D_LOG_CAA  27.62074 18  0.0681 
D_LOG_COAL  17.61279 18  0.4814 
D_LOG_ELE_SP  23.59380 18  0.1688 
D_LOG_GAS  16.85315 18  0.5332 
D_LOG_OIL  30.60599 18  0.0320 
D_LOG_GASO-
LINE  16.67131 18  0.5458 
    
    
All  145.5405 108  0.0094 
    
        
Dependent variable: D_LOG_ELE_SP  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    
D_LOG_CAA  20.38678 18  0.3115 
D_LOG_COAL  14.91241 18  0.6680 
D_LOG_DJU  16.99739 18  0.5233 
D_LOG_GAS  11.01013 18  0.8939 
D_LOG_OIL  13.62319 18  0.7533 
D_LOG_GASO-
LINE  16.05764 18  0.5885 
    
    All  100.3411 108  0.6873 
    
        
Dependent variable: D_LOG_GAS  
    
    
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    D_LOG_CAA  20.29620 18  0.3164 
D_LOG_COAL  32.34413 18  0.0200 
D_LOG_DJU  24.89972 18  0.1277 
D_LOG_ELE_SP  22.09861 18  0.2276 
D_LOG_OIL  20.33053 18  0.3145 
D_LOG_GASO-
LINE  15.84148 18  0.6036 
    
    All  114.8570 108  0.3078 
    
        
Dependent variable: D_LOG_OIL  
    
    Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    
D_LOG_CAA  22.85033 18  0.1964 
D_LOG_COAL  18.80698 18  0.4038 
D_LOG_DJU  25.13761 18  0.1212 
D_LOG_ELE_SP  16.34569 18  0.5684 
D_LOG_GAS  34.15995 18  0.0120 
D_LOG_GASO-
LINE  21.76638 18  0.2425 
    
    All  127.7595 108  0.0943 
    
        
Dependent variable: D_LOG_GASOLINE  
    
    
Excluded Chi-sq df Prob. 
    
    D_LOG_CAA  28.41049 18  0.0561 
D_LOG_COAL  19.78169 18  0.3452 
D_LOG_DJU  23.18929 18  0.1834 
D_LOG_ELE_SP  29.75646 18  0.0399 
D_LOG_GAS  30.00693 18  0.0374 
D_LOG_OIL  12.46348 18  0.8224 
    
    All  133.3138 108  0.0497 
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B.3 Variance decomposition 
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B.4 VAR output 
 Vector Autoregression Estimates      
 Date: 01/14/14   Time: 13:15      
 Sample (adjusted): 9/26/2011 11/04/2013     
 Included observations: 296 after adjustments     
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]     
        
        
 D_LOG_CAA D_LOG_COAL D_LOG_DJU D_LOG_ELE_SP D_LOG_GAS D_LOG_OIL 
D_LOG_GASO-
LINE 
        
        
D_LOG_CAA(-1)  0.020549 -0.165994  0.033317  0.113095 -0.009276 -0.058432 -0.113494 
  (0.07107)  (0.12818)  (0.03335)  (0.50480)  (0.11951)  (0.07407)  (0.13483) 
 [ 0.28914] [-1.29504] [ 0.99895] [ 0.22404] [-0.07762] [-0.78887] [-0.84175] 
        
D_LOG_CAA(-2)  0.041446 -0.342952 -0.004850 -0.320895  0.112739  0.028707  0.103898 
  (0.06934)  (0.12506)  (0.03254)  (0.49252)  (0.11660)  (0.07227)  (0.13155) 
 [ 0.59771] [-2.74234] [-0.14904] [-0.65153] [ 0.96688] [ 0.39722] [ 0.78979] 
        
D_LOG_CAA(-3) -0.002041  0.141561 -0.019241 -0.164771  0.018594  0.024425  0.248589 
  (0.07179)  (0.12947)  (0.03369)  (0.50989)  (0.12071)  (0.07482)  (0.13619) 
 [-0.02843] [ 1.09341] [-0.57117] [-0.32315] [ 0.15404] [ 0.32646] [ 1.82532] 
        
D_LOG_CAA(-4) -0.122116  0.159529  0.026352 -0.681512  0.041849 -0.082351 -0.100298 
  (0.07278)  (0.13126)  (0.03415)  (0.51694)  (0.12238)  (0.07585)  (0.13807) 
 [-1.67792] [ 1.21538] [ 0.77157] [-1.31836] [ 0.34196] [-1.08568] [-0.72641] 
        
D_LOG_CAA(-5)  0.153475 -0.013984  0.055830  0.686263  0.037414 -0.083090 -0.068388 
  (0.07361)  (0.13276)  (0.03455)  (0.52287)  (0.12378)  (0.07672)  (0.13966) 
 [ 2.08489] [-0.10533] [ 1.61612] [ 1.31249] [ 0.30225] [-1.08300] [-0.48969] 
        
D_LOG_CAA(-6) -0.015145  0.228489 -0.000708 -0.098917  0.279165  0.118559 -0.073413 
  (0.07503)  (0.13531)  (0.03521)  (0.53291)  (0.12616)  (0.07819)  (0.14234) 
 [-0.20186] [ 1.68861] [-0.02011] [-0.18562] [ 2.21278] [ 1.51621] [-0.51577] 
        
D_LOG_CAA(-7) -0.074988  0.410234  0.047295 -0.246670 -0.189472  0.006436 -0.170396 
  (0.07382)  (0.13314)  (0.03464)  (0.52436)  (0.12414)  (0.07694)  (0.14005) 
 [-1.01579] [ 3.08119] [ 1.36518] [-0.47042] [-1.52632] [ 0.08364] [-1.21665] 
        
D_LOG_CAA(-8) -0.035875 -0.209220 -0.016407  0.292198  0.102090  0.136644  0.292765 
  (0.07374)  (0.13300)  (0.03461)  (0.52381)  (0.12401)  (0.07686)  (0.13991) 
 [-0.48647] [-1.57307] [-0.47408] [ 0.55784] [ 0.82327] [ 1.77785] [ 2.09257] 
        
D_LOG_CAA(-9)  0.077271 -0.213116  0.048307  0.128131  0.043686  0.096436  0.188040 
  (0.07296)  (0.13158)  (0.03424)  (0.51821)  (0.12268)  (0.07604)  (0.13841) 
 [ 1.05914] [-1.61967] [ 1.41094] [ 0.24726] [ 0.35609] [ 1.26826] [ 1.35856] 
        
D_LOG_CAA(-10)  0.091984 -0.145499  0.025296 -0.076059  0.023020  0.098171  0.094201 
  (0.06504)  (0.11731)  (0.03052)  (0.46201)  (0.10938)  (0.06779)  (0.12340) 
 [ 1.41416] [-1.24029] [ 0.82871] [-0.16463] [ 0.21047] [ 1.44812] [ 0.76337] 
        
D_LOG_CAA(-11) -0.003973 -0.052128  0.025314  0.431678  0.185057 -0.126188 -0.004580 
  (0.06528)  (0.11774)  (0.03064)  (0.46370)  (0.10978)  (0.06804)  (0.12385) 
 [-0.06086] [-0.44274] [ 0.82625] [ 0.93094] [ 1.68575] [-1.85461] [-0.03698] 
        
D_LOG_CAA(-12) -0.072051 -0.148330 -0.038888  0.645787  0.010372 -0.029761  0.022158 
  (0.06370)  (0.11489)  (0.02989)  (0.45247)  (0.10712)  (0.06639)  (0.12085) 
 [-1.13106] [-1.29108] [-1.30083] [ 1.42724] [ 0.09683] [-0.44826] [ 0.18335] 
        
D_LOG_CAA(-13)  0.140701  0.080941 -0.035507 -0.243848 -0.117388 -0.089154  0.056549 
  (0.06057)  (0.10923)  (0.02842)  (0.43019)  (0.10184)  (0.06312)  (0.11490) 
 [ 2.32312] [ 0.74101] [-1.24924] [-0.56683] [-1.15263] [-1.41239] [ 0.49214] 
        
D_LOG_CAA(-14) -0.011779  0.065889  0.041161  0.822460  0.047492  0.036406  0.207121 
  (0.05872)  (0.10591)  (0.02756)  (0.41710)  (0.09874)  (0.06120)  (0.11141) 
 [-0.20060] [ 0.62215] [ 1.49363] [ 1.97186] [ 0.48096] [ 0.59486] [ 1.85917] 
        
D_LOG_CAA(-15) -0.100271 -0.075559  0.031880  1.310807  0.132871 -0.018104 -0.033005 
  (0.06102)  (0.11005)  (0.02863)  (0.43341)  (0.10260)  (0.06359)  (0.11576) 
 [-1.64330] [-0.68660] [ 1.11333] [ 3.02442] [ 1.29497] [-0.28467] [-0.28512] 
        
D_LOG_CAA(-16)  0.010214 -0.141639  0.019170 -0.011630 -0.092821  0.038852 -0.291642 
  (0.06462)  (0.11655)  (0.03033)  (0.45901)  (0.10867)  (0.06735)  (0.12260) 
 [ 0.15805] [-1.21528] [ 0.63214] [-0.02534] [-0.85418] [ 0.57686] [-2.37881] 
        
 
-145- 
D_LOG_CAA(-17)  0.187003  0.006033  0.028801 -0.195896 -0.226916 -0.025013  0.233433 
  (0.06558)  (0.11827)  (0.03078)  (0.46581)  (0.11028)  (0.06835)  (0.12442) 
 [ 2.85156] [ 0.05101] [ 0.93585] [-0.42055] [-2.05772] [-0.36596] [ 1.87624] 
        
D_LOG_CAA(-18)  0.029156 -0.060785 -0.077515  0.337868  0.216974 -0.037666  0.050731 
  (0.06556)  (0.11823)  (0.03076)  (0.46564)  (0.11024)  (0.06832)  (0.12437) 
 [ 0.44475] [-0.51411] [-2.51963] [ 0.72560] [ 1.96826] [-0.55128] [ 0.40790] 
        
D_LOG_COAL(-1)  0.004994  0.014277 -0.018072 -0.112228  0.058170 -0.048108  0.030697 
  (0.04281)  (0.07722)  (0.02009)  (0.30410)  (0.07199)  (0.04462)  (0.08123) 
 [ 0.11665] [ 0.18489] [-0.89946] [-0.36904] [ 0.80799] [-1.07813] [ 0.37793] 
        
D_LOG_COAL(-2) -0.072404  0.132804 -0.018526 -0.225943  0.023889 -0.056845 -0.020690 
  (0.04208)  (0.07590)  (0.01975)  (0.29892)  (0.07077)  (0.04386)  (0.07984) 
 [-1.72048] [ 1.74974] [-0.93806] [-0.75586] [ 0.33757] [-1.29602] [-0.25914] 
        
D_LOG_COAL(-3) -0.076543  0.093670 -0.007575 -0.042506 -0.003412 -0.097421 -0.045047 
  (0.04146)  (0.07478)  (0.01946)  (0.29451)  (0.06972)  (0.04321)  (0.07866) 
 [-1.84608] [ 1.25264] [-0.38930] [-0.14433] [-0.04893] [-2.25442] [-0.57266] 
        
D_LOG_COAL(-4) -0.025359 -0.031245 -0.025975  0.277334  0.192256  0.031935 -0.024486 
  (0.04240)  (0.07647)  (0.01990)  (0.30117)  (0.07130)  (0.04419)  (0.08044) 
 [-0.59807] [-0.40859] [-1.30539] [ 0.92084] [ 2.69644] [ 0.72265] [-0.30439] 
        
D_LOG_COAL(-5) -0.031015  0.166017  0.015938  0.037482  0.016713  0.029915  0.116012 
  (0.04288)  (0.07734)  (0.02013)  (0.30461)  (0.07211)  (0.04470)  (0.08136) 
 [-0.72321] [ 2.14647] [ 0.79193] [ 0.12305] [ 0.23176] [ 0.66931] [ 1.42591] 
        
D_LOG_COAL(-6)  0.015667  0.003507  0.021719 -0.109055  0.010505 -0.019609  0.056942 
  (0.04233)  (0.07634)  (0.01986)  (0.30064)  (0.07117)  (0.04411)  (0.08030) 
 [ 0.37015] [ 0.04594] [ 1.09343] [-0.36274] [ 0.14759] [-0.44452] [ 0.70912] 
        
D_LOG_COAL(-7)  0.010879 -0.037602 -0.019620  0.127198 -0.032995 -0.052486 -0.091667 
  (0.04227)  (0.07624)  (0.01984)  (0.30025)  (0.07108)  (0.04406)  (0.08019) 
 [ 0.25737] [-0.49324] [-0.98908] [ 0.42364] [-0.46419] [-1.19135] [-1.14306] 
        
D_LOG_COAL(-8)  0.046228 -0.013014 -0.021454 -0.435615 -0.064116  0.026529  0.090645 
  (0.04165)  (0.07511)  (0.01954)  (0.29582)  (0.07003)  (0.04341)  (0.07901) 
 [ 1.10997] [-0.17326] [-1.09770] [-1.47254] [-0.91550] [ 0.61118] [ 1.14721] 
        
D_LOG_COAL(-9)  0.070042 -0.096389 -0.004661 -0.111170  0.040687 -0.004113 -0.132059 
  (0.04222)  (0.07615)  (0.01982)  (0.29991)  (0.07100)  (0.04401)  (0.08011) 
 [ 1.65883] [-1.26575] [-0.23521] [-0.37067] [ 0.57304] [-0.09346] [-1.64855] 
        
D_LOG_COAL(-10) -0.028985 -0.055670 -0.025508 -0.001456  0.130990  0.013272  0.043687 
  (0.04155)  (0.07494)  (0.01950)  (0.29516)  (0.06988)  (0.04331)  (0.07884) 
 [-0.69753] [-0.74283] [-1.30806] [-0.00493] [ 1.87462] [ 0.30645] [ 0.55415] 
        
D_LOG_COAL(-11) -0.012628  0.062349 -0.020458  0.577041 -0.131974  0.026995  0.094414 
  (0.04174)  (0.07527)  (0.01959)  (0.29645)  (0.07018)  (0.04350)  (0.07918) 
 [-0.30257] [ 0.82832] [-1.04452] [ 1.94653] [-1.88049] [ 0.62061] [ 1.19240] 
        
D_LOG_COAL(-12)  0.026437  0.034977  0.029934 -0.174150 -0.089391  0.016907  0.123042 
  (0.04192)  (0.07561)  (0.01967)  (0.29778)  (0.07050)  (0.04369)  (0.07954) 
 [ 0.63061] [ 0.46259] [ 1.52151] [-0.58483] [-1.26802] [ 0.38694] [ 1.54700] 
        
D_LOG_COAL(-13)  0.026976 -0.186648 -0.017490  0.275123  0.103602 -0.040665  0.009929 
  (0.04175)  (0.07530)  (0.01959)  (0.29654)  (0.07020)  (0.04351)  (0.07921) 
 [ 0.64615] [-2.47886] [-0.89268] [ 0.92777] [ 1.47574] [-0.93457] [ 0.12536] 
        
D_LOG_COAL(-14) -0.002418 -0.140884  0.015010  0.377888  0.198742  0.087825  0.124385 
  (0.04213)  (0.07599)  (0.01977)  (0.29927)  (0.07085)  (0.04391)  (0.07993) 
 [-0.05738] [-1.85404] [ 0.75916] [ 1.26272] [ 2.80518] [ 2.00002] [ 1.55611] 
        
D_LOG_COAL(-15)  0.049000  0.068167  0.002888 -0.206656 -0.094260 -0.047010 -0.122153 
  (0.04257)  (0.07678)  (0.01998)  (0.30238)  (0.07159)  (0.04437)  (0.08076) 
 [ 1.15101] [ 0.88784] [ 0.14456] [-0.68343] [-1.31675] [-1.05954] [-1.51246] 
        
D_LOG_COAL(-16) -0.036075  0.086124 -0.005727  0.385706  0.054557 -0.034899  0.035736 
  (0.04257)  (0.07678)  (0.01998)  (0.30239)  (0.07159)  (0.04437)  (0.08077) 
 [-0.84738] [ 1.12169] [-0.28667] [ 1.27553] [ 0.76210] [-0.78653] [ 0.44246] 
        
D_LOG_COAL(-17)  0.028875  0.053223 -0.000979  0.237097  0.058875 -0.005325  0.007294 
  (0.04109)  (0.07411)  (0.01928)  (0.29186)  (0.06909)  (0.04282)  (0.07795) 
 [ 0.70273] [ 0.71820] [-0.05079] [ 0.81237] [ 0.85209] [-0.12433] [ 0.09357] 
        
D_LOG_COAL(-18)  0.069909  0.032916 -0.025232  0.082689 -0.023685 -0.004564 -0.049115 
  (0.04011)  (0.07233)  (0.01882)  (0.28488)  (0.06744)  (0.04180)  (0.07609) 
 [ 1.74309] [ 0.45506] [-1.34059] [ 0.29026] [-0.35120] [-0.10918] [-0.64549] 
        
D_LOG_DJU(-1) -0.129377 -0.186655  0.047973  0.318011 -0.080157  0.190658  0.533481 
 
-146- 
  (0.16490)  (0.29740)  (0.07739)  (1.17128)  (0.27729)  (0.17186)  (0.31285) 
 [-0.78458] [-0.62762] [ 0.61992] [ 0.27151] [-0.28907] [ 1.10935] [ 1.70525] 
        
D_LOG_DJU(-2)  0.397267  0.317940  0.034816  1.193915  0.502663 -0.044603 -0.383313 
  (0.16907)  (0.30492)  (0.07934)  (1.20089)  (0.28430)  (0.17621)  (0.32075) 
 [ 2.34973] [ 1.04270] [ 0.43881] [ 0.99419] [ 1.76808] [-0.25312] [-1.19504] 
        
D_LOG_DJU(-3)  0.137128  0.149675  0.036872  0.655876 -0.092829 -0.511133 -0.752990 
  (0.16854)  (0.30398)  (0.07910)  (1.19717)  (0.28342)  (0.17566)  (0.31976) 
 [ 0.81360] [ 0.49239] [ 0.46616] [ 0.54786] [-0.32754] [-2.90974] [-2.35487] 
        
D_LOG_DJU(-4) -0.076065  0.323003  0.026208 -1.384121 -0.371794  0.229406 -0.158692 
  (0.16349)  (0.29486)  (0.07672)  (1.16127)  (0.27492)  (0.17039)  (0.31017) 
 [-0.46525] [ 1.09544] [ 0.34159] [-1.19191] [-1.35238] [ 1.34632] [-0.51163] 
        
D_LOG_DJU(-5) -0.071358  0.159622 -0.132663 -2.785067  0.302446 -0.309837 -0.548391 
  (0.15873)  (0.28627)  (0.07449)  (1.12745)  (0.26691)  (0.16543)  (0.30114) 
 [-0.44956] [ 0.55759] [-1.78096] [-2.47023] [ 1.13313] [-1.87289] [-1.82106] 
        
D_LOG_DJU(-6)  0.148541 -0.279953  0.074844 -0.356419  0.574690  0.243893  0.594051 
  (0.16179)  (0.29180)  (0.07593)  (1.14920)  (0.27206)  (0.16862)  (0.30695) 
 [ 0.91810] [-0.95941] [ 0.98574] [-0.31015] [ 2.11235] [ 1.44637] [ 1.93536] 
        
D_LOG_DJU(-7) -0.172089 -0.071595 -0.148075 -0.509814  0.257063 -0.011758  0.153047 
  (0.16217)  (0.29248)  (0.07610)  (1.15188)  (0.27270)  (0.16902)  (0.30766) 
 [-1.06117] [-0.24479] [-1.94570] [-0.44259] [ 0.94267] [-0.06956] [ 0.49745] 
        
D_LOG_DJU(-8) -0.103988  0.265939  0.119726  0.211503 -0.516401 -0.143475 -0.118165 
  (0.16720)  (0.30155)  (0.07847)  (1.18762)  (0.28116)  (0.17426)  (0.31721) 
 [-0.62194] [ 0.88190] [ 1.52584] [ 0.17809] [-1.83669] [-0.82333] [-0.37251] 
        
D_LOG_DJU(-9)  0.085519  0.171060 -0.056654  0.184774  0.013093  0.010378  0.195053 
  (0.16073)  (0.28988)  (0.07543)  (1.14167)  (0.27028)  (0.16752)  (0.30494) 
 [ 0.53206] [ 0.59010] [-0.75108] [ 0.16185] [ 0.04844] [ 0.06195] [ 0.63965] 
        
D_LOG_DJU(-10) -0.057205 -0.524525  0.026812 -0.161177 -0.022835 -0.136306 -0.159682 
  (0.16089)  (0.29017)  (0.07550)  (1.14280)  (0.27055)  (0.16768)  (0.30524) 
 [-0.35555] [-1.80764] [ 0.35510] [-0.14104] [-0.08440] [-0.81287] [-0.52314] 
        
D_LOG_DJU(-11)  0.305602  0.394251  0.059342  1.992469 -0.214921  0.073734 -0.159940 
  (0.15594)  (0.28125)  (0.07318)  (1.10766)  (0.26223)  (0.16253)  (0.29585) 
 [ 1.95970] [ 1.40179] [ 0.81088] [ 1.79881] [-0.81960] [ 0.45367] [-0.54061] 
        
D_LOG_DJU(-12)  0.126481 -0.002637  0.008027  0.320720 -0.056833 -0.118298  0.018514 
  (0.14951)  (0.26965)  (0.07016)  (1.06199)  (0.25142)  (0.15583)  (0.28365) 
 [ 0.84595] [-0.00978] [ 0.11441] [ 0.30200] [-0.22605] [-0.75916] [ 0.06527] 
        
D_LOG_DJU(-13) -0.083038  0.181838 -0.028605  0.109248 -0.563472  0.001618 -0.288071 
  (0.15271)  (0.27542)  (0.07167)  (1.08470)  (0.25679)  (0.15916)  (0.28972) 
 [-0.54376] [ 0.66022] [-0.39915] [ 0.10072] [-2.19426] [ 0.01016] [-0.99431] 
        
D_LOG_DJU(-14) -0.076446  0.153720 -0.149990 -1.054084 -0.152848 -0.089955 -0.189654 
  (0.15647)  (0.28220)  (0.07343)  (1.11141)  (0.26312)  (0.16308)  (0.29685) 
 [-0.48856] [ 0.54472] [-2.04262] [-0.94842] [-0.58091] [-0.55160] [-0.63888] 
        
D_LOG_DJU(-15)  0.129936  0.524372  0.085754 -0.998504 -0.121228  0.387600  0.162573 
  (0.15877)  (0.28635)  (0.07451)  (1.12775)  (0.26698)  (0.16548)  (0.30122) 
 [ 0.81838] [ 1.83124] [ 1.15091] [-0.88540] [-0.45407] [ 2.34233] [ 0.53972] 
        
D_LOG_DJU(-16) -0.073332  0.493910 -0.019917 -0.776806  0.400086  0.197887  0.011728 
  (0.15721)  (0.28353)  (0.07378)  (1.11665)  (0.26436)  (0.16385)  (0.29825) 
 [-0.46646] [ 1.74199] [-0.26997] [-0.69566] [ 1.51344] [ 1.20774] [ 0.03932] 
        
D_LOG_DJU(-17)  0.030398  0.016978  0.077332 -0.342319 -0.052440  0.072803 -0.302764 
  (0.15731)  (0.28372)  (0.07382)  (1.11738)  (0.26453)  (0.16395)  (0.29845) 
 [ 0.19323] [ 0.05984] [ 1.04752] [-0.30636] [-0.19824] [ 0.44404] [-1.01446] 
        
D_LOG_DJU(-18)  0.142664  0.112215  0.048420 -1.639605  0.491963  0.190250 -0.043665 
  (0.15503)  (0.27960)  (0.07275)  (1.10116)  (0.26069)  (0.16157)  (0.29412) 
 [ 0.92025] [ 0.40134] [ 0.66554] [-1.48898] [ 1.88717] [ 1.17747] [-0.14846] 
        
D_LOG_ELE_SP(-1) -0.021478  0.018645 -0.005760  0.046348  0.005595 -0.005584 -0.018130 
  (0.01060)  (0.01912)  (0.00498)  (0.07531)  (0.01783)  (0.01105)  (0.02012) 
 [-2.02570] [ 0.97504] [-1.15764] [ 0.61541] [ 0.31381] [-0.50530] [-0.90127] 
        
D_LOG_ELE_SP(-2) -0.012038 -0.016297 -3.44E-06 -0.473187  0.031847  0.006717  0.062245 
  (0.01090)  (0.01966)  (0.00512)  (0.07743)  (0.01833)  (0.01136)  (0.02068) 
 [-1.10427] [-0.82892] [-0.00067] [-6.11116] [ 1.73732] [ 0.59125] [ 3.00973] 
        
D_LOG_ELE_SP(-3) -0.008157  0.029565 -0.002551 -0.352288  0.005763 -0.003374 -0.046026 
  (0.01222)  (0.02204)  (0.00574)  (0.08682)  (0.02055)  (0.01274)  (0.02319) 
 
-147- 
 [-0.66735] [ 1.34117] [-0.44475] [-4.05780] [ 0.28041] [-0.26489] [-1.98486] 
        
D_LOG_ELE_SP(-4) -0.020645  0.014334  0.002028 -0.193414  0.029327  0.008169  0.049020 
  (0.01277)  (0.02304)  (0.00599)  (0.09072)  (0.02148)  (0.01331)  (0.02423) 
 [-1.61631] [ 0.62226] [ 0.33837] [-2.13187] [ 1.36543] [ 0.61363] [ 2.02291] 
        
D_LOG_ELE_SP(-5) -0.010897  0.014098  0.008622 -0.144764  0.006576  0.002801  0.016755 
  (0.01273)  (0.02296)  (0.00597)  (0.09042)  (0.02141)  (0.01327)  (0.02415) 
 [-0.85604] [ 0.61407] [ 1.44321] [-1.60104] [ 0.30723] [ 0.21114] [ 0.69376] 
        
D_LOG_ELE_SP(-6)  0.014588  0.022403  0.000328 -0.365853 -0.002609  0.018179 -0.020670 
  (0.01280)  (0.02309)  (0.00601)  (0.09092)  (0.02152)  (0.01334)  (0.02428) 
 [ 1.13960] [ 0.97040] [ 0.05465] [-4.02381] [-0.12119] [ 1.36265] [-0.85116] 
        
D_LOG_ELE_SP(-7) -0.015961  0.016732  0.007101 -0.063843  0.017151  0.017635  0.008206 
  (0.01320)  (0.02380)  (0.00619)  (0.09374)  (0.02219)  (0.01375)  (0.02504) 
 [-1.20940] [ 0.70297] [ 1.14648] [-0.68106] [ 0.77283] [ 1.28214] [ 0.32775] 
        
D_LOG_ELE_SP(-8) -0.021840 -0.004925 -0.001151 -0.218303 -0.000386 -0.006056  0.015188 
  (0.01260)  (0.02272)  (0.00591)  (0.08947)  (0.02118)  (0.01313)  (0.02390) 
 [-1.73391] [-0.21682] [-0.19480] [-2.44001] [-0.01824] [-0.46129] [ 0.63555] 
        
D_LOG_ELE_SP(-9)  0.026238 -0.003058  0.004829 -0.205770 -0.017836  0.020990  0.006672 
  (0.01265)  (0.02282)  (0.00594)  (0.08987)  (0.02128)  (0.01319)  (0.02401) 
 [ 2.07364] [-0.13400] [ 0.81326] [-2.28954] [-0.83826] [ 1.59166] [ 0.27794] 
        
D_LOG_ELE_SP(-10) -0.009414  0.004056  0.003393 -0.127106 -0.010949  0.019823  0.047031 
  (0.01266)  (0.02283)  (0.00594)  (0.08993)  (0.02129)  (0.01320)  (0.02402) 
 [-0.74350] [ 0.17761] [ 0.57111] [-1.41336] [-0.51426] [ 1.50225] [ 1.95794] 
        
D_LOG_ELE_SP(-11) -0.004851  0.015646 -0.003649 -0.213891 -0.030633  0.008698  0.037751 
  (0.01250)  (0.02255)  (0.00587)  (0.08880)  (0.02102)  (0.01303)  (0.02372) 
 [-0.38800] [ 0.69388] [-0.62187] [-2.40859] [-1.45709] [ 0.66752] [ 1.59159] 
        
D_LOG_ELE_SP(-12)  0.006851 -0.003610  0.009578 -0.024684  0.022766  0.029549  0.047556 
  (0.01283)  (0.02314)  (0.00602)  (0.09111)  (0.02157)  (0.01337)  (0.02434) 
 [ 0.53411] [-0.15603] [ 1.59099] [-0.27091] [ 1.05544] [ 2.21018] [ 1.95409] 
        
D_LOG_ELE_SP(-13)  0.008150  0.009673  0.003096 -0.075268  0.014544  0.011902  0.017153 
  (0.01238)  (0.02233)  (0.00581)  (0.08794)  (0.02082)  (0.01290)  (0.02349) 
 [ 0.65828] [ 0.43322] [ 0.53294] [-0.85593] [ 0.69862] [ 0.92243] [ 0.73032] 
        
D_LOG_ELE_SP(-14)  0.000764  0.047578  0.010677 -0.061597  0.003237 -0.001359  0.002565 
  (0.01217)  (0.02195)  (0.00571)  (0.08646)  (0.02047)  (0.01269)  (0.02309) 
 [ 0.06278] [ 2.16727] [ 1.86915] [-0.71245] [ 0.15813] [-0.10714] [ 0.11108] 
        
D_LOG_ELE_SP(-15) -0.011707  0.012715  0.012628 -0.005309  0.024344  0.016054 -0.001475 
  (0.01227)  (0.02214)  (0.00576)  (0.08718)  (0.02064)  (0.01279)  (0.02328) 
 [-0.95387] [ 0.57442] [ 2.19241] [-0.06089] [ 1.17954] [ 1.25507] [-0.06335] 
        
D_LOG_ELE_SP(-16) -0.006764  0.002310  0.000831 -0.127147 -0.005847 -0.009893 -0.003011 
  (0.01207)  (0.02178)  (0.00567)  (0.08577)  (0.02030)  (0.01258)  (0.02291) 
 [-0.56019] [ 0.10610] [ 0.14662] [-1.48250] [-0.28797] [-0.78609] [-0.13145] 
        
D_LOG_ELE_SP(-17) -0.001070  0.004551 -0.005029 -0.083624 -0.019882  0.013099  0.002927 
  (0.01133)  (0.02043)  (0.00531)  (0.08044)  (0.01904)  (0.01180)  (0.02149) 
 [-0.09445] [ 0.22283] [-0.94619] [-1.03955] [-1.04402] [ 1.10975] [ 0.13623] 
        
D_LOG_ELE_SP(-18)  0.001786 -0.003910  0.002722 -0.077490  0.037597  0.004757  0.036573 
  (0.01163)  (0.02098)  (0.00546)  (0.08261)  (0.01956)  (0.01212)  (0.02206) 
 [ 0.15359] [-0.18642] [ 0.49880] [-0.93804] [ 1.92244] [ 0.39242] [ 1.65755] 
        
D_LOG_GAS(-1)  0.035429 -0.084510 -0.035933 -0.151553 -0.122865 -0.006091  0.068402 
  (0.04418)  (0.07968)  (0.02073)  (0.31379)  (0.07429)  (0.04604)  (0.08381) 
 [ 0.80197] [-1.06069] [-1.73321] [-0.48298] [-1.65394] [-0.13230] [ 0.81613] 
        
D_LOG_GAS(-2)  0.075783 -0.110813 -0.006115 -0.294926  0.064779  0.018370 -0.049723 
  (0.04298)  (0.07752)  (0.02017)  (0.30529)  (0.07227)  (0.04480)  (0.08154) 
 [ 1.76320] [-1.42954] [-0.30317] [-0.96606] [ 0.89629] [ 0.41008] [-0.60979] 
        
D_LOG_GAS(-3) -0.001475  0.079767 -0.026949 -0.203424 -0.088320 -0.049833  0.067346 
  (0.04215)  (0.07601)  (0.01978)  (0.29936)  (0.07087)  (0.04393)  (0.07996) 
 [-0.03499] [ 1.04942] [-1.36255] [-0.67954] [-1.24623] [-1.13450] [ 0.84228] 
        
D_LOG_GAS(-4) -0.059445  0.180321  0.029931  0.134854  0.042986 -0.062042  0.019858 
  (0.04262)  (0.07687)  (0.02000)  (0.30275)  (0.07167)  (0.04442)  (0.08086) 
 [-1.39469] [ 2.34577] [ 1.49641] [ 0.44544] [ 0.59977] [-1.39663] [ 0.24558] 
        
D_LOG_GAS(-5) -0.073869  0.023548 -0.005097 -0.146789 -0.008448 -0.095535 -0.183274 
  (0.04391)  (0.07919)  (0.02061)  (0.31187)  (0.07383)  (0.04576)  (0.08330) 
 [-1.68238] [ 0.29736] [-0.24737] [-0.47067] [-0.11442] [-2.08765] [-2.20016] 
 
-148- 
        
D_LOG_GAS(-6) -0.041504 -0.090474  0.002389 -0.246137  0.095418  0.093952  0.194532 
  (0.04473)  (0.08066)  (0.02099)  (0.31768)  (0.07521)  (0.04661)  (0.08485) 
 [-0.92798] [-1.12163] [ 0.11382] [-0.77479] [ 1.26871] [ 2.01553] [ 2.29261] 
        
D_LOG_GAS(-7) -0.121005 -0.068438  0.007270  0.001895  0.130438 -0.002845  0.137038 
  (0.04536)  (0.08181)  (0.02129)  (0.32218)  (0.07627)  (0.04727)  (0.08605) 
 [-2.66776] [-0.83659] [ 0.34154] [ 0.00588] [ 1.71015] [-0.06018] [ 1.59249] 
        
D_LOG_GAS(-8)  0.061406  0.022439 -0.004310 -0.150077  0.139127 -0.116956 -0.051379 
  (0.04552)  (0.08210)  (0.02136)  (0.32336)  (0.07655)  (0.04745)  (0.08637) 
 [ 1.34888] [ 0.27330] [-0.20173] [-0.46413] [ 1.81743] [-2.46501] [-0.59490] 
        
D_LOG_GAS(-9) -0.030453 -0.039391  0.047611  0.625513  0.025671  0.063715  0.005202 
  (0.04446)  (0.08018)  (0.02086)  (0.31577)  (0.07476)  (0.04633)  (0.08434) 
 [-0.68500] [-0.49129] [ 2.28210] [ 1.98091] [ 0.34339] [ 1.37513] [ 0.06168] 
        
D_LOG_GAS(-10) -0.026343 -0.123872  0.015579  0.093967 -0.076826 -0.016679  0.084965 
  (0.04463)  (0.08050)  (0.02095)  (0.31703)  (0.07505)  (0.04652)  (0.08468) 
 [-0.59020] [-1.53882] [ 0.74379] [ 0.29640] [-1.02362] [-0.35854] [ 1.00340] 
        
D_LOG_GAS(-11)  0.050840  0.026796 -0.005321  0.115358  0.058441  0.055440 -0.088604 
  (0.04446)  (0.08019)  (0.02087)  (0.31582)  (0.07477)  (0.04634)  (0.08436) 
 [ 1.14340] [ 0.33415] [-0.25502] [ 0.36526] [ 0.78163] [ 1.19635] [-1.05036] 
        
D_LOG_GAS(-12) -0.017273 -0.079292 -0.008074  0.348103 -0.187833 -0.030337 -0.072103 
  (0.04288)  (0.07734)  (0.02012)  (0.30459)  (0.07211)  (0.04469)  (0.08135) 
 [-0.40280] [-1.02526] [-0.40119] [ 1.14287] [-2.60488] [-0.67879] [-0.88629] 
        
D_LOG_GAS(-13) -0.045019  0.058606 -0.013341  0.132428 -0.088411  0.064848  0.044931 
  (0.04399)  (0.07933)  (0.02064)  (0.31244)  (0.07397)  (0.04584)  (0.08345) 
 [-1.02345] [ 0.73874] [-0.64629] [ 0.42385] [-1.19528] [ 1.41452] [ 0.53841] 
        
D_LOG_GAS(-14) -0.015105 -0.035295  0.018680  0.237377 -0.089474 -0.033309 -0.199854 
  (0.04588)  (0.08275)  (0.02153)  (0.32589)  (0.07715)  (0.04782)  (0.08704) 
 [-0.32923] [-0.42655] [ 0.86759] [ 0.72840] [-1.15973] [-0.69658] [-2.29603] 
        
D_LOG_GAS(-15) -0.041845 -0.164197 -8.65E-05  0.051883 -0.079579 -0.017758  0.268908 
  (0.04469)  (0.08060)  (0.02097)  (0.31742)  (0.07515)  (0.04658)  (0.08478) 
 [-0.93639] [-2.03728] [-0.00412] [ 0.16345] [-1.05900] [-0.38127] [ 3.17180] 
        
D_LOG_GAS(-16) -0.017991 -0.078459  0.020137  0.087547  0.032532 -0.017989  0.061386 
  (0.04649)  (0.08385)  (0.02182)  (0.33025)  (0.07818)  (0.04846)  (0.08821) 
 [-0.38694] [-0.93566] [ 0.92292] [ 0.26509] [ 0.41610] [-0.37122] [ 0.69592] 
        
D_LOG_GAS(-17) -0.031172 -0.021873  0.008332 -0.400209 -0.022402 -0.078020 -0.103522 
  (0.04744)  (0.08557)  (0.02226)  (0.33699)  (0.07978)  (0.04945)  (0.09001) 
 [-0.65703] [-0.25563] [ 0.37420] [-1.18759] [-0.28080] [-1.57784] [-1.15012] 
        
D_LOG_GAS(-18) -0.092404  0.071034 -0.005760 -0.336528  0.107654 -0.113048  0.018737 
  (0.04717)  (0.08506)  (0.02213)  (0.33501)  (0.07931)  (0.04916)  (0.08948) 
 [-1.95916] [ 0.83507] [-0.26024] [-1.00452] [ 1.35737] [-2.29972] [ 0.20940] 
        
D_LOG_OIL(-1)  0.073922 -0.064804 -0.033708  0.229645  0.276218  0.007179  0.132057 
  (0.08229)  (0.14842)  (0.03862)  (0.58452)  (0.13838)  (0.08577)  (0.15612) 
 [ 0.89828] [-0.43663] [-0.87285] [ 0.39288] [ 1.99609] [ 0.08370] [ 0.84585] 
        
D_LOG_OIL(-2) -0.244543 -0.128837 -0.037099  0.051426 -0.037865  0.025626  0.192830 
  (0.07991)  (0.14412)  (0.03750)  (0.56758)  (0.13437)  (0.08328)  (0.15160) 
 [-3.06035] [-0.89399] [-0.98931] [ 0.09061] [-0.28180] [ 0.30771] [ 1.27198] 
        
D_LOG_OIL(-3)  0.033467  0.164750  0.047350  0.243843 -0.002549 -0.018534  0.092486 
  (0.08787)  (0.15847)  (0.04124)  (0.62413)  (0.14776)  (0.09158)  (0.16670) 
 [ 0.38088] [ 1.03960] [ 1.14827] [ 0.39069] [-0.01725] [-0.20238] [ 0.55480] 
        
D_LOG_OIL(-4)  0.024413 -0.123659 -0.034081  0.268954  0.198246 -0.060942  0.052521 
  (0.08576)  (0.15466)  (0.04024)  (0.60912)  (0.14420)  (0.08938)  (0.16269) 
 [ 0.28468] [-0.79954] [-0.84686] [ 0.44155] [ 1.37477] [-0.68185] [ 0.32282] 
        
D_LOG_OIL(-5) -0.052648 -0.037808 -0.068223  0.572253 -0.176183  0.007386  0.076003 
  (0.08497)  (0.15325)  (0.03988)  (0.60357)  (0.14289)  (0.08856)  (0.16121) 
 [-0.61958] [-0.24670] [-1.71084] [ 0.94812] [-1.23301] [ 0.08340] [ 0.47145] 
        
D_LOG_OIL(-6)  0.045761  0.214396 -0.008542 -0.483777 -0.143364  0.068460 -0.173699 
  (0.08450)  (0.15240)  (0.03965)  (0.60020)  (0.14209)  (0.08807)  (0.16031) 
 [ 0.54154] [ 1.40680] [-0.21540] [-0.80602] [-1.00895] [ 0.77735] [-1.08351] 
        
D_LOG_OIL(-7) -0.122181 -2.07E-06  0.107508 -1.007448  0.038634  0.122940  0.093819 
  (0.08443)  (0.15227)  (0.03962)  (0.59969)  (0.14197)  (0.08799)  (0.16017) 
 [-1.44717] [-1.4e-05] [ 2.71342] [-1.67996] [ 0.27213] [ 1.39716] [ 0.58573] 
        
 
-149- 
D_LOG_OIL(-8) -0.077522 -0.054647  0.005375  1.399099  0.003710  0.159071  0.165090 
  (0.08571)  (0.15459)  (0.04022)  (0.60882)  (0.14413)  (0.08933)  (0.16261) 
 [-0.90443] [-0.35350] [ 0.13362] [ 2.29804] [ 0.02574] [ 1.78064] [ 1.01523] 
        
D_LOG_OIL(-9)  0.051498 -0.041934  0.044223 -0.479644 -0.356072 -0.019728 -0.001238 
  (0.08875)  (0.16006)  (0.04165)  (0.63037)  (0.14923)  (0.09250)  (0.16837) 
 [ 0.58028] [-0.26199] [ 1.06183] [-0.76089] [-2.38600] [-0.21328] [-0.00735] 
        
D_LOG_OIL(-10) -0.014052  0.184434 -0.057555 -0.856715  0.107123  0.103288  0.160972 
  (0.08741)  (0.15764)  (0.04102)  (0.62085)  (0.14698)  (0.09110)  (0.16583) 
 [-0.16076] [ 1.16996] [-1.40314] [-1.37992] [ 0.72883] [ 1.13381] [ 0.97073] 
        
D_LOG_OIL(-11) -0.177366 -0.081442 -0.004620  0.488410  0.079533  0.029679  0.094638 
  (0.08880)  (0.16015)  (0.04167)  (0.63073)  (0.14932)  (0.09255)  (0.16847) 
 [-1.99741] [-0.50854] [-0.11087] [ 0.77436] [ 0.53264] [ 0.32068] [ 0.56177] 
        
D_LOG_OIL(-12)  0.034191  0.133390 -0.014742 -0.162565 -0.069876 -0.078947 -0.087153 
  (0.09284)  (0.16743)  (0.04357)  (0.65941)  (0.15611)  (0.09676)  (0.17613) 
 [ 0.36830] [ 0.79668] [-0.33837] [-0.24653] [-0.44761] [-0.81593] [-0.49483] 
        
D_LOG_OIL(-13)  0.136047  0.041554  0.063144  0.190668  0.266263  0.086263  0.059100 
  (0.09035)  (0.16296)  (0.04240)  (0.64178)  (0.15194)  (0.09417)  (0.17142) 
 [ 1.50571] [ 0.25500] [ 1.48919] [ 0.29709] [ 1.75248] [ 0.91604] [ 0.34478] 
        
D_LOG_OIL(-14) -0.120492  0.041422  0.052090  0.501042  0.086499 -0.078113 -0.156953 
  (0.09065)  (0.16349)  (0.04254)  (0.64388)  (0.15243)  (0.09448)  (0.17198) 
 [-1.32922] [ 0.25336] [ 1.22448] [ 0.77817] [ 0.56746] [-0.82679] [-0.91264] 
        
D_LOG_OIL(-15) -0.226949 -0.102411 -0.032205 -0.158238  0.006123 -0.238916 -0.035475 
  (0.08992)  (0.16217)  (0.04220)  (0.63870)  (0.15121)  (0.09372)  (0.17059) 
 [-2.52389] [-0.63148] [-0.76319] [-0.24775] [ 0.04049] [-2.54931] [-0.20795] 
        
D_LOG_OIL(-16)  0.225074 -0.204787  0.049331  0.544747 -0.153132  0.014707  0.165376 
  (0.08687)  (0.15667)  (0.04077)  (0.61702)  (0.14607)  (0.09054)  (0.16480) 
 [ 2.59100] [-1.30714] [ 1.21012] [ 0.88287] [-1.04833] [ 0.16244] [ 1.00348] 
        
D_LOG_OIL(-17)  0.008061 -0.140771 -0.032108 -0.081153  0.112378  0.094656  0.091247 
  (0.08847)  (0.15955)  (0.04152)  (0.62839)  (0.14876)  (0.09220)  (0.16784) 
 [ 0.09112] [-0.88227] [-0.77337] [-0.12915] [ 0.75541] [ 1.02659] [ 0.54366] 
        
D_LOG_OIL(-18) -0.118474 -0.205989 -0.027013  0.038202 -0.157263  0.034902  0.308987 
  (0.08562)  (0.15442)  (0.04018)  (0.60818)  (0.14398)  (0.08924)  (0.16244) 
 [-1.38366] [-1.33391] [-0.67227] [ 0.06281] [-1.09225] [ 0.39111] [ 1.90213] 
        
D_LOG_GASOLINE(-1) -0.033278  0.042656 -0.007111 -0.030728 -0.061260 -0.041025 -0.073558 
  (0.04305)  (0.07764)  (0.02020)  (0.30577)  (0.07239)  (0.04487)  (0.08167) 
 [-0.77303] [ 0.54941] [-0.35201] [-0.10049] [-0.84626] [-0.91437] [-0.90065] 
        
D_LOG_GASOLINE(-2)  0.090725 -0.063979  0.002059 -0.083628 -0.013223  0.052677 -0.017436 
  (0.04002)  (0.07218)  (0.01878)  (0.28425)  (0.06729)  (0.04171)  (0.07592) 
 [ 2.26705] [-0.88643] [ 0.10962] [-0.29420] [-0.19650] [ 1.26296] [-0.22965] 
        
D_LOG_GASOLINE(-3)  0.023958 -0.021494 -0.026686 -0.389792 -0.077043 -0.017326 -0.056677 
  (0.03981)  (0.07179)  (0.01868)  (0.28275)  (0.06694)  (0.04149)  (0.07552) 
 [ 0.60183] [-0.29938] [-1.42850] [-1.37855] [-1.15094] [-0.41760] [-0.75047] 
        
D_LOG_GASOLINE(-4) -0.015372  0.113218  0.014916 -0.138878  0.006722 -0.011311  0.076151 
  (0.03928)  (0.07085)  (0.01843)  (0.27902)  (0.06605)  (0.04094)  (0.07452) 
 [-0.39132] [ 1.59808] [ 0.80912] [-0.49774] [ 0.10176] [-0.27628] [ 1.02182] 
        
D_LOG_GASOLINE(-5) -0.046916  0.011992  0.001842 -0.403404  0.080130  0.036619 -0.220285 
  (0.03922)  (0.07073)  (0.01840)  (0.27854)  (0.06594)  (0.04087)  (0.07440) 
 [-1.19637] [ 0.16956] [ 0.10007] [-1.44826] [ 1.21515] [ 0.89597] [-2.96090] 
        
D_LOG_GASOLINE(-6) -0.020177 -0.017277  0.003189  0.064426  0.023664 -0.031365 -0.023476 
  (0.04127)  (0.07443)  (0.01937)  (0.29313)  (0.06940)  (0.04301)  (0.07830) 
 [-0.48891] [-0.23212] [ 0.16466] [ 0.21978] [ 0.34099] [-0.72921] [-0.29984] 
        
D_LOG_GASOLINE(-7)  0.047678 -0.069677  0.004549  0.624055  0.051641 -0.003399 -0.012927 
  (0.03906)  (0.07045)  (0.01833)  (0.27745)  (0.06568)  (0.04071)  (0.07411) 
 [ 1.22061] [-0.98907] [ 0.24817] [ 2.24927] [ 0.78621] [-0.08349] [-0.17444] 
        
D_LOG_GASOLINE(-8) -0.007341  0.025037  0.016762 -0.348972 -0.050910 -0.037033 -0.152121 
  (0.04051)  (0.07307)  (0.01901)  (0.28777)  (0.06813)  (0.04222)  (0.07686) 
 [-0.18120] [ 0.34266] [ 0.88163] [-1.21269] [-0.74730] [-0.87704] [-1.97916] 
        
D_LOG_GASOLINE(-9)  0.021435  0.063802  0.012628 -0.096411  0.054017  0.031634 -0.137223 
  (0.04088)  (0.07373)  (0.01919)  (0.29038)  (0.06875)  (0.04261)  (0.07756) 
 [ 0.52430] [ 0.86532] [ 0.65822] [-0.33201] [ 0.78575] [ 0.74243] [-1.76923] 
        
D_LOG_GASOLINE(-10) -0.023012  0.062183 -0.017264 -0.421489 -0.120016  0.022703 -0.077406 
 
-150- 
  (0.04296)  (0.07747)  (0.02016)  (0.30512)  (0.07223)  (0.04477)  (0.08150) 
 [-0.53571] [ 0.80264] [-0.85638] [-1.38140] [-1.66150] [ 0.50711] [-0.94982] 
        
D_LOG_GASOLINE(-11)  0.050042 -0.005582  0.000958 -0.123410 -0.041503  0.039824 -0.086929 
  (0.04364)  (0.07870)  (0.02048)  (0.30995)  (0.07338)  (0.04548)  (0.08279) 
 [ 1.14679] [-0.07093] [ 0.04679] [-0.39816] [-0.56561] [ 0.87564] [-1.05005] 
        
D_LOG_GASOLINE(-12) -0.006931  0.004543  0.010937  0.210179  0.038862  0.068517 -0.067044 
  (0.04442)  (0.08012)  (0.02085)  (0.31555)  (0.07470)  (0.04630)  (0.08428) 
 [-0.15601] [ 0.05670] [ 0.52461] [ 0.66608] [ 0.52022] [ 1.47982] [-0.79548] 
        
D_LOG_GASOLINE(-13) -0.021720  0.070891 -0.052201 -0.229531 -0.138208 -0.092555 -0.005200 
  (0.04396)  (0.07929)  (0.02063)  (0.31227)  (0.07393)  (0.04582)  (0.08341) 
 [-0.49406] [ 0.89409] [-2.53021] [-0.73505] [-1.86955] [-2.02000] [-0.06235] 
        
D_LOG_GASOLINE(-14)  0.017950  0.074551  0.017114 -0.280932 -0.046537  0.106825  0.060058 
  (0.04686)  (0.08452)  (0.02199)  (0.33286)  (0.07880)  (0.04884)  (0.08891) 
 [ 0.38305] [ 0.88208] [ 0.77822] [-0.84400] [-0.59057] [ 2.18721] [ 0.67553] 
        
D_LOG_GASOLINE(-15)  0.025469 -0.001744 -0.013660  0.051846 -0.027003 -0.012370 -0.138448 
  (0.04873)  (0.08789)  (0.02287)  (0.34614)  (0.08195)  (0.05079)  (0.09245) 
 [ 0.52264] [-0.01985] [-0.59729] [ 0.14978] [-0.32952] [-0.24356] [-1.49750] 
        
D_LOG_GASOLINE(-16) -0.069968 -0.023351 -0.007185 -0.483534  0.090743  0.016177 -0.102686 
  (0.04991)  (0.09002)  (0.02342)  (0.35452)  (0.08393)  (0.05202)  (0.09469) 
 [-1.40184] [-0.25940] [-0.30677] [-1.36392] [ 1.08119] [ 0.31097] [-1.08444] 
        
D_LOG_GASOLINE(-17) -0.063083  0.071263  0.023256  0.022180  0.102165  0.004872 -0.296011 
  (0.04999)  (0.09016)  (0.02346)  (0.35509)  (0.08406)  (0.05210)  (0.09484) 
 [-1.26187] [ 0.79039] [ 0.99126] [ 0.06246] [ 1.21531] [ 0.09350] [-3.12104] 
        
D_LOG_GASOLINE(-18) -0.045740  0.087685 -0.025139  0.091608 -0.016996 -0.145534 -0.105721 
  (0.04971)  (0.08965)  (0.02333)  (0.35308)  (0.08359)  (0.05181)  (0.09431) 
 [-0.92014] [ 0.97806] [-1.07765] [ 0.25945] [-0.20333] [-2.80906] [-1.12102] 
        
TEMP -3.13E-05  2.64E-05  3.30E-05  0.000597  1.98E-05  1.67E-05 -6.17E-05 
  (6.0E-05)  (0.00011)  (2.8E-05)  (0.00043)  (0.00010)  (6.3E-05)  (0.00011) 
 [-0.52135] [ 0.24394] [ 1.16896] [ 1.39977] [ 0.19558] [ 0.26714] [-0.54144] 
        
        
 R-squared  0.504780  0.482615  0.490639  0.562480  0.439362  0.481441  0.481114 
 Adj. R-squared  0.135563  0.096872  0.110880  0.236281  0.021371  0.094823  0.094251 
 Sum sq. resids  0.039607  0.128830  0.008723  1.998246  0.111994  0.043023  0.142556 
 S.E. equation  0.015309  0.027610  0.007184  0.108738  0.025743  0.015955  0.029043 
 F-statistic  1.367164  1.251131  1.291973  1.724348  1.051127  1.245262  1.243631 
 Log likelihood  900.0232  725.4580  1123.959  319.7115  746.1858  887.7795  710.4748 
 Akaike AIC -5.223129 -4.043635 -6.736211 -1.302105 -4.183688 -5.140402 -3.942397 
 Schwarz SC -3.639766 -2.460272 -5.152848  0.281259 -2.600324 -3.557038 -2.359034 
 Mean dependent -0.001363  0.001882  0.000408 -0.000203  0.000520  0.000286 -0.001002 
 S.D. dependent  0.016465  0.029053  0.007619  0.124427  0.026022  0.016770  0.030517 
        
        
 Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  1.05E-23      
 Determinant resid covariance  2.08E-25      
 Log likelihood  5471.076      
 Akaike information criterion -30.95997      
 Schwarz criterion -19.87643      
        
        
 
 
